The Mexican power industry, similar to in other jurisdictions, is comprised of generation, transmission, distribution, commercialisation and supply activities, as well as the planning and control of the National Electric System (Sistema Eléctrico Nacional) and the administration and operation of the Wholesale Electricity Market (Mercado Eléctrico Mayorista).
The main laws that govern the Mexican power industry are the following:
According to applicable law, the generation, commercialisation and supply of power is open to private investment and subject to a free competition regime. In that context, state-owned utilities still own a significant number of power generation assets and serve a substantial portion of the load across Mexico. On the other hand, planning and control of the National Electric System and transmission and distribution activities are considered public services and “strategic areas” reserved to the State. Private companies are not allowed to participate in such reserved activities, but may be contracted or may associate with governmental entities to finance, construct and operate transmission and distribution infrastructure.
The power industry structure is established in the Mexican Constitution, which defines the functions and roles of the main industry agencies, regulators and operators.
The CRE is the autonomous regulator of the power industry (although it is co-ordinated by the Ministry of Energy (Secretaría de Energía, SENER) which, in turn, is the governmental agency responsible for energy policy.
The SENER is an agency of the executive power in charge of defining and implementing the energy policy which must, at all times, respect the constitutional principles that govern the energy sector.
The National Centre of Energy Control (Centro Nacional de Control de Energía, CENACE) is a decentralised governmental entity in charge of the planning and control of the National Electric System as well as the administration and operation of the Wholesale Electricity Market.
The principal state-owned entity in the Mexican power industry is the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE). The CFE’s generation subsidiaries own the majority of the power plants in Mexico, whereas the CFE Suministrador de Servicios Básicos (a power supply subsidiary of the CFE) is the main load-serving entity in the country, especially for domestic end users. The CFE Transmisión and CFE Distribución (which are also wholly owned subsidiaries of the CFE) own the transmission and distribution infrastructure required for providing the transmission and distribution public services. Even though the CFE is a key player in the Mexican power industry, there are also multiple private power generation and supply companies that participate in the market. Among others, Iberdrola, Enel, EDF, Mitsui, Acciona and Ammper have become major stakeholders within the power sector.
Pursuant to applicable laws and regulations, foreign investment is allowed to participate in power generation, commercialisation and supply activities with no restrictions. As a result, there are no power-industry-specific foreign investment review processes or limit thresholds.
If certain foreign investment protection standards are breached by the Mexican government, foreign investors may validly file claims under investment arbitration proceedings to demand damages and losses from the Mexican government in accordance with international treaties entered into by Mexico. While foreign investors also have access to domestic courts, it is more common for their Mexican subsidiaries to exercise legal actions in local courts against private third parties (for example, civil/commercial lawsuits under commercial agreements) or governmental authorities (especially constitutional challenges named juicios de amparo).
The Federal Economic Competition Commission (Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica, COFECE) is the constitutional autonomous entity responsible for the oversight of free competition in markets such as power generation and supply.
The Federal Economic Competition Law (Ley Federal de Competencia Económica) is the main law in connection with free competition and antitrust-related matters. Pursuant to this law, mergers and acquisitions (including in the context of the power industry) are subject to the filing of a notice with the COFECE in the event that the relevant transaction exceeds at least one of certain statutory thresholds set forth by law, regardless of whether such a transaction presents a competitive concern or not.
As a result, the information required to determine whether a transaction is notifiable consists of:
It is important to consider that the fact that a transaction is not notifiable under the above criteria does not limit the COFECE’s power to investigate and analyse such a transaction. If the COFECE considers that the concentration under investigation is contrary to the provisions of the Federal Economic Competition Law, it may order the partial or total disinvestment of the concentrated assets, as well as the imposition of other sanctions.
If the relevant merger or acquisition does not affect or change the characteristics of the generation assets or activities, which are regulated by the energy laws and are the subject matter of a permit, the approval of the energy regulator is not required.
