International arbitration is increasingly the preferred method of resolving international disputes in Mauritius. However, for domestic disputes, parties have a preference to resort to the courts, although parties do opt for purely domestic arbitration.
International disputes arise mainly in the context of investments made abroad by companies incorporated in Mauritius, especially where the investors and operating companies are based in different jurisdictions and choose Mauritius as a neutral arbitration seat with an established legislative framework.
With the lifting of travel restrictions in and out of Mauritius, parties are now attending arbitration proceedings in person. Nonetheless, with the experience gathered during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a greater use of IT in arbitration proceedings.
Most international arbitrations are related to the following:
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) are the arbitral institutions most commonly used for international arbitration because parties are of the view that they offer a combination of the best features, such as maximum flexibility to agree on procedural matters, speed and efficiency in the appointment of arbitrators, means of reducing delays and counteracting delaying tactics, costs computed without regard to the amounts in dispute, and best results on service delivered.
The principal arbitration institutions based in Mauritius are the MCCI Mediation and Arbitration Centre (MARC), the Mauritius International Arbitration Centre (MIAC) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Initially, MARC was designed for local arbitration but has gained prominence in matters of international arbitration.
Disputes related to domestic arbitrations are heard by the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court. There are no specific courts designed to hear disputes related to local arbitrations.
Section 42 of the international Arbitration Act (IAA) gives special jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, which is composed of three judges to hear disputes arising under the IAA.
International arbitration in Mauritius is governed by the IAA, which is based largely on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Section 2B of the IAA provides that, in applying and interpreting it and in developing the law applicable to international arbitration in Mauritius, regard shall be had to, inter alia:
There have been no significant changes to the national arbitration law of late.
In relation to an “international arbitration” within the meaning of the IAA, Section 4 therein provides that the arbitration agreement must be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or other legal instrument, or in the form of a separate agreement, and shall be in writing.
With respect to international arbitration, there is no specific provision in the IAA that deals with the question of arbitrability, except that Sections 39(b)(i) and (ii) provide that the subject matter of the dispute must be capable of being settled by arbitration under Mauritius law, and the award should not be in conflict with the public policy of Mauritius.
In the case of Betamax [2021], the Privy Council reasserted the principles of arbitrability and the freedom of parties to resort to arbitration.
The Betamax Case
In mid-2019, the Supreme Court of Mauritius delivered its judgment in the case of State Trading Corporation v Betamax [2019 SCJ 154], wherein the Court had set aside an arbitral award on the ground of public policy. In the judgment, which is the first of its kind since the IAA came into force, the Supreme Court found that, while setting aside an award in Mauritius, courts need to have regard to the domestic public policy of the state rather than the international public policy of that state, and a contract entered into in violation of the public procurement laws of Mauritius is contrary to public policy, so the courts cannot give effect to such an award through recognition and enforcement.
On 24 June 2019, the Supreme Court of Mauritius granted permission to Betamax to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. On 14 June 2021, the Privy Council delivered its judgment in Betamax v State Trading Corp (Mauritius) [2021] UKPC 14. The judgment provides important guidance on the setting aside of arbitral awards on grounds of public policy where a contract is alleged to be illegal.
The Privy Council held as follows:
Since the inception of the IAA, there has not been any court decision on which subject matters are arbitrable, but it can be said that any matter that is not capable of being litigated cannot equally be a subject matter of arbitration. Nevertheless, generally, matters involving public order and the status of the person cannot be subject to arbitration.
Section 5(2) of the IAA provides that the Supreme Court must refer the parties to arbitration unless a party shows, on a prima facie basis, that there is a very strong probability that the arbitration agreement may be null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in which case it shall itself proceed finally to determine whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
The position is explained in UBS AG v The Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd [2016 SCJ 43], in which the Supreme Court held the following: “The principle is that the court must refer the matter to arbitration, that is, it must give the arbitrator the opportunity to decide the jurisdictional issue first, unless the party who is objecting to the matter being referred to arbitration discharges the burden, which has been placed squarely on him, by showing that there is a very strong probability of the arbitration agreement being null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in which case the Court will then have to proceed to finally determine whether the arbitration agreement is in fact so. The burden put in this way means that the hurdle has been set high since the objecting party has to satisfy, on a prima facie basis, the very high threshold imposed by the 'very strong probability' standard.”
