White-Collar Crime 2022

Last Updated September 12, 2022

Italy

Law and Practice

Authors



Cagnola & Associati Studio Legale was set up in July 2016 and is based in Milan, Italy. The firm specialises in corporate criminal law, an area in which its team of professional lawyers has developed significant expertise by participating in some of the most notable national and international trials. Its lawyers provide legal defence for both individuals and corporations in criminal proceedings and advisory services. The firm consistently relies on the most qualified experts and consultants in each specialised area. Amongst the firm’s areas of expertise are anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, criminal tax law, environmental criminal law, banking and financial criminal law, and corporate and bankruptcy criminal law. The firm is composed of 18 people and provides legal assistance throughout Italy and internationally.

Preliminary Notice

As this guide was being drafted, the Italian Criminal legal system was contemplating a deep legislative reform (the so called Cartabia Reform, after the name of the Minister of Justice, Mrs Marta Cartabia), which is currently delegated to the Italian government following Parliament’s approval of the delegation Law 134/2021. The reform aims at modifying several crucial points of both substantial criminal law and criminal legal procedure. Hence, many of the aspects touched on in this guide could be deeply altered by this reform, if approved. On 15 September 2022, the Italian Parliament gave its final green light to the issuing of the relevant implementing legislative decrees.

The Italian legal system distinguishes between two main categories of criminal offence:

  • felonies (delitti) – more serious crimes which require mens rea (criminal intent), unless specific provisions extend the accountability to actions committed through negligence as well; and
  • misdemeanours (contravvenzioni) – less serious crimes which do not necessarily require mens rea, and which can be punished, without any extra provisions, in cases of mere negligence.

Every criminal act consists of both a so-called objective element and a so-called subjective one. The objective element pertains to the material facts of the case and includes the criminal act itself and, where envisaged by the crime in question, the occurrence of an event which has to be a causal consequence of that act. The subjective element pertains to the psychological state of the perpetrator of the act (ie, whether there was wilful intent).

Wilful intent represents the normal subjective criterion for criminal charges, as one can infer from Article 42, paragraph 2 of the Italian Criminal Code (ICC), which states that “No-one may be punished for a fact that the law considers to be a crime, if that person has not committed it with intent, except for cases of unpremeditated or unintentional crimes expressly provided for by the law”. Therefore, criminal law presumes wilful intent to be a subjective element for the charge of criminal responsibility.

According to Section 157 of the ICC, the statute of limitations extinguishes a crime:

  • in the amount of time corresponding to the maximum penalty provided for by the law with reference to the criminal offence in question; or
  • in an amount of time which, in any case, cannot be less than six years for a felony and four years for a misdemeanour.

The ICC provides for specific cases in which the limitation period is interrupted, in such cases the amount of time needed to extinguish the crime is increased.

The limitation period begins to run from the moment when the crime is committed. They are doubled for specific criminal offences set out by the ICC.

The ICC provides for particular cases in which the limitation period is suspended. An important legislative reform – in force since 1 January 2020 – introduced the rule (Section 159, paragraph 3 of the ICC) based on which the statute of limitation is suspended from the first instance decision until the irrevocability of the decision that concluded the proceedings. The recent so-called Cartabia Reform (see 1.1 Classification of Criminal Offences) introduced a new Section 344-bis to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (ICCP), according to which the omitted closing of the appeal judgment within two years gives rise to non-prosecution; moreover, the omitted closing of the judgment before the Supreme Court within ones year also gives rise to non-prosecution as well. The provision at stake is quite complex and several exceptions are provided.

The defendant can always expressly waive the statute of limitations.

In the case of a permanent offence (reato permanente) or of a continuing offence (reato continuato) the limitation period begins to run from the day on which the permanence or the continuation has ended.

The statute of limitations does not apply to crimes punished with a life sentence.

Italian criminal law does not provide a specific regulation for white-collar crimes outside the Italian jurisdiction.

Pursuant to Section 7 of the ICC, an Italian citizen or a foreigner is punished according to Italian law if they commit, in a foreign territory:

  • crimes against the Italian State;
  • crimes of forgery of the Italian State seal and of use of that forged seal;
  • crimes concerning the forgery of Italian currencies which are legal tender in the territory of the Italian state, or forgery of other Italian valuables and securities;
  • crimes committed, with abuse of powers or with violation of legal duties, by Italian public officials; and
  • any other criminal offence for which special rules of law or international conventions establish the enforceability of Italian law.

The ICC prescribes other particular cases in which a crime, committed outside Italian territory by an Italian citizen or by a foreigner, can be punished according to Italian law (eg, cases in which a request of the Ministry of Justice is needed or cases in which a complaint by the offended party is needed).

Legislative Decree 231/2001 introduced, into the Italian legal system, the liability of legal entities themselves with regard to certain criminal offences committed by their directors, representatives or employees in the interest, or to the advantage, of the legal entities themselves.

The liability of the legal entity only arises from criminal offences committed by “individuals who are representatives, directors or managers of the company” (generally, only individuals that are in top management positions), or “by individuals who are managed or supervised by an individual in a top position”. The legal entity cannot be held liable if the individuals indicated have acted solely in their own interest or in the interest of others.

The body is not liable for the criminal offences committed by the above-mentioned people, if it can demonstrate the adoption and implementation, prior to the commission of the crime, of organisational models suitable for preventing offences similar to the one that was committed.

Three kinds of sanctions can be imposed on the legal entity found guilty: fines, banning sanctions and confiscation.

The legal entity’s liability is autonomous from the liability of the individual charged. There is no personal liability for managers and directors for the sole reason that the legal entity is deemed liable for an offence. Nevertheless, the legal entity’s managers or directors may be deemed personally liable for the same offence as that charged against the entity. In such cases, the legal entity cannot be legally represented in the criminal proceedings by the director charged with the same criminal offence.

According to Section 42 of Legislative Decree 231/2001, in cases of transformation, merger or splitting up of the originally responsible legal entity, the trial proceeds against the legal entity resulting from the modification or benefitting from the division.

As a general rule of Italian criminal law, every crime which caused financial or non-financial damage, obliges the party found guilty to compensate the suffering party for the damage itself. Any other subjects who are considered liable for such damage according to the civil laws are also obliged to offer compensation.

The offended party who suffered damage from the commission of a crime can act as plaintiff in the criminal proceedings, asking for compensation for that damage. The plaintiff is represented, in the criminal proceedings, by a defence counsel, who has the same procedural rights, powers and faculties as the other trial parties. If the offended party has acted as a plaintiff in the criminal proceedings, the criminal court, in case of conviction, can order compensation from the convicted party.

The quantification of the damage is usually remitted to a civil court.

Nevertheless, the criminal court has the power to order the immediate paying of a part of the compensation, on a provisional basis, if a certain percentage of the damage is considered already proved.

Class actions are regulated by the Italian Code of Civil Procedure and can take place only in civil proceedings.

Whilst the last few months have not been characterised by particularly significant developments in or legislative changes to the Italian white-collar crime space – mainly due to the impact of the epidemic on the government’s agenda – many interesting decisions have been issued by the Supreme Court in this field.

The Viareggio Disaster

The Italian Supreme Court issued its decision on the infamous “Viareggio disaster”. On 29 June 2009, due to a freight train derailment, a huge fire took place in Viareggio, killing 32 people. The cause of the derailment has been identified as the breaking of part of a convoy, caused by a high level of corrosion. After convictions in a first instance trial and before the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court quashed the previous rulings. In detail, the decision is remarkable with reference to the reflections made by the Supreme Court on negligence in general and on the criminal liability of the CEO of a company.

Liability of Auditors

The criminal liability of statutory auditors for the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy can occur only when specific, factual symptomatic elements are present, which can demonstrate that the failure in putting in place the control power was not merely negligent, but amounts to evidence of mens rea (Supreme Court, Criminal Section, 5th Division, Decision 20867/2021).