As explained in 1.2 Principal State-Owned or Investor-Owned Entities, the CENACE is responsible for the planning and control of the National Electric System – which includes the power and responsibility to ensure the reliability, sustainability, continuity, quality and safety of the grid in order to adequately cover power demand. The CENACE also participates in the preparation of grid expansion and modernisation plans together with the SENER, CRE and CFE.
The executive submitted an initiative to amend the Constitution to reinstate a state monopoly in the power sector. According to the President’s proposal, the CFE would be the centre of the power industry and be in charge of all of the activities in the sector, leaving private generators a limited participation of up to 49% of the required supply. The initiative was rejected by Congress last April and did not come into effect.
On a separate action, the Mexican Supreme Court resolved a constitutional recourse (acción de inconstitucionalidad) submitted by certain members of the Mexican Senate against the reform to the Power Industry Law enacted in March 2021 (the “LIE reform”) which was considered unconstitutional as it intended to increase, without justification, the participation of the CFE in power generation activities and, among other changes, eliminated the obligation of the CFE to purchase power under competitive processes, and changed the dispatch order cancelling the economic merit principle, giving priority to the CFE’s plants, regardless of their higher cost or technology. These changes breached anti-monopolistic and free competition principles established in the Mexican Constitution. The Supreme Court did not reach the required majority (8 out of 11 votes) to declare the LIE reform unconstitutional; thus, the recourse was dismissed. However, there are hundreds of amparo lawsuits submitted by the affected sector participants that are still pending resolution by Mexican lower courts. Their resolutions will determine the ultimate outcome of the LIE reform.
Additionally, the CRE has recently issued two controversial regulations regarding:
Consistent with prior actions that intend to limit private participation in the sector, both of these new regulations seem to establish additional burdens and restrictions for new power generation projects.
The current policy of the Mexican government has not changed since the beginning of its term in 2018. Strengthening the CFE, as the publicly owned utility service, and reducing the participation of private investment in the power sector has been the main focus of the Mexican government’s energy policy, and is expected to continue that way for the remainder of the administration.
Considering that utility-scale power generation projects have been subject to multiple regulatory restrictions and de facto boycotts for the purposes of their development, construction and commissioning, distributed generation has become a legally, technically and financially feasible alternative for end users to both reduce their power bills and contribute to the fight against climate change. This alternative has not been challenged by the power authorities and the federal government.
The Wholesale Electricity Market is administered and operated by the CENACE as the independent system operator. The Wholesale Electricity Market is essentially comprised of a Short-Term Energy Market (where energy and ancillary services are sold/purchased) and a Capacity Market. Energy and capacity may also be transferred and acquired by means of bilateral hedging agreements between market participants, provided that such products are still settled through the Wholesale Electricity Market in terms of Financial Bilateral Transactions (Transacciones Bilaterales Financieras) or Bilateral Capacity Transactions (Transacciones Bilaterales de Potencia), as applicable, pursuant to the Market Rules. Clean Energy Certificates (Certificados de Energía Limpia, CELs) are also traded via bilateral arrangements – between power generators, suppliers and certain end users registered with the CRE.
Generators, traders, suppliers and qualified end users that participate directly in the market make sales and purchase energy through offers in the Short-Term Energy Market. Sale offers from power plants must be made in accordance with their production (variable) costs (although this is not exempt from controversy as a result of the LIE reform, which provides for total unit costs, that is, fixed and variable costs). Theoretically, the more cost-efficient power plants are dispatched by the CENACE and receive as payment the local marginal price, which corresponds to the (marginal) cost of the last (marginal) power plant to be dispatched.
Additionally, within the context of the Wholesale Electricity Market, mid and long-term auctions were called by the CENACE in 2015, 2016 and 2017 in order for load-serving entities to hedge their portfolios of energy, capacity and CELs. While the long-term auctions were a success, the current Mexican government decided to halt them as of 2018 in order to redirect energy policy for the purposes of strengthening the CFE.
Imports and exports of electricity from/to other jurisdictions are permitted under applicable laws and regulations. The major transmission interconnections are ERCOT (Texas) and CAISO (California) in the northern border of Mexico. There are also interconnections with the transmission systems of Guatemala and Belize.
