Corporate M&A 2022 Comparisons

The Italian M&A market closed a particularly positive year both in terms of number of transactions and turnover. In 2021, 1,165 transactions were closed for a value of approximately EUR98 billion. This is the best year since the 2008 financial crisis.

Never before, in Italy there has been such a high value of investments. In 2021, the deals have been 705 (27.3% more than in 2020) and EUR85.5 billion was invested, 122.1% more than in 2020 where EUR39 billion was invested. According to the economists, the success in 2021 would set the stage for further good performance, also expected in 2022.

The trend of M&A in Italy in 2021 reflects the great performance recorded at a global level: indeed, the 2021 world market closed with an increase of 47% in terms of turnover compared to the previous year, and with more than USD4.4 trillion invested.

In the past 12 months, the best performing sectors in terms of number of deals have been the industrial and chemical sectors (195 deals), the consumer sector (132 deals) and the technology sector (88 deals). Conversely, in terms of value, the infrastructure and construction sector leads the ranking with EUR22,312 million invested, followed by the telecommunications sector with EUR11,897 million and the energy sector with EUR10,583 million.

The energy sector, in terms of value, it exceeded EUR10 billion, with an extremely significant growth compared to the previous years and with investments held by private equity funds. The price of energy supplies has gone up, due to the increase in the cost of raw materials (especially gas) and it is expected to explode because of the current international scenario.

It is also worth mentioning the life science sector, that recorded investments of EUR2 billion, more than double compared to those recorded in 2020. Also in this field, a great boost comes from private equity, even if mainly through add-on operations promoted by companies already in the portfolio, with a strong focus on research centres and laboratories.

In contrast, the lasting effects of the emergency restrictions to fight the COVID-19 pandemic has continued to affect negatively restaurants, tourism and the art (theatres, cinemas, etc).

The means of acquisition of listed companies typically involve a takeover bid, with cash tender offer or, in whole or in part, other considerations such as securities. Takeover bids may be divided into mandatory, and voluntary takeovers. Alternative means of acquisition of both listed and unlisted companies involve direct or reverse merger with the target company.

The means of acquisition of unlisted companies typically involve private negotiations between the parties and the consideration is paid in cash. Several guaranties may be provided upon completion of the transaction depending on the specific needs of the parties involved.

It is also possible for the seller to make a contribution to the activities of interest to the purchaser, to a special-purpose corporate vehicle (SPV) and with the subsequent transfer to the purchaser of the participations in the same SPV.

The consideration mostly used in the transactions is cash, while share deals are rare.

The primary regulators for M&A activity in Italy are:

• the Bank of Italy, which supervises the activities of banks and financial intermediaries;
• the National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange (CONSOB), which supervises all listed company and the market generally;
• the Italian Antitrust Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato or AGCM);
• the Italian Insurance Regulatory Authority (Istituto per la Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni or IVASS);
• the Italian Electronic Communications and Media Authority (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni or AGCOM) in relation to the media and telecommunications industry; and
• the European Central Bank (BCE). 

The "Golden Power" Regime

Among the recent measures put in place by the Italian government to fight the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic is Decree-Law No 23/2020 (the “Liquidity Decree”), which has extended the scope of application of the “Golden Power” regime, a system of special intervention powers of the Italian State already provided for by Decree Law No 21/2012 (the “Golden Power Decree”), the purpose of which is to safeguard strategic sectors of national interest.

The Golden Power regime has gone beyond the former principle of "privileged participation" which assigned the State a "golden share" with special prerogatives and rights (such as influencing the decisions of the companies concerned) and set a new system according to which the State receives certain "Golden Powers" exercisable in the event of extraordinary transactions involving companies operating in national strategic sectors.

The areas of application of the Golden Power regime, as amended by the Liquidity Decree, are defence, national security, energy, transport, communication, and have been gradually expanded with subsequent measures, to include the telecommunications sector and the 5G technology.

See 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments for further information.