The Supreme Court is inclined to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement when determining the governing law in arbitration proceedings. Where the arbitration agreement is silent on the governing law, the law of the seat of arbitration will apply.
Section 20(2) of the IAA recognises the principle of the separability of the arbitration clause, so the arbitration clause is treated as an agreement that is independent of the other clauses of a contract. The arbitration clause in a contract shall not be affected if the contract is declared null and void.
Section 12(2) of the IAA provides that the parties are free to agree on the procedure for appointing the arbitral tribunal.
Section 12(4) of the IAA provides that, if the chosen method fails, any party to arbitration – including in cases of multi-party arbitrations – may request the PCA to take any measures necessary, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment.
With respect to arbitration agreements governed by Mauritian law, the Mauritian Code de Procédure Civile allows a party to apply to a judge of the Supreme Court for the appointment procedure if the arbitration agreement fails to provide for such.
The IAA does not provide for the intervention of the Mauritius courts in the selection of arbitrators. Section 2A of the IAA expressly provides that no court shall intervene in matters governed by the IAA, except where so provided in the IAA.
As stated under 4.2 Default Procedures, a party may make a request to the PCA, which may give directions as to the making of any necessary appointments, direct that the arbitral tribunal be constituted by such appointments, revoke any appointment already made, appoint or reappoint any or all of the arbitrators, and designate any arbitrator as the presiding arbitrator (Section 12(6) of the IAA).
Section 13(3) of the IAA provides that an arbitrator may be challenged only if there are justifiable doubts regarding their impartiality or independence, or if they do not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.
Section 14 of the IAA provides that, unless the parties have agreed on a procedure for challenging an arbitrator, a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator must send a written statement of the reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal within 15 days of becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or of any circumstance referred to in Section 13(3); unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws from their office or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal will decide on the challenge.
Section 16 of the IAA provides that the appointment of a substitute arbitrator should be in accordance with the procedure that applied to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.
Sections 13(1) and (2) of the IAA provide that an arbitrator must disclose any circumstance that is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence from the time that they are approached in connection with the possible appointment, and throughout the arbitral proceedings.
The principal arbitration institutions based in Mauritius are the MARC, MIAC and PCA, which have similar rules as under the IAA with respect to the duty of arbitrators to disclose potential conflicts of interest.
Under the IAA, a dispute is not arbitrable if the subject matter thereof is not capable of settlement by arbitration under Mauritian law, or where the Supreme Court finds that the award in the arbitration agreement is in conflict with public policy.
Section 20 of the IAA provides that an arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including on any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court can address issues of the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in two circumstances.
Pursuant to Section 39 of the IAA, upon an application made by a party, the Court can set aside an award made by the arbitral tribunal for reasons set out therein, including where the Court is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is not valid, that the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by – or not falling within the terms of – the submission to arbitration or contains a decision on a matter that is beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, or that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under Mauritius law.
Furthermore, Section 40 of the IAA provides that the New York Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement of awards rendered under the IAA. Pursuant to Article V of the New York Convention, recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused on similar grounds as provided in Section 39 of the IAA.
To date, there has not been any decision whereby the Supreme Court of Mauritius has reviewed negative rulings on jurisdiction by arbitral tribunals.
Parties have the right to go to court to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal after an award has been rendered – see 3.3 National Courts' Approach. The court will give the arbitral tribunal the opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction first.
The IAA does not provide for a standard of review but, in the case of Betamax [2021], the Privy Council highlighted that courts should be very careful before interfering with an arbitrator's findings of facts and law.
Section 5 of the IAA provides that the court should automatically transfer the action to the Supreme Court when a party contends that the action brought before a court is the subject of an arbitration agreement, provided that said party makes such request no later than when submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute. The Supreme Court then decides on a prima facie basis if there is a very strong probability that the arbitration agreement may be null and void.
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in a number of cases has been to stay the court proceedings where it is not satisfied on a prima facie basis that there is a very strong probability that the arbitration agreement may be null and void.
The IAA does not provide for an arbitral tribunal to assume jurisdiction over any third parties.