Imports of energy are made through sale offers in the Wholesale Electricity Market, whereas exports are made by means of purchase offers. Both of these offers are settled at the local marginal price of the price node associated with the Mexico-foreign country interconnection.
Likewise, imports or exports of electricity may also be carried out on an isolated supply basis (ie, independent of the Wholesale Electricity Market when the assets are not interconnected to the National Electric System).
During 2021, gross statistics indicate that around 55% of the power supply in Mexico comes from combined cycle power plants, and 15% from other conventional (thermal) power sources. Clean energy output from hydro, wind and solar photovoltaic assets accounted for approximately 9%, 8% and 7%, respectively. The remaining 6%, in aggregate, was produced from other sources such as nuclear and cogeneration.
There are no specific concentration limits for power generation or commercialisation activities. The Federal Economic Competition Law establishes the terms and conditions for the oversight, by the COFECE, of free competition in the context of power generation and supply activities for the purposes of avoiding monopolistic practices of industry participants.
If the COFECE considers that there is a concentration contrary to the provisions of the Federal Economic Competition Law, it may order the partial or total deconcentration of the concentrated assets, as well as the imposition of other sanctions.
Additionally, the CRE (the regulator) and the SENER (the policymaker) have certain oversight authorities regarding the power industry. The CRE is responsible for the oversight of the Wholesale Electricity Market, including, for instance, verifying that sale offers from power plants comply with certain cost parameters set forth by the Market Rules. Moreover, the CRE also has the authority to order accounting, operational or functional separation of power industry participants for the purposes of the adequate performance of the industry. On the other hand, the SENER may order the legal separation of entities (both public and private) in order to promote open access to the grid and the efficient operation of the power sector.
Mexico has signed international agreements/treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in order to establish commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Consistent with such international agreements/treaties, the main law regarding climate change is the General Climate Change Law (Ley General de Cambio Climático) enacted in June 2012, and which is still in force. The carbon market (sistema de comercio de emisiones) set forth by the General Climate Change Law is a foundational piece of Mexico’s environmental policy going forward.
In the context of the power industry, the main law associated with energy transition is the Energy Transition Law (Ley de Transición Energética) which regulates the sustainable use of energy and promotes the development of clean energy sources.
There are no specific programmes to encourage the early retirement of carbon-based generation, or compensation mechanisms in the event coal-fired generation facilities are retired. As a matter of fact, the current policy of the Mexican government is to avoid the retirement of power plants owned by the CFE. The CFE is the owner of the vast majority of carbon-based (particularly, coal-fired) power plants in Mexico.
The Energy Transition Law establishes that, by 2024, 35% of power production in Mexico must come from clean energy sources. In fact, CELs were created pursuant to the Power Industry Law as a mechanism to develop new clean energy projects to comply with this clean energy target.
Furthermore, long-term auctions were originally designed to incentivise the procurement by load-serving entities, especially the CFE Suministrador de Servicios Básicos, of power generation from new clean power plants. Nonetheless, as mentioned previously, the Mexican government has decided not to continue with the long-term auctions programme until further notice.
From a tax standpoint, investments in the purchase of machinery and equipment for energy production from renewable resources (eg, wind turbines, solar panels, trackers and inverters) are subject to a 100% income tax deduction. Furthermore, the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta) also establishes certain tax benefits vis-à-vis the payment of dividends by renewable generators through the CUFIN Verde instrument.
Additionally, equipment and facilities to be installed for the purposes of renewable energy generation assets may be subject to certain benefits with respect to the payment of import duties, as per applicable Mexican laws and free trade agreements signed by the Mexican government. Likewise, the Electricity Sectorial Program (PROSEC) issued by the Mexican Ministry of Economy (Secretaría de Economía) grants certain benefits to renewable energy developers and sponsors with respect to exemptions or reductions of import duties (for example, regarding the import of solar panels and other equipment associated with solar energy projects, such as inverters).