The Right against Self-Incrimination

The fundamental right to remain silent is also valid against the investigative powers of the Bank of Italy and of the Italian National Commission for Listed Companies and the Stock Exchange (CONSOB) when answering such questions may lead to liability arising against the subject. This principle has been pointed out with specific reference to the criminal offence of insider trading (Constitutional Court, Decision 84/2021).

The State-Mafia Treaty

On 6 August 2022, the Court of Appeal of Palermo filed its reasoning in the decision in which, a few months before, several defendants were acquitted for their roles in the so-called State-Mafia treaty, an investigation that generated huge media interest. The Court of Appeal acquitted the Italian public officials who had been charged, quashing the first instance decision.

The Morandi Bridge Collapse

On 7 April 2022, the Judge of the Preliminary Hearing of Genoa issued a plea bargain decision against Autostrade per l’Italia and Spea Engineering, the legal entities charged pursuant to Decree 231/2001, in the context of the criminal proceedings on the collapse of the Morandi bridge. The infamous disaster occurred on 14 August 2018, killing 43 people. Another 59 defendants will face the main trial before the Criminal Court of Genoa.

The Italian prosecution service is divided into several prosecutor’s offices, based in the main cities of Italy. Every single prosecutor’s office is staffed by a chief prosecutor and by a certain number of public prosecutors. The biggest prosecutor’s offices are divided into departments with particular specialisations (eg, a financial crimes department, a crimes against the public administration department and a crimes against the environment department).

According to the ICCP, the preliminary investigations are directed by the prosecutor, who directly manage the judicial police.

The judicial police are composed of a number of different units. With reference to white-collar crimes, the most specialised unit is the Italian Tax Police (Guardia di Finanza), which has specific responsibility for tax crimes, corporate crimes, bankruptcy crimes, fraud, etc.

That said, there are a number of other units which have a specific responsibility for some type of crime: the Health and Safety Police, the Revenue Agency, the Customs Agency, the Regional Agency for Environment Protection, the Carabinieri Anti-adulteration Unit, and many others.

Italian prosecutor’s offices work in co-operation with other public sector organisations, as the National Anti-Corruption Authority, the National Antitrust Authority and the Bank of Italy. Some prosecutor’s offices have undersigned memoranda of understanding with these public sector organisations that guarantee a direct flow of information and documents between them.

The most important criminal courts in Italy are divided into specialised departments, with specific responsibility for particular categories of crime, such as financial crime.

Every criminal investigation is initiated by the prosecutor’s office when the commission of a crime is reported to the office itself or to the judicial police.

The initiation of criminal preliminary investigations is regulated by Sections 326 et seq of the ICCP.

Pursuant to Section 330, the public prosecutor and the judicial police are notified, ex officio, of the commission of a crime, and receive information of the commission of that crime through the procedure provided for by the following sections (eg, the filing of a complaint).

In greater detail, according to Section 347 of the ICCP, when the judicial police become aware of the commission of a crime, they immediately inform the prosecutor in a written communication which describes the main elements of fact and the evidence collected. If possible, the judicial police have to provide the prosecutor with the identity of the individual under investigation and of any potential witnesses.

When a criminal investigation is initiated, the prosecutor is bound to perform any activity necessary to evaluate the prosecution and also to perform investigative assessments for the benefit of the individual under investigation (Section 358).

With reference to white-collar crimes, the relevant criminal investigations are often instigated by administrative proceedings, in which the public sector authority reports the notice of a crime to the prosecutor’s office (for instance, a tax audit carried out by the Revenue Agency or by the Tax Police, or an inspection carried out by CONSOB).

In the Italian legal framework, the prosecutor’s office has wide and far-reaching investigative powers aiming at gathering information and documents related to white-collar criminal offences (for instance, acquisition of information from other public sector organisations, investigative interrogations, interviews of the individual under investigation, inspections of places, searches of premises or personal searches, technical expertise, wire taps, shadowing and the seizure of documents, correspondence and data).

In greater detail:

  • investigative authorities can directly ask an individual or a legal entity to hand over documentation or information every time they deem that such an initiative is considered useful for the investigation;
  • investigative authorities can seize documents (emails, forensic copies of computer files, etc), when the latter are considered relevant for the investigation, seizures can be ordered by the public prosecutor or performed, ex officio, by the judicial police (in this case, the seizure must be carried out within 48 hours of its being granted by the prosecutor); and
  • during the preliminary investigations, the judicial police and the prosecutor can carry out the interrogation of any individual (including those not under investigation) who is considered to be in a position to provide the authorities with information that may be useful for the investigation.

Internal investigations are not mandatory under the Italian legal framework; they are carried out on a voluntary basis.

That said, internal investigations can be considered necessary, or at least highly advisable, for a corporation, in the event that the company becomes aware of a crime committed by one of its employees or directors.

The advantages of carrying out an internal investigation usually increase in cases where a crime which can trigger the liability of the legal entity involved (according to Legislative Decree 231/2001) has been committed, since – in such cases – the investigation can be crucial for the legal entity to demonstrate the validity of its organisational model for preventing offences similar to the one that was committed.

Internal investigations are usually considered by prosecutor’s offices and courts as items of evidence, although the relevant judicial authority is free to evaluate them at its own discretion.

Italian law does not provide any specific regulation governing internal investigations, instead they are usually regulated by corporate procedures. Internal investigations may be limited by the provisions of Italian civil and labour law.

Within the European Union, two main legal instruments are available to local authorities for cross-border co-operation.

  • European Investigation Orders (regulated by Legislative Decree 108/2018) – acts issued by judicial authorities or by administrative authorities, and confirmed by a member state’s judicial authority, ordering investigative acts or evidence collection, whose subjects are individuals or entities that are already in the territory of the Italian state or in the territory of another member state.
  • European Arrest Warrants (regulated by Law 69/2005) – an arrest order valid throughout all member states of the European Union.

Italy has undersigned several mutual legal assistance treaties with other countries, which allow the flow of information and documents, and other forms of co-operation between the judicial authorities.

Extradition

Extradition is regulated by the ICCP. An extradition request towards Italy cannot be granted with reference to a political crime, nor in cases in which there is a reason to believe that the defendant or the convicted person will be persecuted or subjected to discriminatory acts due to their race, religion, sexual orientation, nationality, language, political opinions or personal conditions, or that they will be subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment. An extradition request towards Italy cannot be granted without the positive decision of the Court of Appeal (known as a jurisdictional guarantee); such a decision can be appealed before the Supreme Court of Cassation.

When Italy files an extradition request, the Ministry of Justice is in charge of the relevant procedure.

In general, the regulation of extradition is ruled by the principle of speciality, under which an extradited person may not be prosecuted by the requesting state for any offence committed prior to their extradition or surrender other than those for which extradition was granted.

White-collar prosecution (as is the case for other crimes) is initiated by the enrolment in the prosecution office record of a notitia criminis and, as soon as available, of the names of the investigated people. Preliminary investigation is then carried out by the prosecutor, collecting evidence of the existence of the crime. If the collection is positive, the prosecutor serves a notice of the conclusion of the investigation. This provides a first description of the alleged crime and allows the investigated people to have access, for the first time, to the case file and put forward their defence arguments within 20 days. If still convinced of the existence of criminal liability at the end of this stage, the prosecutor goes forward with an act of formal indictment: a request of committal for trial (addressed to the judge of the preliminary hearing) or a decree of direct committal for trial (a fast-track procedure provided for crimes indicated in Section 550 of the ICCP).

Criminal prosecution is mandated by Section 112 of the Constitution, which means that the prosecutor has no discretion to decide whether or not to prosecute crimes that they deem proved at the end of the investigation. However, the guarantee of this constitutional duty is different in proceedings against individuals than it is in those against corporations. In the first case, if the prosecutor decides to drop the case, they must file a formal request to the judge of the preliminary investigation, who is in the final position to drop the case or not. In the second case, the prosecutor may directly drop the case, with a motivated decree that must, however, be served to the general prosecutor, who can disagree and decide to continue the case.