Section 21 of the IAA provides that, unless agreed otherwise by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may grant interim relief measures for the following:
Section 22 of the IAA provides that, upon the application of a party, the Supreme Court shall enforce an interim measure granted by an arbitral tribunal.
Section 23 of the IAA further provides that the Supreme Court has the power to issue interim measures upon the application of a party, and shall exercise that power in such a manner as to support and not disrupt the existing or contemplated arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, the Court shall act only if or to the extent that the arbitral tribunal – and any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with power in that regard – has no power or is unable for the time being to act effectively.
Section 21(1)(e) of the IAA provides that the arbitral tribunal may order security for costs.
The IAA does not expressly provide that the Supreme Court can order security for costs in relation to arbitral proceedings. However, by virtue of its wide powers to grant interim measures under Section 23 of the IAA, the Court is able to make an order for security for costs if the arbitral tribunal or institution is unable to do so at a given time (eg, before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal).
The IAA provides certain rules governing the procedure for arbitration in Mauritius.
Section 26 of the IAA provides the following, inter alia:
Section 24 of the IAA provides that every arbitral tribunal must treat the parties with equality and give them reasonable opportunity to present their case and adopt procedures that are suitable to the circumstances of the case, avoiding unnecessary delay and expense, so as to provide a fair and efficient means for the resolution of the dispute between the parties. Subject to the IAA, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, and may determine all procedural and evidential matters.
Section 31 of the IAA provides that, unless agreed otherwise by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may be represented in the arbitral proceedings by a law practitioner or another person chosen by the party, who does not need to be qualified to practise law in Mauritius or any other jurisdiction.
Section 24(3) of the IAA provides that, failing an agreement between the parties, the arbitral tribunal may determine all procedural and evidential matters, including the following:
The IAA does not provide for any specific rules of evidence to apply to arbitral proceedings seated in Mauritius. Please see 8.1 Collection and Submission of Evidence.
Section 29 of the IAA provides that the Supreme Court may issue a witness summons to compel the attendance of any person before an arbitral tribunal to give evidence or produce documents or other material, or may order any witness to submit to examination on oath before the arbitral tribunal or before an officer of the Court or any person for the use of the arbitral tribunal. The Supreme Court will do so in accordance with its rules on the taking of evidence. According to such rules, every person who is competent to give evidence is also compellable, and is not excluded by reason of being a party to the action (Section 163 of the Courts Act).
The IAA makes no specific provision in relation to the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. In practice, the requirement of confidentiality is provided in the arbitration agreement and/or the rules of the arbitral institution.
Section 36 of the IAA provides that an arbitral award must be made in writing and signed by the arbitrator or, in arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, by the majority of all members of the arbitral tribunal or by the presiding arbitrator alone where there is no majority (unless otherwise agreed by the parties), provided that the reason for any omitted signature is stated.
An award must state the reasons on which it is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an award on agreed terms.
An award must also state the date on which it was made.
Section 33 of the IAA provides that, unless agreed otherwise by the parties, the arbitral tribunal has the following attributes:
The parties are entitled to recover interest and legal costs, pursuant to Sections 33(1)(d) and (2) of the IAA.
The general principles are that costs should follow the event, except where it appears to the arbitral tribunal that this rule should not apply or not apply fully in the circumstances of the case, and that the successful party should recover a reasonable amount that reflects the actual costs of the arbitration and not only a nominal amount (see Section 33(2)(a) of the IAA).
Section 39 of the IAA provides that a party may apply to the Supreme Court to set aside an arbitral award, within three months of receiving the award. The grounds for setting aside an arbitral award are largely similar to the ones provided in the New York Convention, on the basis of which a court can refuse to recognise and enforce an award.
Parties may also provide in the arbitration agreement that, notwithstanding Section 39 of the IAA, any party can appeal to the Supreme Court on any question of Mauritius law arising out of an award, with leave of the Court (see paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the IAA).
Parties cannot agree to exclude the application of Section 39 of the IAA, nor to expand the scope of the optional appeal under the First Schedule to the IAA.
An appeal (if provided for in the arbitration clause) will only concern a question of Mauritius law if it includes an error of law that involves an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law but does not include any questions regarding the following:
See 5.5 Standard of Judicial Review for Jurisdiction/Admissibility and Betamax [2021].