The Power Industry Law, the Market Rules and the general administrative provisions issued by the CRE (including the Grid Code (Código de Red) which establishes certain technical requirements and obligations – for example, in terms of voltage, frequency response and reliability-related curtailments – for the interconnection and operation of power plants) are the principal laws and regulations that govern the construction and operation of power generation facilities in Mexico.
Power plants with an installed capacity equal to or greater than 0.5 MW need to obtain a power generation permit from the CRE. In order for the CRE to issue such permits, the relevant applicant must provide evidence about its legal, technical and financial capacity as well as the description of its power generation project.
As a result of the recent LIE reform (which, as mentioned in 1.6 Recent Material Changes in Law or Regulation, has been challenged by hundreds of participants and whose entry into force has been suspended by Mexican courts), new power generation permits may be subject to the power sector planning criteria of the SENER, though it is still unknown if and how these planning criteria would be implemented vis-à-vis the issuance of such new power generation permits. Power generation projects should be issued by the CRE within a timeframe of six to eight months. However, for the last three years, the CRE has either exceeded these statutory timeframes or has simply not responded to permit applications.
In addition to the CRE power generation permit, generation projects are also required to obtain other governmental authorisations such as interconnection studies and agreements, resolution of a social impact assessment (EVIS), environmental permits and construction and operation licences from various federal, state and municipal authorities.
The typical terms and conditions of power generation permits include:
In order to obtain an amendment of a term/condition under a power generation permit, the approval of the CRE board of commissioners is required. Amendment of power generation permits should take between six to eight months. However, for the last three years, the CRE has gone well beyond these statutory timeframes or has simply not responded to the amendment requests.
As a general rule, construction and operation of power generation facilities does not grant eminent domain, condemnation or expropriation rights.
Nevertheless, for power plants that “require a specific location”, legal easements may be created for the construction, installation and maintenance of such assets. According to the CRE, the only technologies that “require a specific location” are geothermal and hydro power plants. Developers of these types of power generation facilities must, prior to filing for a legal easement, follow a burdensome process with the corresponding landowners and competent authorities in order to obtain the real estate rights necessary for the construction, operation and maintenance of their projects. This process includes notices to the landowners, negotiation periods, appraisals and compensation determined in accordance with parameters set forth by a governmental agency, and “validation” by local courts. Complying with all of these requirements has become an administrative nightmare and has resulted in significant delays in the commercial operation date of the relevant projects.
The Power Industry Law and the Market Rules establish certain requirements in order for a power plant to be decommissioned. These requirements include filing of certain information with the CENACE, and as a general rule, the power plant owner must notify the CENACE of the decommissioning of the asset at least one year in advance. Prior to authorising the decommissioning of a power plant, the CENACE must assess whether the power plant intended to be decommissioned is required for maintaining the reliability of the National Electric System.
There is no specific obligation set forth by power-industry-related laws or regulations to fund decommissioning of a power plant beyond the physical life of the facility or at the end of its physical or economic life. Other conditions for the decommissioning of a power plant contained in environmental authorisations may apply.
The principal laws and regulations that govern the development, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of transmission lines and associated facilities are the following:
Although the transmission public service is reserved to the State, the SENER and the CFE may call for public-private partnerships in order to develop, finance, construct, operate and/or maintain transmission infrastructure. These projects must be justified by technical and cost-benefit assessments and shall be subject to public bidding proceedings, provided further that: (a) CFE Transmisión will remain the sole transmission public service provider; and (b) the public domain assets relating to public service transmission projects cannot be transferred, mortgaged, pledged or collateralised.
In this regard, the Power Industry Law and its associated regulations do not require a permit or licence to construct or operate transmission infrastructure. Nonetheless, federal, state and municipal authorisations (particularly from an environmental and social standpoint) may be required to construct and operate transmission-related facilities.
Likewise, generation permits may include the right to use a transmission line to connect the generation facility with the national grid. The relevant works require general permits for construction and development, which include construction licences, land-use permits, environmental authorisations and social consultation.
See 5.1.2 Regulatory Process for Obtaining Approvals to Construct and Operate Transmission Facilities.