Italy does not have legislation on deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements. Such provisions are not compatible with the Italian system of criminal law, which is based on the principle of mandatory prosecution (Section 112 of the Constitution). The discretionary possibility for the prosecutor to defer a prosecution, or not to prosecute a crime at all, would be considered in conflict with this principle.

A plea bargain is a recognised special proceeding, prescribed by Section 444 of the ICCP, through which the indicted person asks for the application of a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment in order to end the criminal proceedings and obviate the risk of a harsher penalty.

The plea bargain application, indicating the requested penalty and the criteria to determine it, must be addressed to the prosecutor to obtain their consent and then to the judge for their legal evaluation. The judge verifies the lack of grounds to issue a dismissal judgment, the correctness of the legal qualification of the fact and circumstances, and the correctness of the penalty calculation. If this legal check is passed, the judgment applying the penalty is issued.

The plea bargain allows for a penalty reduction of up to one third and other legal benefits (such as the possibility of an early extinction of the crime and freedom from the obligation to pay the proceedings’ expenses). Moreover, its legal effects and outcomes are, compared to the ones for a conviction, less detrimental. The plea bargain judgment has no effect of res judicata in civil or administrative proceedings. Due to its beneficial nature, and to the fact that it prevents a criminal court deciding on the compensation for damages (which must then be addressed by the civil courts), in Italy the option of a plea bargain may be expressly excluded for some crimes (eg, sexual crimes) or made conditional on the payment of a due sum (eg, tax crimes).       

Criminal company law is regulated in Italy by the Italian Civil Code. The main criminal offences are:

  • Sections 2621–2622 – false accounting (see 3.6 Financial Record Keeping);
  • Section 2625 – hindrance of the internal control functions of a company, which amounts to a crime if it causes damage to shareholders (punishment is imprisonment for up to one year and a fine, doubled if the offence is committed in listed companies);
  • Sections 2626–2627 – undue restitution to shareholders of capital contributions, profits or capital buffers of the company, punishable with imprisonment for up to one year;
  • Section 2628 – illegal operations with the company shares, punishable with imprisonment for up to one year;
  • Section 2629 – operations in prejudice of the company creditors, punishable with imprisonment for six months to three years;
  • Section 2629-bis – omitted communication of a conflict of interests, punishable with imprisonment for one to three years if the omission causes damage to the company or others;
  • Section 2632 – fictitious formation of the company capital, punishable with imprisonment for up to one year;
  • Section 2634 – patrimonial disloyalty, committed when the author causes damage to a company by pursuing their own or another's interest, in conflict with the company’s one, punishable with imprisonment for six months to three years;
  • Section 2635 – private corruption (see 3.2 Bribery, Influence Peddling and Related Offences);
  • Section 2636 – illegal influence on the assembly, committed when the author determines a fictitious majority in the assembly pursuing an unfair profit, punishable with imprisonment for six months to three years;
  • Section 2637 – price manipulation of non-listed financial instruments, punishable with imprisonment for one to five years for any person who disseminates false information or employs other devices likely to cause a significant alteration in the price of a financial instruments of a non-listed company; and
  • Section 2638 – hindrance to the regulatory authorities (see 3.7 Cartels and Criminal Competition Law).

In all these cases, confiscation of the profit, product and goods derived from the crime is provided by Section 2641.

Corporate Liability

When committed in the interest, or to the advantage, of the company, the aforementioned crimes may trigger corporate liability pursuant to Section 25-ter of Legislative Decree 231/2001.

In the same decree, Section 24 provides for liability of the company if the predicate crime of fraud against the state, or another public entity, is committed in the interest, or to the advantage, of the company. If held liable, the legal entity is punished with a pecuniary sanction of up to EUR774,500 and the application of disqualifying sanctions.

Other forms of corporate fraud are punished by Italian criminal law, but they do not trigger corporate liability (eg, Section 515 of the ICC, fraud in commerce).

Bribery

Bribery in the public sector is regulated by the ICC in the following Sections.

  • Section 318 – so-called “improper corruption”, which is committed by a public officer (or a person in charge of a public service, see Section 320) who unduly receives or accepts the promise of money or other goods for carrying out an act related to their public functions. Punishment (also applicable to the corruptor) is imprisonment for three to eight years, plus disqualifying sanctions and confiscation of the profit.
  • Section 319 – so-called “proper corruption”, which is committed by a public officer (or a person in charge of a public service, see Section 320) who receives or accepts the promise of money or other goods for omitting or delaying an act related to their public functions, or for carrying out an act which is contrary to their duties. Punishment (also applicable to the corruptor) is imprisonment for six to ten years, plus disqualifying sanctions and confiscation of the profit; various aggravating circumstances are provided (eg, if the act is committed in a judicial proceeding (Section 319-ter)).
  • Under some conditions (Section 322-bis), the act is punishable in Italy even if the bribery involves a public officer from a foreign country.

Influence Peddling

The above crimes may also amount to influence peddling (Section 346-bis) if anyone, taking advantage of a relationship with a public officer or a person in charge of a public service, unduly receives or accepts the promise of money or other goods as a price for their intermediation with that person or to pay that person for carrying out their public functions. Punishment (extended to the payer) is imprisonment for one to four years.

Private Corruption

In the private sector, in 2012, the new Section 2635 of the Civil Code was introduced, punishing the crime of private corruption. It is committed by a corporation employee (either a manager or a subordinate person) who solicits or receives (even as a mere promise) money or other goods to commit or omit an act in violation of their duty of loyalty. Punishment is imprisonment for one to three years, doubled if the act is committed in a listed company.

When committed in the interest, or to the advantage, of the company, the aforementioned crimes may trigger corporate liability pursuant to Sections 25 or 25-ter of Legislative Decree 231/2001.

Italian criminal legislation does not provide a specific obligation to prevent bribery or influence peddling and to implement a compliance programme.

However, bribery is a possible predicate crime to corporate administrative liability under Legislative Decree 231/2001, whereby it is mandated that the corporation can exclude the liability (Sections 6 and 7) only if certain conditions are met, amongst which is having adopted and effectively implemented a compliance programme.

Hence, even if the introduction of the compliance programme is not an obligation (and there are no sanctions for not having introduced one), it must be considered a precondition for the corporation’s legal defence and attempt to avoid liability.

In order to ensure its exemptive effect, the compliance programme must be specifically for (and suited to) the prevention of crimes of the type that has occurred, taking note of the requirements set forth by Section 6 (eg, identify the activities at risk, provide for specific protocols of action, introduce a supervisory body and a disciplinary system against violations, and introduce a whistle-blowing system).

Criminal Banking

Legislative Decree 385/1993 (the consolidated law on banking or TUB) provides criminal sanctions for various offences around unauthorised banking activities. Amongst these are:

  • unauthorised collection of savings (Section 130, imprisonment for one to three years and a fine);
  • unauthorised collection of savings and performance of credit services (Section 131, imprisonment for one to eight years and a fine); and
  • unauthorised performance of specific financial activities (Section 132, imprisonment for six months to four years and a fine).

An example of illicit banking conduct is the crime of usury punished by Section 644 of the ICC. It is committed by whoever lends money, receiving or accepting usurious interest in return. Punishment is imprisonment for two to ten years and a fine.

Legislative Decree 58/1998 (the consolidated law on financial markets or TUF) provides criminal sanctions for various offences of unauthorised financial activity. Amongst these is Section 166, which punishes with imprisonment of one to eight years and a fine any person who, without authorisation, provides investment or collective asset management services, markets units or shares of collective investment undertakings, or sells financial products or financial instruments or investment services.

Market Abuse

Specific criminal sanctions are provided in the TUF for market abuse offences, namely the following.

  • Insider trading (Section 184), punishable with imprisonment for two to twelve years and a fine of EUR20,000 to EUR3 million for any person who, possessing inside information by virtue of their role in the issuer company or in the exercise of their duties, carries out transactions on financial instruments using such information, or discloses such information to others outside the normal exercise of their duties, or recommends or induces others to carry out any financial transactions on the basis of such information.
  • Market manipulation (Section 185), punishable with imprisonment for two to twelve years and a fine of EUR20,000 to EUR5 million for any person who disseminates false information or sets up sham transactions or employs other devices likely to cause a significant alteration in the price of financial instruments.