Mauritius is a party to the New York Convention, with no reservations.
In accordance with rule 15 of the Supreme Court (International Arbitration Claims) Rules 2013, an application for the recognition and enforcement of an award must be made by way of a motion supported by written evidence in the form of an affidavit or witness statement. It must initially be made without notice to the respondent. Upon receipt of the application, the Chief Justice may issue a provisional order granting recognition of the award or authorising the enforcement of the award in the same manner as a judgment of the Court.
Within 14 days of receiving the provisional order, the applicant must cause the application and the provisional order to be served on the respondent and on any additional party as may be ordered by the Chief Justice. Thereafter, a respondent may apply to set aside the provisional order within 14 days (or such other period as may be allowed by the Court if service must be effected outside the jurisdiction). The award will not be enforced until the end of the period given to the respondent in which to apply to set it aside, or until the disposal of such application made by the respondent.
The Supreme Court has not yet made any pronouncement regarding an award that is the subject of a set-aside proceeding at the seat. However, it appears that nothing precludes a party in whose favour an award has been delivered from initiating enforcement procedures in Mauritius, notwithstanding set-aside proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Mauritius is inclined to give effect to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award, unless there are compelling reasons not to do so.
The Supreme Court has consistently adopted the approach of scrutinising the grounds put forward by an applicant for the setting aside of an arbitral award, with the pronouncement in Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Limited & Anor [2014] reflecting this rigid approach: “In our view, a respondent should not raise an objection to the recognition of a foreign award under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention injudiciously. Essentially, the respondent has to show with precision and clarity in what way and to what extent enforcement of the award would have an adverse bearing on a particular international public policy of this country. Not only must the nature of the flaw in the arbitration proceedings be unambiguously described but a specific public policy must be identified and established by the party relying on it.”
In State Trading Corporation v Betamax [2019], on the issue of public policy, the Supreme Court held that: “The breach of the legal provisions must be flagrant, actual and concrete. But it is not any legal breach which would suffice to set aside the enforcement of an award. The threshold is quite high; it should be the breach of a fundamental legal principle, a breach which disregards the essential and broadly recognised values which form part of the basis of the national legal order, and a departure from which will be incompatible with the State’s legal and economic system.” In that judgment, it was confirmed that the IAA does not refer to international public policy but expressly provides that the arbitral award may be set aside where the Court finds that “the award is in conflict with the public policy of Mauritius.” It is clear therefore that the public policy is the domestic public policy of Mauritius.
While it is not possible under Mauritius law to initiate class action proceedings before a court in Mauritius, the IAA does not preclude the possibility of class action arbitration or group arbitration. To date, no recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award under a class action arbitration or group arbitration has been sought in Mauritius, and the Supreme Court of Mauritius has not been called upon to deliver judgment or clarification in that regard. However, following the reasoning in the judgment of State Trading Corporation v Betamax [2019], the Supreme Court of Mauritius may refuse to grant the recognition and enforcement of an award under a class action arbitration or group arbitration on the ground that the award is in conflict with the public policy of Mauritius, viewed in the domestic Mauritian context.
Counsel and attorneys should abide by their respective Code of Ethics during arbitration proceedings carried out in Mauritius. However, there are no ethical codes or other professional standards that apply to arbitrators in Mauritius; the ethical rules of the arbitral tribunal, if any, will apply.
Third-party litigation funding is permitted in Mauritius, although it is neither provided for nor prohibited by any legislation, nor otherwise regulated. Third-party litigation funding is not common, and has not been the subject of any judicial pronouncement.
Under the First Schedule to the IAA, an arbitral tribunal with its seat in Mauritius can consolidate separate arbitral proceedings where the parties are licensed Global Business Companies. In all other cases, the First Schedule to the IAA will only apply where the parties have so agreed by making express reference to that Schedule or to specific provisions. The consolidation of separate arbitral proceedings can be ordered under the First Schedule in the following circumstances:
Regardless of whether it is domestic or foreign, a party can only be bound by an arbitration agreement if that party is privy to that arbitration agreement, and it will be bound by an award if it has been joined as a party to the arbitration proceedings. Likewise, decisions of the courts of Mauritius will only apply to a party, whether domestic or foreign, if it has been joined as a party to the court proceedings and duly summoned to attend court.