Regulatory Shield

In relation to these sectors, a regulatory “shield” has been introduced according to which the Italian government has, inter alia, the right to:

• dictate specific conditions to guarantee the protection of the essential interests of the State;
• veto the adoption of corporate resolutions, mainly concerning:
1. the modification of statutory clauses relating to the transfer of the headquarters or the corporate purpose (oggetto sociale) abroad;
2. mergers;
3. demergers; and
4. dissolution or sales of the company, branches of company, subsidiaries, rights of enjoying or use of tangible and intangible assets, as well as the assumption of constraints that condition their use; and
• oppose the purchase of investments by a subject different from the Italian State or by subjects controlled by the latter, which lead the buyer to exercise, directly or indirectly, also through subsequent acquisitions, through a third party or through related subjects, voting rights that could compromise the interests of defence and national security.

Under Italian Antitrust Law enacted by Law No 287/1990, as amended, all mergers and acquisitions involving undertakings with aggregate turnover in Italy exceeding EUR511 million and when the aggregate domestic turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned exceeds EUR31 million, must be previously notified to and authorised by the Italian Antitrust Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato or AGCM). These are the thresholds published on 22 March 2021 and they are adjusted annually. Both thresholds need to be met to trigger the need for any notification.

In cases where the operation results in a change of the employer for the employees working in the relevant business, the acquirer of a business should take account of the labour law regulations applicable to the transfer of business or going concern. In the case of companies employing more than 15 employees, a prior trade union consultation procedure should be carried out. This is not applicable when the transaction involves the sale of shareholdings, as there will be no change in the employer, unless otherwise provided for by collective bargaining agreements in certain sectors.

The legislation applicable in the period after the operation has been completed to be taken into consideration is the following:

• dismissals (which will vary also according to the date of hiring and the number of employees);
• health and safety at the workplace, including, without limitation, compliance with the anti-COVID-19 protocols;
• part-time work and remote work;
• fixed term employment contracts; and
• compliance with compulsory hiring of disabled employees.

The provisions laid down by collective bargaining agreements at a national and company level should also be taken into consideration, as governing a large part of the employment relationship, including, without limitation, minimum salaries and job levels. 

Under the Golden Power regime, the following acquisitions must be notified to the Prime Minister’s Office (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri) by the purchaser, within ten days, together with any information useful for the general description of the acquisition project in relevant sectors, the purchaser and its area of operation:

• the purchase at any title of shareholdings by foreign parties, including (for a period of time, currently until 31 December 2022) those belonging to the European Union, of such significance as to determine the permanent establishment of the purchaser by reason of the assumption of control of the company whose shareholding is the object of the purchase, pursuant to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code and the Legislative Decree No 58; and
• the purchase of shareholdings by foreign parties not belonging to the European Union which assign a share of voting rights or capital equal to at least 10%, taking into account the shares or units already directly or indirectly owned, and the total value of the investment is equal to or greater than EUR1 million.

Threat of Serious Prejudice

If the purchase of any such assets of strategic importance involves a threat of serious prejudice to the essential interests of Italy or a danger to security or public order then, within 45 days from the said notification, and with a decree of the Prime Minister, the effectiveness of the purchase may be conditional on the purchaser's assumption of commitments aimed at guaranteeing the protection of the aforementioned interests. If the government does not respond during the 45-day period, the transaction is considered authorised under the principle of silence-approval (silenzio assenso).

The government’s assessment on the transaction is based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria and also takes into account any positions expressed by the European institutions. The governmental check is aimed at verifying whether the post-transaction situation is likely to jeopardise the safety and continuity of supplies, plants and essential production chains as well as whether it can, in general, threaten the national interest.

Violations

The violation of the indications or of the procedure, entails the application a penalty which extends from the suspension of voting rights to the nullity of the deeds; in most cases, an administrative sanction is also applied, for an amount up to double the value of the transaction and, in any case, not less than 1% of the turnover achieved by the companies concerned in the last financial year, in addition to the obligation to restore of the status quo ante.

As mentioned in 2.3 Restrictions on Foreign Investments, the most significant legal developments related to M&A are the recent measures extending the scope of application of the “Golden Power” regime, a system of special intervention powers of the Italian State the purpose of which is to safeguard strategic sectors of national interest, enacted by the Golden Power Decree and extended by the Liquidity Decree.

Decree Law No 228 of 30 December 2021 has further extended until 31 December 2022 the scope of application of the obligation to notify the purchase of shareholdings and the related Golden Powers exercisable by the Italian Government including those which result in the assumption of control even by a foreign entity belonging to the European Union.