Pursuant to the Power Industry Law, transmission of power is deemed a “social and public interest” activity; therefore, it has priority over any other activity intended to be developed on a certain plot of land. Consequently, legal easements may be created in accordance with the Power Industry Law to construct and operate transmission facilities.
Please note that proponents of transmission projects must, prior to filing for a legal easement, follow a burdensome process with the corresponding landowners in order to obtain the real estate rights necessary for the construction, operation and maintenance of their projects. This process includes notices to the landowners, negotiation periods, appraisals and compensation determined in accordance with parameters set forth by a governmental agency, and “validation” by local courts. Complying with all of these requirements has become an administrative nightmare and has resulted in significant delays in the commercial operation date of the relevant projects.
Under the premise that the transmission public service is reserved to the State under the Mexican Constitution and the Power Industry Law, CFE Transmisión (which, again, is a State-owned company) is the only entity that may provide the transmission public service in Mexico. As a result, CFE Transmisión has the monopoly on the transmission public service across the whole country. Transmission and distribution services are some of the few monopolies authorised in the Mexican Constitution.
The Power Industry Law, as well as the general administrative provisions and resolutions issued by the CRE, are the main laws and regulations that govern the provision of the transmission public service and the associated regulated tariff.
The transmission public service is provided by CFE Transmisión at a regulated tariff, which is determined by the CRE on a yearly basis through a rate case process that determines the revenue requirement of the transmission service provider, and takes into consideration:
Once the CRE has determined the revenue requirement for the transmission public service, the relevant amount is shared: 70% by end users and 30% by generators. The transmission tariff is charged by CFE Transmisión – on a Mexican-pesos-per-kWh basis – by means of calculating the energy injected by the generators and the energy consumed by the end users into/from the grid (depending on their voltage level, that is, above 220 kV or below such threshold).
Pursuant to the transitory articles of the 2013 Constitutional Energy Reform as well as the Power Industry Law, the transmission public service must be provided on an open-access and non-discriminatory basis. As a result, and unless it is not technically possible (including due to the lack of available wheeling capacity), CFE Transmisión must allow the interconnection of power plants and load points to the grid for the purposes of injecting or consuming power, as applicable. CFE Transmisión will charge a regulated transmission tariff to the generators and end users (see 5.2.2 Establishment of Transmission Charges and Terms of Service).
In order to be legally entitled to interconnect to the grids operated by CFE Transmisión, the applicant must follow an interconnection studies process with the CENACE (as the independent system operator) – in accordance with the Interconnection Manual (Manual para la Interconexión de Centrales Eléctricas y Conexión de Centros de Carga) – to assess whether interconnection and reinforcement works are required for the requested interconnection to the National Electric System.
Upon completion and acceptance of the interconnection studies, as well as the delivery by the applicant of a performance bond in favour of the CENACE to secure the performance of the interconnection and reinforcement works set forth by the studies, the CENACE will instruct CFE Transmisión to execute the corresponding interconnection agreement (which is a standard form of contract approved by the regulator) with the applicant. The interconnection agreement contains the key terms and conditions for the interconnection of the relevant power plant or load point to the grid, including the scheduled commercial operation date of the corresponding facilities.
The principal laws and regulations that govern the development, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of distribution facilities are the following:
Although the distribution public service is reserved to the State, the SENER and CFE may call for public-private partnerships in order to develop, finance, construct, operate and/or maintain distribution infrastructure. These projects must be justified by technical and cost-benefit assessments and shall be subject to public bidding proceedings, provided further that: (a) CFE Distribución will remain the sole distribution public service provider; and (b) the public domain assets relating to public service distribution projects cannot be mortgaged, pledged or collateralised.
In this regard, the Power Industry Law and its associated regulations do not require a permit or licence to construct or operate distribution infrastructure. Nonetheless, federal, state and municipal authorisations (particularly from an environmental and social standpoint) may be required to construct and operate distribution-related facilities.
See 6.1.2 Regulatory Process for Obtaining Approvals to Construct and Operate Distribution Facilities.