In both of these cases, confiscation of the profit, product and goods used to commit the crime is provided by Section 187. Courts may increase the fine when it appears inadequate even if the maximum is applied. Moreover, when committed in the interest or to the advantage of a company, the aforementioned crimes may trigger corporate liability pursuant to Section 25-sexies of Legislative Decree 231/2001.

In Italy there is no specific obligation to prevent tax crimes, nor is it a criminal, administrative or civil offence to fail to do so.

Criminal tax law is covered by Legislative Decree 74/2000. The decree sets forth different tax crimes based on fraudulent conduct and a specific mens rea of tax evasion (for oneself or others). This area has been recently renewed with Decree 124/2019 (Law 157/2019), which has sharpened the sanctions against tax frauds.

Section 2 punishes (now with imprisonment for four to eight years) the crime of filing a fraudulent tax return by using invoices or other documents relating to non-existent operations. The crime is committed with the filing of a tax return whereby the tax income has been illicitly reduced by deducting costs for operations which are deemed non-existent from an objective (ie, total lack of the service or over-invoicing of an existing service) or subjective (ie, real service invoiced to or by a wrong person or entity) standpoint.

Section 3 punishes (now with imprisonment for three to eight years) the crime of filing a fraudulent tax return by means of other artifices. The crime is committed by filing a tax return whereby the tax income has been illicitly reduced through simulated operations, or using false documents or other fraudulent means that are suitable to deceive the Tax Authority, if the thresholds of punishment are met.

Section 8 punishes (now with imprisonment for four to eight years) the crime of issuing the false invoices that are then used to commit the Section 2 crime.

Section 11 punishes with imprisonment for six months to four years the crime of fraudulent escape from the payment of tax, committed if, with the intent to escape the payment of taxes for an amount higher than EUR50,000, the agent:

  • sells in a simulated way;
  • carries out other fraudulent actions on their own or others’ goods in a way that could concretely impair the tax collection procedure; or
  • indicates a reduced amount of tax income in the papers submitted for a tax settlement.

All the crimes listed above are also punished with the mandatory confiscation of the price or profit and application of disqualifying sanctions. Moreover, the recent reform has introduced corporate liability (Decree 231/2001) for all the above-mentioned tax crimes (providing both pecuniary and disqualifying sanctions) and the possibility of a discretionary confiscation of any asset that turns out to be disproportionate to the income of the taxpayer.

Criminal offences are set forth to ensure the transparency and correctness of the financial records with regard to both the market and the shareholders. This legal area has been comprehensively renewed with the introduction of new legislation in 2015.

False accounting is a crime punished by Sections 2621–2622 of the Civil Code. The crime is committed if the agent, pursuing a profit, intentionally places in the financial records (or in other mandatory communications) false material facts or fails to report material facts whose communication is imposed by law, in a way that is designed to mislead the reader. Punishment is imprisonment for three to eight years when the misreporting involves listed companies, or one to five years in non-listed companies. Confiscation of the profit, product and goods used to commit the crime is provided by Section 2641. As discussed in 3.1 Criminal Company Law and Corporate Fraud, the crime is possibly predicate to corporate liability under Legislative Decree 231/2001.

The omitted deposit of the financial records does not amount to a crime but only to an administrative offence sanctioned with a fine (Section 2630).

Antitrust and competition legislation in Italy has a largely administrative or civil nature. Criminal sanctions are provided only in specific cases.

Antitrust administrative sanctions are provided by Section 15 of Law 287/1990, in cases of unfair cartel agreements or abuse of a dominant position the author of the offence is ordered to eliminate the unfair situation and can be sanctioned with a fine up to 10% of its latest revenue.

A criminal sanction may be applied if the conduct is carried out as a form of hindrance to the functions of a regulatory authority such as AGCOM, the regulator for competition and markets in Italy. Section 2638 of the Civil Code may be applied, punishment is imprisonment for one to four years, doubled if the act is committed in a listed company. Confiscation of the profit, product and goods used to commit the crime is provided by Section 2641.

Unfair competition is a civil offence set forth by Section 2598 of the Civil Code, which is committed if the author carries out acts to create confusion with a competitor or its products, denigrates a competitor or damages a competitor by any means contrary to professional ethics. In this case, the author is ordered to stop the conduct and can be convicted to provide compensation for the damage.

A criminal sanction may be applied if the act of unfair competition is committed with menace or violence against a competitor (Section 513-bis of the ICC). In this case, the sanction is imprisonment for two to six years.

Consumer law in Italy is of an administrative nature and is regulated by Legislative Decree 206/2005.

The regulatory authority (AGCOM) may identify, investigate and order the stopping of any commercial conduct which is unfair towards consumers, also imposing an administrative sanction from EUR5,000 to EUR5 million (Section 24).

Common criminal law offences, set forth in the ICC, may also find application in the protection of consumers, such as:

  • Section 442 – commerce in adulterated or counterfeit food, punished with imprisonment for three to ten years;
  • Section 443 – commerce in adulterated drugs, punished with imprisonment for six months to three years and a fine;
  • Section 515 – fraud in commerce, punished with imprisonment for up to two years and a fine;
  • Section 517 – commerce in industrial goods with forged brands, punished with imprisonment for up to two years and a fine;
  • Section 640 – fraud, punished with imprisonment for six months to three years and a fine; and
  • Section 644 – usury, punished with imprisonment for two to ten years and a fine.

Sections 515 and 517 also trigger corporate liability under Legislative Decree 231/2001.

The ICC provides for several criminal offences relevant to cybercrimes and computer fraud:

  • Section 615-ter, unauthorised access to an IT system, punished with imprisonment for up to three years;
  • Sections 635-bis et seq, damage to IT systems, punished with imprisonment for one to five years; and
  • Section 640-ter, wire fraud, punished with imprisonment for six months to three years and a fine.

Moreover, in order to make them compliant with EU Directive 2013/40/UE, Section 19 of Law 238/2021 has introduced many new elements to the following crimes provided by the ICC:

  • Section 615-quater, which punishes the crime of detention, diffusion or set-up of abusive tools, pass-codes or other means used in order to get access to informatic or telematic systems;
  • Section 615-quinquies, which punishes the crime of detention, diffusion or abusive set-up of tools, devices or software aimed at damaging or interrupting an informatic or telematic system;
  • Section 617-bis, which punishes the crime of detention, diffusion, abusive set-up of tools or other means aimed at intercepting, hampering or interrupting communications of telephonic or telegraphic conversations; and
  • Section 617-quinquies, which punishes the crime of detention, diffusion and set-up of abusive tools or other means aimed at intercepting, hampering or interrupting informatic or telematic communications.

With reference to the protection of company secrets, the ICC provides for the crime of revelation of scientific or commercial secrets, punished with imprisonment for up to two years.

Customs law violations may amount to administrative or, in the most serious cases, criminal offences. This sector is mainly regulated by Legislative Decree 43/1973, amended over the years.

Legislative Decree 8/2016 introduced new criteria for distinguishing between administrative and criminal offences, which has had an important effect on customs law. More recently, Legislative Decree 75/2020 partially redefined the criteria introduced in 2016, expanding the criminal relevance of smuggling offences.

The main customs law offence is smuggling (ie, the fact of introducing goods into the territory of the state without paying the due customs charges). In accordance with the new distinction introduced in 2020, the following now apply.

  • Smuggling offences punished with a pecuniary sanction only amount to administrative offences; these pecuniary sanctions are, in most cases, calculated as a multiple of the evaded custom charge (from two to ten times). However, smuggling offences punished with a pecuniary sanction still amount to criminal offences if the evaded custom charge is higher than EUR10,000.
  • Smuggling offences punished with imprisonment still amount to criminal offences (eg, conspiracy to smuggle refined tobacco, punished with imprisonment of three to eight years).
  • Aggravated cases of smuggling, punished with imprisonment from three to five years, still have criminal relevance and now amount to an autonomous crime; these cases occur when the act is committed with the use of weapons, by three or more people, together with forgery offences or crimes against the public administration, or by a person who is part of a conspiracy aimed at committing smuggling.