The extension of such notification obligation concerns:

• strategic assets, including all those connected to the critical factors referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, letters a), b), c), d) and e) of Regulation (EU) 2019/452, including those relating to the financial, credit and insurance sectors; and
• the acquisition of shareholdings, including those which result in the assumption of control by any foreign entity, even belonging to the European Union, as well as those which assign a share of voting rights or capital equal to at least 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 50% to foreign parties not belonging to the European Union, regardless of the assumption of corporate control.

Regulations implementing the Golden Power regime were also enacted by the Italian government with DPCM No 179 of 18 December 2020, concerning the identification of assets and relationships of national interest in the sectors referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 19 March 2019, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1-ter, of the Golden Power Decree, and with DPCM No 180 of 23 December 2020 concerning the identification of assets of strategic importance in the energy, transport and communications sectors, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Golden Power Decree.

Significant changes to takeover legislation in the past 12 months have been enacted with the Liquidity Decree, which extended the scope of application of the Golden Power Decree in an effort to protect Italian assets from hostile takeovers by foreign investors.

Stakebuilding strategies are not so customary in Italy considering, in particular, the entry into force of the Market Abuse Regulation.

In relation to shares, under Article 120 of the Consolidated Act on Finance enacted by Legislative Decree No 58/1998 (TUF), as last amended by Legislative Decree No 49/2019 in force as of 10 June 2019), parties with a shareholding in an issuer of listed shares, having Italy as their home member state, in an amount greater than 3% (5% if the issuer is a SME) must notify the company and CONSOB. Under Article 117 of CONSOB Regulation (the Regulation No 11971/1999, as last amended by Resolution No 21016/2019 in force as of August 2019), parties holding the share capital of a listed company must notify the investee company and CONSOB:

• when the threshold of 3% is exceeded, if the company is not an SME;
• when the thresholds of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50%, 66.6% and 90% are reached or exceeded; and
• when the investment falls below the thresholds indicated above.

In relation to financial instruments:

Under Article 119 of CONSOB Regulation, parties who, directly or through nominees, trustees or subsidiary companies, hold an investment in financial instruments, must disclose to the investee company and to CONSOB when:

• the thresholds of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 66.6% are reached or exceeded; and
• the investment in financial instruments is reduced under the thresholds set forth above.

Under Article 122-bis of CONSOB Regulation, anyone who holds financial instruments to which the appointment of a member of the board of directors or of the board of statutory auditors is reserved, shall inform the issuer and CONSOB if either:

• it is able to elect on its own a member of the board of directors or of the board of statutory auditors, or it ceases to be able to do so; or
• it exceeds, with respect to the aggregate amount of financial instruments issued in the same category, the thresholds of 10%, 25%, 50% and 75%, or falls below such thresholds.

In the case of a tender offer, the main hurdles are:

• any antitrust pre-merger control;
• regulatory approval of the offering document by CONSOB; and
• approval of the financing bank.

The bylaws of a limited number of listed companies provide for limits to share ownership.

Dealings in derivatives are allowed, upon certain conditions as described in 4.5 Filing/Reporting Obligations.

Dealings in derivatives are subject to the condition that net short positions are disclosed if they are greater than 0.1% (and following 0.1% steps). Long positions must also be disclosed in relation to both cash settled and physical delivery instruments, when the aggregate position (inclusive of the shares owned by the investor) crosses (upwards or downwards) 5%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 66.6% of a listed company’s voting capital (no offset with any concurrent short position is allowed).

Any entity that comes to hold a participation greater than 5% (if mandated by CONSOB) 10%, 20% and 25% of the voting capital in a listed company has to disclose the following to CONSOB, the target company and the public: 

• how the acquisition has been financed;
• if it is acting alone or in concert;
• if it intends to increase its participation, acquire the control of the target company or assert an influence over management;
• its intentions with respect to current or future shareholders' agreements; and
• if it intends to propose the expansion of the board or the removal of the directors.

According to the Market Abuse Regulations, a deal must be disclosed when there is a reasonable expectation that the transaction will take place ("reasonable expectation test"). Disclosure may therefore take place prior to the execution of binding documentation, but must specify the effective status of the process.

Market practice on timing of disclosure may differ from legal requirements since the parties may delay disclosure when an early disclosure could jeopardise the negotiations or the completion of the transaction.