See 5.1.4 Proponent's Eminent Domain, Condemnation or Expropriation Rights.
See 5.1.5 Transmission Service Monopoly Rights.
The Power Industry Law, as well as the general administrative provisions and resolutions issued by the CRE, are the main laws and regulations that govern the provision of the distribution public service and the associated regulated tariff.
The distribution public service is provided by CFE Distribución at a regulated tariff, which is determined by the CRE on a yearly basis through a rate case process that determines the revenue requirement of the distribution service provider, taking into consideration:
Once the CRE has determined the revenue requirement for the distribution public service, the relevant amount is divided among 16 distribution divisions in proportion to the revenue obtained from the distribution public service during the previous year. The resulting distribution tariff is charged to end users on a Mexican-pesos-per-kWh or kW basis depending on five different distribution categories.
Torre del Bosque
Blvd Manuel Avila Camacho #24
7th Floor
Col. Lomas de Chapultepec
Mexico City 11000
Mexico
+52 5555 409 200
contacto@galicia.com.mx www.galicia.com.mxThe Current Problem of Power Self-Supply (Autoabastecimiento de Energía Eléctrica) in Mexico… What’s Next?
The power self-supply scheme (esquema legado de autoabastecimiento de energía eléctrica) was established in 1992 pursuant to the Power Public Service Law (Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica). Self-supply was considered an exception to power public service activities that, according to the Mexican Constitution (Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos) and prior to the Energy Constitutional Reform of 2013, was reserved to the State, particularly the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE).
The self-supply scheme essentially allows permit holders to generate power and supply it to their shareholders/partners (as consumers), provided that the generation facility, the self-supplied consumers and their load points are authorised by the Energy Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Energía, CRE).
When the Power Industry Law (Ley de la Industria Eléctrica) was enacted in 2014 as the implementing legislation of the 2013 Energy Constitutional Reform, the transitory articles of the new law provided that self-supply permits and contracts would be grandfathered and still be subject to the former Power Public Service Law in order to respect the acquired rights of self-supply permit holders, consumers and their projects.
Nevertheless, the Mexican federal government headed by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has made multiple public statements during the past three years, in the sense that the grandfathered power self-supply scheme is illegal and results in unjustifiable subsidies for the benefit of private companies and to the detriment of the CFE.
During this three-year period, consistent with the new energy policy of President López Obrador’s administration, the CRE has pursued a handful of regulatory actions to change the landscape of the grandfathered self-supply scheme. These regulatory actions have been as follows.
All of these actions initiated by the federal government contravene basic constitutional principles which prohibit monopoly in the power sector and promote participation of the private sector. Because of these clear violations of the constitution, courts have consistently annulled or suspended the relevant amendments to the LIE, regulations or regulatory actions.
In what has been the most relevant of the actions mentioned above, Congress approved the LIE reform with the main purpose of reinforcing the position of the CFE (the State-owned power company) in the power sector. The LIE reform was also challenged, not only by participants in the power sector, but also by minorities in Congress through constitutionality recourses. In April 2022, the Mexican Supreme Court dismissed an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) submitted by a group of members of the Senate against the LIE reform.
In a nutshell, the Mexican government’s argument about the breach of the spirit of the law by self-supply permit holders and their self-supplied consumers is that self-supply was carried out by private companies as a parallel market for the sale and acquisition of power – which, according to the government’s interpretation, should have been reserved to the CFE because it had the monopoly of the power public service and was the only entity authorised to sell energy to end users. This argument has been replicated by the CRE in the context of the above-mentioned permit revocation proceedings and the determination of significant fines to permit holders on the basis that they carried out a prohibited sale of energy to their self-supplied shareholders/partners.
The authors believe the CRE’s arguments lack legal basis as the energy law that regulates the self-supply scheme expressly authorises the delivery of power to self-supply consumers and that payment of consideration for such power is not prohibited. The CRE also fails to consider that the permits were issued precisely by the CRE, as regulator of power generation activities, and that the CRE itself authorised the delivery of power to the self-supply consumers. It seems unviable that the CRE will be legally capable of sanctioning a permit holder for carrying out an activity that the CRE itself authorised.