In all cases, confiscation of the profit or product of the crime and confiscation of the things used to commit the crime are mandatory (Section 301).

Moreover, Legislative Decree 75/2020 added all criminally relevant smuggling offences to the list of predicate crimes to corporate liability under Section 25-sexiesdecies of Legislative Decree 231/2001, providing both pecuniary and disqualifying sanctions.

In Italian criminal law, concealment is a generic concept which may assume criminal relevance in different ways.

First of all, concealment is a main constituent element of the crime of handling goods deriving from a crime (ricettazione) set forth by Section 648 of the ICC, which is punished by imprisonment for two to eight years and a fine of EUR516–10,329 for whoever purchases, receives or conceals money or goods deriving from a crime, with the intent of gaining a profit for oneself or others.

Any felony (delitto) can be predicate to the crime of concealment; however, a person can be held liable for concealment only if they have not taken part (even as a mere participant) in the commission of the predicate crime. Moreover, pursuant to a novelty introduced by Legislative Decree No 195/2021, misdemeanours can now be predicate offences to this crime as well. In such cases, the penalty is a custodial sentence of one to four years and a fine of EUR3,000–6,000.

Moreover, the act of “concealing” may also be the constituent element of other white-collar crimes such as:

  • the concealment of information whose communication to a counter-party was – in good faith – deemed mandatory may lead to the finding of the crime of fraud (Section 640 of the ICC), punished with imprisonment from six months to three years; and
  • the concealment of accounting sheets may lead to the finding of the tax crime of concealment or destruction of accounting sheets (Section 10 of Legislative Decree 74/2000), punished with imprisonment of 18 months to six years.

Finally, any crime is aggravated (Section 61, (2) of the ICC) if committed with the purpose of concealing another one.

Aiding and abetting another person to commit a crime is regulated by Section 110 of the ICC. According to this provision, aiders and abettors are subject to the same penalties provided by the corporate crime to the main offender. Pursuant to settled Italian case law, four preconditions must occur in order to establish liability for aiding and abetting:

  • a plurality of people committing the crime;
  • commission of a crime (or of an attempt to commit a crime) by the principal author;
  • facilitation provided by the aider and abettor to the main author; and
  • awareness on the part of the aider and abettor to help the main author commit the crime.

As to the facilitation requirement, the provided help can be material or psychological. Material help occurs when the aider or abettor makes it simpler for the author to commit the crime (for example, the handing over of a lockpick to the thief in order to facilitate the opening of the door). Psychological help occurs when the aider or abettor instigates, encourages or drives the main author to commit the crime (for example, a promise to a thief to buy a stolen painting, before a crime is committed, is held responsible for the psychological instigation of that thief).

Sections 112 and 114 of the ICC provide for aggravating and mitigating factors. An example of an aggravating factor is the participation in the crime of five or more people; an example of a mitigating factor is the negligible contribution provided by the aider and abettor.

The ICC regulation of money laundering and self-laundering (the latter in force from 1 January 2015 onwards) has been substantially renewed by Legislative Decree 195/2021. The main new elements are that:

  • both crimes can now have, as a predicate offence, any crime, even if committed with negligence (while the previous norm required wilful crimes as predicate offences); and
  • both crimes can now also have misdemeanours as a predicate offence, even if in this case the penalty is milder.

Money laundering occurs when the agent, being aware of the circumstance that money or other goods stem from the predicate offence, conceals their provenance (paper trail tampering). The applicable penalty is a custodial sentence of two to eight years and a fine of EUR5,000–25,000 (self-laundering) and a custodial sentence of four to twelve years and a fine of EUR10,000–25,000 (money laundering). If the predicate crime is a misdemeanour, the penalty is instead a custodial sentence of one to four years and a fine of EUR 2,500–12,500 (self-money laundering) and a custodial sentence of two to six years and a fine of EUR 2,500–12,500 (money laundering). Confiscation of the profit is mandatory. Both crimes trigger corporate liability when committed in the interest, or to the advantage, of a legal entity.

Legislative Decree 231/2007, recently amended, provides for specific duties targeted at preventing money laundering. The infringement of these duties can lead to administrative and, in the most serious cases, criminal liability.

The prosecution of administrative offences is carried out by different bodies, depending on the identity of the obliged person who has infringed the anti-money laundering obligations: a general competence is attributed to the Italian Ministry of Economics, while sanctions in regulated sectors are applied by the relevant regulatory authorities (eg Bank of Italy, Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni (the Italian insurance regulator) or Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (the Italian securities regulator)). Examples of administrative offences include:

  • infringement of the obligation to carry out adequate verification of a client (Section 56), punished with a pecuniary sanction of EUR2,000 or, in aggravated cases, with a pecuniary sanction of EUR2,500–50,000; and
  • failure to report a suspect operation (Section 58), punished with a pecuniary sanction of EUR3,000 or, in aggravated cases, with a pecuniary sanction of EUR30,000–300,000.

The responsibility for the prosecution of criminal offences is held by the public prosecutor. The main criminal offences, besides the ones set forth in the ICC, are (Section 55):

  • falsity or fraud in the verification of a client, punishable with imprisonment for six months to three years and a fine for anyone who, obliged to carry out adequate verification of a client, forges the data or information received from the client, or knowingly receives and uses forged data or information; and
  • violation of the prohibition to report a suspect operation, punishable with imprisonment for six months to one year.

With reference to individuals, two kinds of defence can be employed.

The first one relates to the actus reus and it is aimed at establishing that the alleged illegal behaviour did not occur. Since, in most cases, white-collar offences provide criminal punishment for violations of financial, tax or regulatory provisions, it is of the utmost importance for the criminal defence to be supported by the expertise of colleagues adept in these areas.

The second type of defence relates to the mens rea. Almost all white-collar offences require wilful intent and therefore the defence must aim at proving that there was no intention to commit a crime (mere negligence is not sufficient to establish the mens rea).

With reference to corporate defence, the existence of a suitable compliance programme (an organisational model pursuant to Law 231/2001) at the time when the crime was committed can amount to a valid excuse. This is the case when the crime was committed by the management of the company and it can be proved that managers fraudulently circumvented the compliance programme or, automatically, in cases where the crime was committed by a subordinate employee. The implementation of the organisational model after the commission of the crime does not exclude corporate liability but can effectively mitigate the punishment.

Corporate liability in the Italian system is not triggered by any crime but only by specific categories of crime listed by Law 231/2001, such as bribery, false balance sheets or money-laundering. A suitable compliance programme can provide a liability shield with reference to each of the aforementioned crimes.

Section 131-bis of the ICC provides for a general exemption from criminal liability (also applicable to white-collar offences) when the offence brought about by the conduct is negligible and there is no repeat of the conduct.

Other specific exceptions are set out by single provisions in the field of white-collar offences. Examples are:

  • tax crimes where the tax evasion does not cross given thresholds;
  • false balance sheets where no meaningful offence for the company or for the creditors occurs; and
  • the crime of undue collection of public loans, which is not punishable when the amount of money does not exceed EUR4,000.

The idea of rewarding the author of a crime for post factum co-operation or self-disclosure has traditionally been regarded with scepticism in the Italian criminal law system, since such rewards might reduce the general preventative function of the criminal penalty, or might induce the author of the crime to accuse (even groundlessly) other people in order to mitigate their position.

However, Italian criminal legislation has recently shown an increasing interest in this kind of provision.