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rp@bc.intnet.mu www.benoitchambers.comInternational Arbitration in Mauritius
There have been exciting developments in the Mauritian arbitration world over the last several years. This article will provide an update on the latest developments in the Flashbird v CSPI saga, discussing the recent judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC).
Flashbird v CSPI
In its judgment, the JCPC provides much guidance on the interpretation of hybrid arbitration clauses and explains that the arbitration clause, which in that case mentioned both the MARC (the ADR arm of the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules, was in fact a MARC clause and not an ICC one. In so doing, the JCPC confirmed the international validity of a MARC award, which the Paris Court of Appeal and the French Cour de cassation have refused to enforce in France.
This development therefore crystallises the divergence between the JCPC’s approach and that of the French courts, which refused to enforce the MARC award on the basis that the arbitration clause was an ICC clause.
This profound divergence inevitably leads to the question of whether the outcomes in Hilmarton, Putrabali, Dallah and Kabab-Ji were truly the result of a pro-arbitration stance by French courts or whether they were mere coincidences or anomalies.
Indeed, this decision adds much to the debate revolving around the Hilmarton, Putrabali, Dallah and Kabab-Ji paradigms, where awards set aside at the seat had been enforced by the French courts or where awards upheld by the French courts had not been enforced elsewhere; these paradigms had been put forward by some as an indicator of whether any given court or legal system was "pro-arbitration" or not.
In rejecting Flashbird’s appeal, the JCPC upheld the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mauritius refusing to set aside the MARC award on the ground that the composition of the arbitral tribunal and/or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties under section 39(2)(a)(iv) of the Mauritian International Arbitration Act.
Background
The matter involved an arguably pathological, or hybrid, but certainly poorly drafted arbitration clause that had been the basis of two parallel arbitrations being administered by different arbitral institutions, and which had led to separate setting aside and enforcement proceedings in relation to both parallel awards.
The dispute arose out of a consultancy contract relating to a Build-Operate-Transfer project for security and safety services at international airports in Madagascar. In the first paragraph of the arbitration clause, the parties had made reference to the MARC, whereas in its second paragraph they had referred to the “arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce”.
CSPI commenced arbitration before the MARC.
Flashbird’s objection and parallel ICC arbitration
Upon the MARC’s appointment of a sole arbitrator, Flashbird raised the objection that the arbitral tribunal should have been constituted with three arbitrators instead of one.
This objection was subsequently rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, which acts as the default appointing authority under the Mauritian International Arbitration Act.
Flashbird did not participate for several months. Towards the end of the MARC proceedings, it commenced parallel arbitration against CSPI before the ICC.
The MARC award
The MARC arbitrator’s interpretation of the arbitration clause was that the parties had mistakenly referred to the ICC Rules and that they had meant to go to arbitration before the MARC under its Règlement d’arbitrage, the MARC Rules. In his reasoning, this was the only explanation to give useful effect to the clause.
In making this determination, the MARC arbitrator had referred, inter alia, to the fact that Article 2 of the ICC Rules did not sit well with an arbitration being administered by a different institution, and that Article 2 of the MARC Rules provided for their application where the parties had chosen the MARC as an arbitral institution.
With the MARC arbitrator having given an award in favour of CSPI, Flashbird brought proceedings before the Supreme Court in Mauritius to set the award aside. Flashbird contended that the arbitration should have been considered to be a hybrid arbitration so that the MARC should have applied the ICC Rules and that, had the ICC Rules been applied, the tribunal would have consisted of a panel of three arbitrators.
The Mauritian Supreme Court’s decision
Rejecting Flashbird’s application to set aside the MARC award, the Mauritian Supreme Court held that Flashbird had not been able to establish that three arbitrators instead of one would have been appointed under the ICC Rules, given that the presumption under those rules was that, where there is no agreement between the parties as to the number of arbitrators, a sole arbitrator is appointed by the court unless the ICC court finds that the dispute warrants the appointment of three arbitrators.
It further held that Flashbird also had to demonstrate that the alleged irregularity had caused “substantial prejudice” in order for the award to be set aside, and that it had not been able to do so.