While it is true that the rules applicable to self-supply projects may be subject to change (as such activities evolve every day, especially after more than two decades), it also true that any legal changes must respect the principles laid out in the Mexican Constitution regarding legality, proportionality, due process, no retroactivity, and the right to a healthy environment. If any of the changes that have already been pursued by the current Mexican government or that may be proposed in the future do not comply with these constitutional premises, then courts should, and will very likely, declare those actions unconstitutional and leave them ineffective. Moreover, if these regulatory changes end up being implemented, foreign companies that have invested in these kinds of projects will certainly file claims for losses and damages in accordance with international investment treaties signed by Mexico.
The Mexican government has taken advantage of the confusion in the sector to put pressure on power consumers to leave the self-supply scheme (and breach their supply agreements) and purchase power from the CFE at competitive prices. Such invitation to negotiate is coupled with threats of indemnifications and, incredibly, criminal accusations, again with no legal basis.
Companies from various industries (eg, food, steel, mining, banking services, etc) that consume power under the self-supply scheme are expected to be involved in these “negotiations” with the Mexican government. However, the negotiations should also include generators. Private participants, that is, generators and consumers, are willing to end this endless discussion, and move to a solution that recognises the validity of the legal structure and preserves the right of generators to continue producing electricity, and the freedom of consumers to choose the best option for the supply of electricity in a competitive market.
Overall, the eyes of the power industry are and will continue to be on the outcome of the self-supply problem. Compromises will be necessary from the three sides (government, offtakers and generators). A negotiated solution may be possible from a legal, financial and technical standpoint if all the parties are willing to acknowledge and concede that:
If the main claims of the government relate to excessive costs and subsidies that the CFE cannot recover and that have seriously damaged its economic situation, a viable solution should contemplate a reallocation of these costs, which include reduced wheeling tariffs, capacity reservation and other system-operational costs.
From a legal perspective, the self-supply structure from the previous legal regime may be transformed into the new mechanisms provided in the LIE, which would require the “migration” of the generation permits and consumer status. Self-supply agreements would be replaced with agreements between generators and an intermediary in the form of a qualified supplier (as required by the current LIE) who, in turn, would sell the power and related products to the end consumers. This change in legal structure will get rid of an unproductive discussion as to the legality of the self-supply projects, and will provide legal certainty to all participants involved. From an economic standpoint, it will distribute the power sector’s costs more fairly among all the participants: generators, consumers, system operators and the CFE, as the provider of the transmission and distribution services.
The implementation of this solution would still require attention to the following items:
Power supply contracts would have to be terminated and re-entered under the new legal structure. Since many of the self-supply projects have received loans from banks and other financial institutions, this contractual restructuring would also require lenders’ consents and amendments to the financing documents, and reconstitution of security packages.
It is clear that the ideal solution still represents a great challenge. However, sticking to the current polarised positions will only extend the political debate, continue the judicial battle and constitutional challenges, and prevent the power sector from evolving to a cleaner and sustainable future.
The authors are convinced that there is room for an agreement that benefits all stakeholders along the above-mentioned lines. An agreement of this sort would represent a breakthrough for the Mexican power industry that will ultimately create more favourable conditions, not only for M&A or refinancing transactions associated with self-supply projects, but more generally for the purposes of investment in the generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure that is undoubtedly required across the country – including the possibility of developing public-private partnerships among the CFE, private corporations and lenders for the deployment of more modern, more economic and cleaner generation, transmission and distribution assets in the Mexican energy space. The effects of this ideal scenario will be reflected in the power bill costs of households, small and medium-sized companies, big corporations, incumbent and up-and-coming industries, and any other power supply end user in the country.
Torre del Bosque
Blvd Manuel Avila Camacho #24
7th Floor
Col. Lomas de Chapultepec
Mexico City 11000
Mexico
+52 5555 409 200
contacto@galicia.com.mx www.galicia.com.mx