  • The new Section 13 of Legislative Decree 74/2000, introduced in 2015, states that the tax crimes of incorrect or omitted tax returns shall not be punished if the taxpayer voluntarily self-corrects its tax position – before having knowledge of any tax inspection – and pays the due sums. This provision was extended in 2019 to the tax frauds punished by Section 2 and 3 of Legislative Decree 74/2000.
  • The new Section 323-ter of the ICC, introduced in 2019, states that the authors of crimes against the public administration (including bribery) shall not be punished if, before having knowledge of any investigation, and in any case within four months from the commission of the fact, they voluntarily self-denounce, providing useful information for the prosecution of the crime and of the other participants in it; restitution of the profit of the crime is a further precondition in order not to be punished.
  • In 2014, so-called “voluntary disclosure” legislation was introduced (Law 186/2014) in order to encourage the self-reporting of some tax crimes, in cases of positive conclusion of the disclosure procedure, the taxpayer was not punished for the tax crimes reported and for money-laundering facts linked to them.

In these cases, co-operative conduct with the investigation might be taken into consideration by the judge when applying the penalty (eg, reducing it because of the generic mitigating circumstances (Section 62-bis of the ICC)).

Private Sector

The practice of whistle-blowing in the private sector has been regulated by Law 179/2017, which amended the framework of the organisational models provided for by Section 6 of Legislative Decree 231/2001. Legislative Decree 231/2001 introduced the liability of the legal entity with regard to certain criminal offences committed by its directors, representatives or employees, in the interest or to the advantage of the legal entity itself. The body is not liable for the criminal offences committed by the said people if it can demonstrate the adoption and implementation, prior to the commission of the crime, of organisational models suitable for preventing offences similar to the one that was committed.

Section 6 mentioned above (as amended by Law 179/2017) sets out that the organisational models must provide for:

  • one or more ways to offer detailed reporting of the unlawful conduct (relevant according to Legislative Decree 231/2001) that the individual believes has occurred, based on precise and consistent factual elements, which are known because of the corporate functions performed, in order to protect the integrity of the legal entity;
  • alternative ways of reporting, which guarantee (through technological anonymity) the confidentiality of the whistle-blower;
  • the prohibition of retaliatory and discriminatory acts against the whistle-blower, in relation (directly or indirectly) to the reporting; and
  • disciplinary sanctions against anyone who violates the confidentiality obligations in relation to the identity of the whistle-blower or against anyone who carries out, intentionally or with gross negligence, ungrounded reporting.

Retaliatory dismissal against the whistle-blower is void.

The addressees of the reporting obligation are the individuals mentioned by Section 5, a) and b), of the Legislative Decree 231/2001 (employees that are in top management positions and employees that are subject to the management or supervision of others).

Public Sector

A specific regulation is in force for public employment (Section 54-bis Legislative Decree 165/2001, amended by Law 179/2017). The public employee who reports unlawful conduct – of which they became aware due to their employment – cannot be sanctioned, demoted dismissed, moved, or subjected to any other negative organisational measures due to this reporting. The identity of the whistle-blower cannot be revealed. In criminal proceedings, their identity is protected within the limits provided for by the ICCP.

Law 179/2017 also introduced, for both the private and public sectors, a special exemption from criminal liability for the whistle-blower with reference to crimes of unlawful disclosure of secrets. This exemption is subject to certain limits, expressly prescribed by law.

In the Italian criminal trial, the burden of proof is entirely on the public prosecutor.

Section 27, paragraph 2 of the Italian Constitution sets out that the defendant is not considered guilty until a final judgment of conviction (ie, an irrevocable conviction decision).

The relevant standard of proof is expressly indicated by Section 533 of the ICCP: a conviction decision is issued by the judge only when the defendant is proven guilty beyond any reasonable doubt.

The proof of criminal liability does not allow any presumption mechanism, but Italian jurisprudence admits so called “indirect or circumstantial evidence” in order to prove the liability of the defendant.

In cases where a defendant is deemed guilty of a criminal offence by a criminal court, the assessment of penalties is specifically regulated by the ICC.

According to Section 132 of the ICC, the judge applies the penalty on a discretionary basis, but he or she must point out the reasons that justify the use of such discretionary power.

In any case, in increasing or decreasing the penalty, the judge cannot exceed the relevant limits provided for by the law.

According to Section 133 of the ICC, using the discretionary power prescribed by Section 132, the judge must take into consideration the seriousness of the crime, which is inferred from:

  • the nature, the kind, the means, the subject, the time, the place and any other aspect of the conduct;
  • the seriousness of the damage or of the risk caused by the crime to the injured party; and
  • the level of mens rea or fault.

Moreover, the judge must also take into consideration the tendency or capacity of the defendant to commit further crimes, which is inferred from:

  • the reasons that led the offender to commit the crime and the character of the offender;
  • the criminal and judicial records of the offender and, in general, the background of the offender (their conduct and life before the commission of the crime);
  • the conduct simultaneous with and subsequent to the crime; and
  • the individual, familial and social conditions of the offender.

In the case of a plea agreement between the defendant and the prosecutor, the judge must verify the adequacy of the penalty agreed. The judge cannot modify this penalty; only grant it or, if they deem the penalty inadequate, reject it.

Cagnola & Associati Studio Legale

Via Conservatorio, 15
20122 Milan
Italy

+39 02 3598 8008

+39 02 4070 1597

info@cagnolaeassociati.it www.cagnolaeassociati.it
Author Business Card

Trends and Developments


Authors



Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP is a leading international law firm with offices in over ten countries. The Milan team works with leading multinationals, financial institutions and investors, many of them listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, as well as SMEs, that play a key role in driving the Italian economy. It provides support on cross-practice, cross-border, corporate, M&A, private equity, compliance, and financial transactions as well as defending clients in their disputes, both in and out of court, particularly in the technology, energy and infrastructure, and financial sectors.

Introduction

Following the end of the critical phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, notwithstanding that there are other emergencies such as the energy crisis and the war in Ukraine, life is slowly starting to get back to normal.

Even in the world of white-collar crime, after years of state of emergency and remote hearings, in recent months things seem to have returned to the pre-pandemic status quo.

There is therefore a need to understand whether these unusual years have introduced any changes, even long-lasting ones, both in terms of crime trends and of tools used within the criminal justice system to deal with potentially unlawful situations.

Especially after the summer recess of 2022, some conclusions can be drawn to try to understand how this “new normal” will develop and what changes, both social and legal, that emerged during the pandemic will characterise future trends.

In an attempt to give an overview of the issues that have undergone the most significant changes, as well as to identify the common features and specific trajectories that the Italian and European judicial systems will follow in the coming years, this article will cover the current “hottest trends”, including:

  • cybercrimes and cyber-laundering, with an increase in digitalisation and the related risk of exploitation of new technologies for criminal purposes, which has led to a rise in control functions delegated by the authorities to financial operators and companies in order to fight money laundering;
  • fraud related to European and national funding, with an increase of the latter as a means to overcome the COVID-19 crisis, which has resulted in more stringent conditions being put on financial operators and companies with regards to compliance and due diligence so as to avoid any potential illegal use thereof; and
  • the new trend set by the Milan Prosecutor’s Office of appointing “monitors” under the anti-Mafia legislation to companies that, though outside the Mafia environment, have shown a lack of compliance, especially in the selection of third parties, with the aim of encouraging compliance culture.

Analysis of the above trends will reveal:

  • an increasing focus on the involvement of entities in the financial and industrial sectors in preventing, together with the authorities, the commission of crimes by means of thorough checks of the relevant operations;
  • the pressure put on companies to structure their internal compliance systems in effective and integrated terms; and
  • the need for internal investigations to allow for the testing of compliance systems and active co-operation with the authorities.

Digitalisation, Cybercrimes and Money Laundering

As a result of the lockdown period, which in Italy lasted from 2020 to 2021, and the rise of remote work, which still characterises employment relationships in 2022 with the majority of the population being confined to their homes, and the subsequent increase in the use of the internet, of online transactions and the digitalisation of many economic fields, criminals have (successfully) tried to take advantage of the situation. The direct consequence is that financial cybercrimes have increased exponentially.

Financial cybercrimes constitute a variety of offences, including phishing, spoofing, IBAN swapping etc, which concern both individuals and companies and can cause multi-million dollar damage, as a result of which companies and individuals are increasingly investing in cybersecurity in order to protect themselves from hacker attacks.