The Necessity of Due Diligence

When an M&A transaction is going to be carried out it is very important for a careful legal due diligence to be carried out by specialised outside Legal Counsel. It is usual in an investigation to check the actual contents of a business activity or of some of its aspects, in order to assess them from a legal and economic standpoint. In particular, it consists of gathering, examining and processing documents and information on the business and its parts.

Its fundamental purpose is that of reducing the discrepancies in information between the seller and the potential purchaser on the target of the transaction. By taking a “photograph” of the legal situation of the target business and its main legal risks, potential purchasers can confirm whether or not they are interested in the acquisition, its purpose and feasibility as initially envisaged, and can identify the best possible structure to achieve it. Furthermore, a careful legal due diligence will allow the initial economic valuation, the purchase price and any adjustments of it to be confirmed or corrected, providing a valid support also in the negotiation of the representations and warranties to be requested from the seller.

Broad Scope of Legal Due Diligence

The scope of legal due diligence is very broad, covering the following fields:

• the corporate situation (including prior transactions that may have involved the target company);
• business and financial main contracts;
• the regulatory and administrative situation;
• real estate properties;
• employment matters;
• trade marks and patents;
• insurance; and
• litigation.

Particular care must be taken with respect to litigation, both commenced by the target and that against it, as also in the former case significant contingent liabilities could exist (losing the case and having to bear the legal costs, and also dangerous counterclaims). Furthermore, the investigation should extend not only to pending litigation but also to that threatened.

If listed companies are involved, the scope is usually narrower or has higher materiality thresholds, given the large amount of publicly available information. Normally a legal due diligence is inserted into the negotiation process which has already been started up between the seller and the buyer.

COVID-19

In general terms, the pandemic had an impact on the progress of transactions. Of course, in certain cases, the pandemic specifically affected the due diligence phase during negotiations. This may entail, should the negotiations be resumed after a significant period, the specific need of performing a new due diligence exercise.

It is customary that, during the negotiation phase, the parties, enter into standstills and/or exclusivity agreement. Standstill mechanisms are frequent for transactions involving listed companies. Standstills and exclusivity are considered as valid means useful to protect the specific interests of the parties, which may vary depending on the nature of the transaction. This protection can be obtained either by providing specific clauses in the letter of intent or in a non-disclosure agreement or by entering in separate specific agreements.

Terms and conditions of the offer are set in a definitive agreement and disclosed to the public.

The length of process in acquisition/sale transactions may vary on a case-by-case basis. It really depends on the structure of the transaction and on the complexity of negotiations.

The transactions in 2020 and 2021 experienced several practical delays in terms of length of the entire process, mostly due to the COVID-19 pandemic and relating lockdown measures. In some cases, the implementation of digital means aimed at guarantee the confrontation and negotiations between the parties, notwithstanding the lockdown and social distancing measures, played a crucial role in deals’ positive outcomes.

In addition, from a regulation standpoint, other emergency governmental interventions caused slowdowns in the acquisition/sale processes. In this respect it worth mentioning the Golden Power regulation according to which, subject to certain conditions, it is necessary to submit a notification of the intended investment to the Italian authorities. This notification process may have a delaying impact on the transaction, as a whole.

According to Article 106 of the TUF, whoever has acquired (directly or indirectly) a shareholding in excess of 30% of the ordinary share capital of a publicly listed company is obliged to launch a takeover bid on all the remaining ordinary shares. The obligation also arises for whoever already holds 30% of voting shares and acquires more than 5% of the share capital.

The consideration offered may be cash, existing or new shares or other securities (such as convertible bonds or warrants), or a combination thereof. In the case of mandatory takeover, however, the bidder is required to offer cash payment as an alternative if the offer includes securities that are not traded on any EU Regulated Market.

CONSOB should receive and analyse all necessary documentation relating to the guarantees at least one day before the date of publication of the offer document, as the bidder must provide evidence that the consideration, whether in cash or securities, is available in advance of the acceptance period.

Mandatory takeover bids cannot be subject to any conditions while voluntary bids may be subject to certain terms.

Common conditions to voluntary tender offers are acceptance thresholds, to ensure that the bidder achieves control of the target (or its de-listing), and antitrust/regulatory clearances. The bidder may include a lenders’ waiver to change-of-control provisions under the relevant financing agreements as a condition to the offer.

The usual acceptance threshold is 50% plus one share (to be calculated by also computing any shares already owned by the bidder). The bidder may reserve the right to waive the condition if the acceptance levels allow them to control the target on a de facto basis.