Ironically, throughout the proceedings at first instance, it had not come to light that the ICC had itself appointed a sole arbitrator in applying its own rules in the parallel arbitration commenced by Flashbird. The Mauritian Supreme Court had, in its judgment, highlighted Flashbird’s failure to adduce evidence in that regard.
The JCPC’s decision
Flashbird appealed to the JCPC on four grounds. Two of those grounds were not considered because they had not been raised before the Supreme Court, did not fall within the exceptional category of case identified in Baker v The Queen [1975] AC 774, and could not in any event be established on the limited evidential material before the JCPC.
The two other grounds were taken together and consisted of the contention that the arbitration clause was a hybrid clause and that the arbitration, and in particular the constitution of the tribunal, should have been conducted in accordance with the ICC Rules.
The appeal was heard by Lord Briggs, Lady Arden, Lord Hamblen, Lord Leggatt and Lady Rose. In its judgment, delivered by Lord Hamblen, the JCPC upheld the Supreme Court’s approach.
The JCPC agreed that there was no need to rule on the proper interpretation of the arbitration agreement because Flashbird had failed to establish that:
The JCPC further observed that “there is force in the arbitrator’s conclusion that the second paragraph of the clause should be interpreted as referring to MARC rules” before listing no fewer than six reasons in support of that conclusion.
The JCPC also gave some guidance as to the interpretation of hybrid arbitration clauses, explaining that, whilst it is possible to agree to a “hybrid” arbitration clause, there are manifest complications and disadvantages in doing so, and clear words are required to establish such an agreement.
The enforcement proceedings in France
It is puzzling to note that the French Court of Appeal had overruled the reasoning of the MARC arbitrator for having retained jurisdiction under MARC Rules and the Mauritius-based MARC, and decided that the matter should have been submitted to ICC arbitration and the ICC, based in Paris, when the arbitration clause specifically referred to the MARC in its first paragraph.
The French Court of Appeal adopted the view that the parties had merely “declared” that Mauritius had an arbitral institution in its first paragraph, contrary to the approach of the MARC arbitrator who instead gave useful effect to that reference in establishing the parties’ common intention. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why parties would be minded to “declare” the existence of an arbitral institution in Mauritius in a Madagascar-related contract if they did not wish their arbitration to be administered by that institution.
Besides, Flashbird had evidently not challenged the MARC as arbitral institution before the courts of the seat of arbitration. The only criticism levelled by Flashbird before the Mauritian Supreme Court was the absence of the appointment of three arbitrators. As it turns out, the subsequent parallel ICC arbitration itself led to the ICC appointing a sole arbitrator. No complaint had been made by Flashbird against the MARC arbitrator nor with regard to any other difference between the MARC Rules and ICC Rules that might have adversely affected its interests.
CSPI appealed to the French Cour de cassation against the judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal refusing to recognise and enforce the MARC award in France. The Cour de cassation simply rejected the appeal without giving reasons.
The French outcome may call into question the French pro-arbitration stance often claimed on the bases of Hilmarton, Putrabali, Dallah and Kabab-Ji, which now seem to be mere coincidences or anomalies resulting from French law’s attempt to move away from the widely accepted territoriality principle and to entirely delocalise international arbitration.
The parallel ICC award
As for the parallel ICC arbitration commenced by Flashbird, the sole ICC arbitrator gave an award in favour of Flashbird a few months after the Supreme Court had upheld the MARC award.
CSPI commenced setting aside proceedings against the ICC award before the Mauritian Supreme Court on various grounds, including that the ICC arbitrator had no jurisdiction and that the ICC award conflicted with the MARC award, which had already decided the dispute and should be treated as final. The Supreme Court’s judgment is awaited.
CSPI has also applied to set aside a French exequatur order of the ICC award, which had automatically been granted in accordance with French procedural rules. This application has been made on similar grounds to those raised in support of its application to set aside the ICC award before the Mauritian Supreme Court. The matter has been stayed before the Paris Court of Appeal pending the decision of the Mauritian Supreme Court.
Future developments
As was concluded in last year’s edition, “the next episodes in the CSPI v Flashbird saga promise to deliver even more thrills and spills one way or another.”
[The above views are those of the author, who wishes to disclose his role as counsel for CSPI.]
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