In these kinds of attacks, follow-on action lacks effectiveness, given the difficulties in tracking down criminal proceeds and the frequent use of sophisticated technologies to conceal one’s digital identity.

Therefore, prevention becomes a fundamental asset for companies and, in particular, cybersecurity has become one of the main tasks in companies’ compliance agendas, with the relevant budget constantly growing year after year.

However, avoiding falling victim to cybercrimes is not sufficient. As once said by a manager of a cybersecurity company: “the whole idea is why invest hundreds of thousands of dollars to build your own malware when you can just convince someone to do something stupid?”. Companies are now focusing more on internal compliance rules regarding both the use of IT devices and the checklist before approving bank transactions, together with continuous and tailored training for employees.

Anti-money laundering (AML) has a pivotal role in combating cybercrimes: while money laundering is a long-standing problem, with the increase in cyber flows this phenomenon is progressively evolving into cyber laundering – obviously strictly connected to cybercrimes, in order to secure the relevant proceeds – particularly targeting the financial sector and causing damage of up to USD6 trillion globally over the last year.

With the rise of new technologies, this phenomenon has become more and more sophisticated, making cash flows more difficult to trace and allowing for funds for illicit asset purchases and other illegal activities to be created.

Recent trends include a surge in virtual asset management, a proliferation of cryptocurrencies and an increased use of schemes and filters, including virtual ones, to conceal the beneficiary of a given transaction. In fact, more and more relationships with financial institutions are no longer initiated through face-to-face encounters, but rather online, thus making it easier for them to be exploited for criminal purposes through anonymity and the difficulty in tracking down transactions.

In order to prevent this type of criminal activity, regulators, both at a national and European level, have provided for decentralised control mechanisms, to be performed by individual national authorities and agencies, which are part of a network of transnational horizontal collaboration – between, for example, National Prosecutor’s Offices, Financial Intelligence Units and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) – and continuous exchange of data and information.

In this respect, European provisions on AML, set out mainly in EU Directives No 2015/849, No 2018/843 and No 2018/1673, aim to harmonise member states’ legislation and avoid “forum shopping”, which could be an issue given differences in the way offences are worded as well as the provision of different penalty levels in each state.

Furthermore, AML regulations provide for the increased involvement of financial operators in the fight against money laundering by delegating control functions to the latter. For example, Legislative Decree No 90/2017, amending Legislative Decree No 231/2007 (the “AML Decree”) provides for an AML officer who is charge of all AML-related compliance within each entity, whereas the European Banking Authority’s Guidelines of June 2022 require entities to identify at least one board member responsible for implementing the provisions necessary to comply with EU Directive No 2015/849. Legislative Decree No 90/2017 also imposes a duty of active co-operation with the authorities through the reporting of suspicious transactions and the disclosure of information concerning clients, with a view to preventing and punishing unlawful behaviours.

In this regard, one of the newest pieces of AML legislation in Italy, which follows the path laid down by European AML Directives and the AML Decree, is a Decree issued by the Ministry of Economy and Finance in January 2022, which sets out certain operational requirements for crypto-asset service providers, including enrolling in a register (as already provided for money changers) and reporting obligations in relation to transactions involving cryptocurrencies.

As a result of the above, therefore, financial operators are being pressured into taking risk-based approaches and adopting effective AML programmes, by making use of artificial intelligence (eg, blockchain technology, which allows firms to keep track of transactions by using cryptography), to ensure ongoing compliance with the evolving regulatory landscape, anticipate emerging risks appropriately and avoid the negative consequences of failing to do so, such as reputational harm and adverse financial repercussions.

In fact, while new technologies may be the cause of the emergence of new AML risks, they can nonetheless help in mitigating said risks, as they allow information to be analysed in a swift manner and any suspicious transaction pattern to be detected automatically, hence they can make a valid contribution to know your customer (KYC) processes and also reduce costs for operators.

Against this backdrop, prosecutors are now focusing on verifying financial institutions’ compliance with AML regulations, especially those in the fintech sector, such as electronic money institutions and payment institutions. In fact, considering that – according to prosecutors – many online financial providers have often been used for criminal purposes, owing to a lack of compliance within the financial system, another new trend consists in the increase of criminal proceedings against financial institutions for money laundering. In more detail, prosecutors consider entities which do not comply with the AML framework as having acted recklessly by knowingly not adopting an AML programme and by accepting the risk of having fraudsters as clients, and consequently are considered to be accomplices in the crimes committed by the latter. 

This latter trend requires financial institutions, especially new players with lighter corporate and compliance histories, to include compliance, mainly but not only in the area of AML, at the top of their agenda and to implement constant and smooth co-operation with the authorities, demonstrating their commitment to combating financial crimes and money laundering.

The Green Transition and Fraud Related to EU and National Funding

Over the past two years, there has been a sharp increase in funding, both at national and European level, as a way to overcome the COVID-19 crisis and as part of the EU’s plan to secure a number of goals, such as digitalisation and the “green transition”. This phenomenon, however, in addition to playing an important role in terms of relief and stimulus, is appealing to criminals and has proved vulnerable to Mafia meddling.

In this context, with the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), adopted in 2021 as part of the Next Generation EU Plan (NGEU) to revive the economy following the COVID-19 pandemic, and allocating EUR191.5 billion to be used in six policy areas, including digitalisation, innovation, sustainable mobility and the green transition, two different phenomena have emerged (or, at least in the first case, became more evident): fraud aimed at obtaining public funds and tax credits.

Obtaining public funds

Obtaining public funds is linked to, for example, obtaining incentives related to renewable energy sources or to specific types of digitalisation, creating an area in which, as stated by the Milan Prosecutor’s Office, there is a high risk of Mafia infiltration and which will see an increase in controls by the newly established EPPO and, consequently, in internal investigations and litigation.

In order to counter these types of fraud, the law provides for both preventive checks at the time of application, in which importance is given to self-declarations submitted by the individuals or entities making an application and claiming to be eligible for funding, and ex-post controls, carried out by certain authorities such as the Italian Anticorruption Authority (ANAC), at a national level, and by the EPPO and European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) at a European level, since supervising the granting of incentives has always been one of the goals, from the point of view of enforcement agencies, which has had a focus on phenomena such as fraud against the State and dissipation of public funds.

The very idea of the EPPO, which is the first example of a central prosecution authority in the EU, stems from the need to protect EU interests, and, in fact, its focus is on VAT and other EU-related fraud.

Though it only started operating in June 2021, the EPPO has carried out almost 1,000 investigations so far, with more to come in the following years. Concerning Italy, EPPO investigations have recently led to:

  • the seizure of EUR1.1 million from two Italian companies operating in the medical supply sector, following the allegation that they provided hospitals in Northern Italy with face masks and protective suits without suitable certification;
  • the seizure of EUR2 million and the arrest of twelve individuals in relation to alleged fraud concerning EU agricultural funds in the Italian region of Sardinia; and
  • the arrest of two public officials working in the field of social housing in Palermo and an accountant in relation to alleged unlawful inducement to give or promise money concerning the renovation project of a social housing building.

In addition to the control carried out by the authorities, in the current system we can see that there is greater accountability for all those involved in the process of granting funding, who are called upon to conduct a thorough check as to the suitability of applicants to obtain funding, ranging from financial liability to criminal liability for complicity in the fraud committed by the applicant, in relation to behaviour that appears more of an oversight in compliance than actual co-participation in the crime.

One example of this type of accountability concerns the State, which, if it does not recover European funds obtained unlawfully by fraudsters, must partially reimburse the funding.

Further examples where liability extends beyond the main fraudster involve mergers and acquisitions of companies that have unlawfully benefited from public funds.

Given the fact that, in the case of a merger or transfer of a business unit, the acquiring company would become, in the former case, criminally liable pursuant to Legislative Decree No 231/2001 (“Law 231”), which establishes corporate criminal liability, or jointly and severally liable for the payment of a fine in the latter case, it becomes crucial, in the acquisition phase, to understand whether there are any risks of criminal corporate liability, to assess whether it is possible to proceed with the transaction and, if so, to create mitigants.