There are no provisions preventing business combination being conditional on the bidder obtaining financing.

The most common security measure is an equity commitment letter from the purchaser’s shareholders to cover the amount of the consideration.

Minority shareholders can be granted a board representation and veto rights aimed at protecting the essential risk profile of their investment covering: 

• extraordinary transactions (mergers, spin-offs, disposals of assets);
• capital increases not at fair market value;
• the assumption of further indebtedness in excess of given thresholds; and
• resolutions of the extraordinary general meeting. 

The above-mentioned veto rights are deemed not to create a joint control with the minority shareholder.

In Italy, the voting right can be exercised by proxy upon certain conditions.

According to the so-called "Cure-Italy" Decreethe following provisions are applicable to shareholders' meetings called by 31 July 2020 or by the date, if later, until which the state of emergency on the national territory – regarding the health risk connected with COVID-19 pandemic – is in force (currently the state of emergency has been extended to 31 March 2022):

Resorting to the Institution of the Appointed Representative

The possibility, for all companies with listed shares, to resort to the institution of the appointed representative pursuant to Article 135-undecies TUF for the exercise of voting rights at ordinary and extraordinary shareholders' meetings, even if any clauses in the By-laws provide otherwise. Moreover, the same companies can also provide in the notice of call that the participation in the meeting is carried out exclusively through the said representative and that they are granted proxies and sub-delegations pursuant to Article 135-novies TUF and as an exception to Article 135-undecies, paragraph 4 TUF.

The above-mentioned provisions also apply to companies admitted to trading on a multilateral trading system and to companies with shares widely distributed among the public.

Obligation to Appoint Said Representative

The obligation for companies with listed shares to appoint the representative referred to above, if they do not adopt remote voting methods, and the power for these companies, in the event that, on the date on which the provisions of the "Cure-Italy" Decree enter into force, a meeting has already been called without the representative having been appointed or remote voting methods having been envisaged, allows the postponement of the meeting or its reconvening.

According to Article 111 TUF, squeeze-out with the forced and simultaneous purchase of all the remaining shares is allowed if the bidder has come to hold at least 95% of the target share capital, after a tender offer on all the target shares. The squeeze-out price is determined by law and is usually equal to the price of the preceding bid.

If the bidder has not reached the squeeze-out threshold (respectively set at 90% and 95%), they may merge the listed target company into a non-listed entity, with the target residual shareholders having a right of withdrawal from the company.

Commitments to tender are common in friendly offers and are usually entered into prior to the launch of the offer itself (less frequently during the offer period). Their execution and contents must be disclosed to the public.

The shareholder is only allowed to withdraw from the commitment to tender the shares in the case of a competing, higher offer.

A bid is made public as soon as the relevant decision has been made by the bidder or the relevant obligation has arisen, provided that they have obtained the financial resources to pay for the consideration.

If the absorbing entity is not listed, the parties to the business combination must make available the following information: 

• the merger plan, which contains the exchange ratio;
• the management bodies’ reports, containing the illustration of the legal and business reasons for the transaction;
• the independent expert’s report on the exchange ratio; and
• the involved entities’ prior annual three accounts and the transaction reference account.

If the absorbing entity is listed and the shares to be issued amount to more than 20% of the share capital, it is also mandatory to publish an information document containing: 

• a description of the combination transaction from a legal and business standpoint;
• the factors of risk in relation to the resulting entity’s business and the shares to be issued;
• a description of the rights attached to the shares to be issued; and
• a certified pro-forma accounts for the combined entity.

All parties involved in a transaction must disclose three prior annual financial statements and transaction reference accounts.

When listed companies are involved, also the pro-forma accounts (to be certified and drawn up in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and the interpretation provided by the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee) are required.

The merger plan is made available to the public.

The manager's/independent experts' reports are disclosed only to the shareholders. If listed companies are involved, all the documentation must be made available to the public. The merger resolutions and implementation act are carried out through public notarial deeds.

The directors of the target company must manage a conflict of “corporate interests”: on the one hand, they must protect the right of shareholders to sell. This right constitutes a “corporate interest” that as such must be facilitated; on the other hand, they must preserve the right of the target company to confidentiality, on penalty of liability under Article 2391, last paragraph and 2392, first paragraph, Italian Civil Code.