Tax credits

EU-level interventions, such as the NGEU, have been complemented by various national interventions, among which are a series of bonuses aimed at developing the construction sector, such as the “Renovation Bonus” and the “110% Superbonus scheme”, which consists of a deduction of expenses incurred for the implementation of specific interventions aimed at energy efficiency and increasing building safety.

These incentives usually consist in tax credits, in which the subject carrying out renovation works advances the payment and later, by proving that he or she falls within the parameters to qualify for the bonus, will receive a tax credit equal to a share of the amount spent for the work carried out.

Tax credits are a type of public funding which may be transferred to financial institutions in exchange for cash, thus creating a secondary market, mainly managed by financial institutions, concerning the possibility of the beneficiary obtaining immediate liquidity from the relevant bonus through the transfer of the tax credit, for example, to whomever actually carries out the work or to a bank, against a reduction of what the beneficiary would have received if he or she had waited until the deadline set for obtaining the tax credit.

However, the main menace in this area is that the underlying credit may not be real, ie, not due (such as tax credit for fictitious construction work, R&D costs or other activities related to the NRRP). Therefore, there is also an investigative focus on the transfer of tax credits lacking those requirements under which the credit could have been granted in the first place.

The risk is that criminal liability could also extend from the transferor of the tax credit to those financial institutions which, in order to obtain the credit, did not make a proper assessment and thus accepted the risk of the wrongdoing. Hence, once again, financial institutions should focus on credit due diligence, in order to double-check the legality of the credit which is being acquired.

In particular, if the underlying credit turns out to be undue, financial institutions would be held criminally liable together with the original beneficiary. If, on the other hand, the underlying credit was transferred after all the required functional checks were put in place to verify the beneficiary’s claim, financial institutions would not be held liable if they were able to prove that they had effectively and thoroughly performed due diligence in this regard.

As is also the case for AML, in the area of public (national and European) funds too, Italy is witnessing increased pressure by the authorities on the private sector, especially the financial sector, as it is increasingly being called upon to play a role in monitoring the fairness of economic transactions.

Preventive Measures as a Means to Encourage Compliance Culture

The last trend that has been emerging recently is the increasing use, especially by the Milan Prosecutor’s Office, of what is known as monitorship (amministrazione giudiziaria) under anti-Mafia legislation, which is being used as a means to encourage compliance culture in companies, though it was originally created as a sanctioning tool to permanently strip the Mafia of any ties with the economic world through the confiscation of assets, such as businesses used to launder the proceeds of illegal activities.

Monitorship is characterised by a streamlined enforcement procedure: in fact, for it to apply there is no need for a criminal trial to take place nor for criminal liability to be established, as it is a preventive action based on presumptive evidence which implies a burden of proof shared between the prosecution (who only have to prove the existence of evidence) and the affected party (who, when confronted with said evidence, has to prove its lack of involvement in the Mafia system).

Once a monitor is appointed by the court, they will try to bring the company back to its ordinary, lawful business activity, and make sure that such problems do not recur. If, however, following the period during which a company is monitored strong relations with the Mafia emerge, the company shall be permanently confiscated.

In recent years, the Milan Prosecutor’s Office has used monitorship in a different way, not so much for the purpose of fighting the Mafia through confiscation, but rather as a temporary measure aimed at incentivising all those companies that have shown a poor compliance culture, which thus led them to have Mafia-related companies among their suppliers, to implement their own internal procedures so as to avoid further possible meddling in the future.

In this view, in fact, monitorship does not so much affect the Mafia-related company as those companies, part of the lawful production circuit, that have entered into contracts with suppliers or customers from the Mafia world and that, through the relationships established with these individuals, risk indirectly benefitting organised crime.

It has been noted that, in this case, monitorship acts as a response to the violation of normal rules of prudence, good business administrationand transparency, and is intended to last for a limited period of time, at the end of which the company would not be confiscated (as provided for in the anti-Mafia regulations) but would be returned to the owners with a new, enhanced compliance capacity.

In practice, therefore, the use of this tool is often almost as an alternative to criminal trials under Law 231, as it achieves, in a quicker manner, the goal of strengthening compliance which might instead take longer within the context of a criminal trial.

Once again, as for AML and public funding, companies are required to implement strict internal control systems to detect not only the risks of “direct” Mafia infiltration, but also of indirect Mafia infiltration, through their suppliers and customers.

Therefore, similarly to how financial institutions are held liable for money laundering if their account holders commit this crime, as well as for the unlawful transfer or use of sham tax credits, companies may also be held criminally negligent for failing to provide an adequate internal control system.

Conclusion: A Shift from Punishment to Prevention

What emerges from this analysis is how, over recent years, there has been a shift from a punitive perspective to a preventive one in the area of white-collar crime, connected with a widening of the scope of corporate criminal liability with regards to companies and financial operators, resulting from the pressure put upon the latter by the authorities in order to carry out control functions over their business counterparts (eg, clients, suppliers, tax credit transferors) so as to discourage the commission of crimes and foster a culture of compliance.

Hence, it is fundamental that companies and financial operators properly assess risks and that there is continuous monitoring, so as to avoid any potential negative consequences which could have devastating impacts on their business activities.

In this regard, besides ensuring that compliance exists not only on paper but also in practice, entities should opt for an integrated approach to corporate compliance by adopting organisation, management and control models, such as the one provided for by Law 231, which are tailored to the specificities of each entity and which concretely interact with other compliance tools relating to the areas of, for example, privacy, supplier quality management (eg, ISO certifications) and sustainability (eg, sustainability reports).

A further push in this direction is given by the so-called “Crisis Code” (Legislative Decree No 14/2019), which requires companies to introduce “appropriate arrangements to prevent business crises”, therefore, a coherent system that looks at both the financial soundness and the overall resilience of corporate compliance, which is no longer seen as an obstacle to business activity but rather as a guarantee for its continuation and as an additional stimulus.

Therefore, with a view to ensuring effective and continuous monitoring and in addition to setting up a compliance system, it is essential that, should any compliance risks arise, entities proceed to carrying out internal investigations which, in order to achieve a balance between the need to conduct investigations and the risk of self-incrimination, should take the form of preventive defensive investigations, carried out by outside counsel, which provide a series of guarantees, such as secrecy of communications between client and counsel, a prohibition against seizing the investigation reports and the probative value of the evidence collected, which could therefore be used if criminal proceedings are instituted.

Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP

Corso Giacomo Matteotti 10
20121, Milan
Italy

+39 02 4541 3800

+39 02 4541 3801

gtesta@orrick.com www.orrick.com
Author Business Card

Law and Practice

Authors



Cagnola & Associati Studio Legale was set up in July 2016 and is based in Milan, Italy. The firm specialises in corporate criminal law, an area in which its team of professional lawyers has developed significant expertise by participating in some of the most notable national and international trials. Its lawyers provide legal defence for both individuals and corporations in criminal proceedings and advisory services. The firm consistently relies on the most qualified experts and consultants in each specialised area. Amongst the firm’s areas of expertise are anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, criminal tax law, environmental criminal law, banking and financial criminal law, and corporate and bankruptcy criminal law. The firm is composed of 18 people and provides legal assistance throughout Italy and internationally.

Trends and Developments

Authors



Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP is a leading international law firm with offices in over ten countries. The Milan team works with leading multinationals, financial institutions and investors, many of them listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, as well as SMEs, that play a key role in driving the Italian economy. It provides support on cross-practice, cross-border, corporate, M&A, private equity, compliance, and financial transactions as well as defending clients in their disputes, both in and out of court, particularly in the technology, energy and infrastructure, and financial sectors.

Compare law and practice by selecting locations and topic(s)

{{searchBoxHeader}}

Select Topic(s)

loading ...
{{topic.title}}

Please select at least one chapter and one topic to use the compare functionality.