The assistance of a specialised Legal Counsel in the due diligence is also important with respect to a possible liability of the directors of the buyer who have decided to acquire a target which then turns out to be detrimental. Since the diligence of the directors under Article 2392, first paragraph, Italian Civil Code, “can never affect management choices […], but only the omission of those precautions, preventive verifications normally required for a choice of this type” (see Court of Cassation, 28 April 1997, No 3652), the performance of an appropriate due diligence must normally be considered to be a mandatory act.

It is not common for board of directors to establish special or ad hoc committees in business combination. Ad hoc committees are formally established only within the more complex transactions; otherwise, the Chief Executive Officer is put in charge of the process and periodically reports to the board. In case of a conflict of interest, eg, in related parties' transactions, the independent/non-related directors must assume a prominent role in the decision-making process.

The target directors in Italy must take a stance on the offer, recommending whether to tender the shares from a financial fairness standpoint (with the help of an independent fairness opinion).  They may take defensive measures (see 9.2 Directors' Use of Defensive Measures) only with the authorisation of a general meeting (in the absence of a prior authorisation under the bylaws).

Under Italian law, a court-appointed independent expert must render a fairness opinion on the combination exchange ratio. Furthermore, the involved entities’ directors may retain their own advisers on a voluntary basis.

Director’s conflict of interest represents one of the most common subjects of corporate litigation in Italy. Referring to listed companies, CONSOB sometimes opens investigations to verify compliance with the related parties' transaction rules.

Hostile takeovers are rarely carried out in Italy. The TUF admits friendly as well as hostile takeover bids. 

Directors of the target company can take defensive measures, ie, any measure to prevent or frustrate the success of the takeover. This type of action is aimed at raising the costs or reducing the benefits for the bidder and can be adopted by the target before or after the bid has been launched. The TUF regulates defensive measures in principle but does not provide any rules detailing cases or circumstances which would amount to defensive measures.

The effectiveness of defensive measures is affected by the “passivity rule” (ie, any defensive action in response to an offer must first be approved by the target company’s shareholders under Article 104 of the TUF) and by the “breakthrough” (ie, restrictions on voting rights and limitations on the transfer of securities shall have no effect, under Article 104-bis of the TUF).

Typical defensive measures available to the company are:

• share capital increase by the target company, or the purchasing of its own shares by the target company;
• conversion of ordinary shares into other financial instruments, or merger with other companies;
• sale of assets; and
• awarding “golden handshakes” to the target’s directors if they are removed from office.

Listed companies have the right to waive the passivity rule, in whole or in part, by amending their articles of association and by communicating this decision to CONSOB. While the offeror’s board of directors acts independently, that of the target would need the previous authorisation of the shareholders’ meeting in order to take defensive measures.

The defensive measures described above have not changed as a result of the pandemic.

When the directors enact defensive measures, they have to obtain the prior authorisation of the general meeting (in the absence of a prior blanket authorisation under the bylaws).

The position of the directors on the bid and their recommendation on whether to offer the shares from a financial equity point of view are not binding on the shareholders or on the bidder. If they seek to take defensive measures, in the absence of prior authorisation under the bylaws, the directors must obtain prior authorisations from the general meeting.

Within the field of M&A deals referring to non-listed companies, arbitration is more frequent than litigation. Litigation in connection with M&A is not common in Italy.

M&A litigation takes place after the closing, usually within the next two years.

Unlike in 2020, where there have been certain delays also in jurisdictional activities, an increase in disputes  occurred in the  second part of 2021 when court activities have bit by bit reinstated on a regular basis. The main lesson learned is that the search for a settlement agreement by the parties turns out to be the best solution, especially when the dispute has dragged on for a long time.

The scenario that has emerged following the outbreak of COVID-19 and the resulting greater market volatility has widened the operating space for greater shareholder activism.

The focus of activism is aimed at obtaining a better overall management of the investee company, direct representation on the board or an increase in the price of the takeover bid.

Sometimes activists publish a manifesto recommending that the company make certain transactions that, in their view, would raise stock prices. Their aim is to pursue a better overall management and board representation.

Activism has not been considerably affected by the pandemic, considering the broad alternative means offered by the social media for this purpose.

Activists have tried to interfere with ongoing transactions through proxy struggles and litigation, attempting to block the implementation of a transaction or obtain a raise in the takeover bid price.