The main rules governing transfer pricing are:
Transfer pricing rules were first introduced into Portuguese written legislation through Law 30-G/2000, 29 December, and Ministerial Order number 1446-C/2001, 21 December, and entered into force in the beginning of 2002. In 2008, the advanced transfer pricing agreements framework was introduced. In 2019, Law 119/2019 of 18 September and Ministerial Orders number 267/2021 of 26 November and 268/2021 of 26 November aligned the domestic transfer pricing regime with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (2017) and BEPS actions 8, 9, 10 and 13.
Article 63 of the Portuguese CIT Code defines a controlled transaction as any transaction between related parties.
Controlled Transactions
Controlled transactions comprise:
Related Parties
Related parties are entities where one of the parties has, directly or indirectly, a significant influence on the other party’s management. Such influence exists notably in regard to:
The Portuguese legislation lists five specific methods which can be used by taxpayers: (i) the comparable uncontrolled price method; (ii) the resale price method; (iii) the cost-plus method; (iv) the transactional profit split method; and (v) the transactional net margin method.
Unspecified methods are allowed every time the methods listed in 3.1 Transfer Pricing Methods cannot be used due to the unique or singular character of the transaction, or the lack of reliable comparable information or data on similar transactions between independent parties, in particular for transactions regarding real estate rights, share capital of non-listed companies, credit rights and intangibles.
Portugal has a flexible approach concerning transfer pricing methods. Taxpayers area allowed to select any method providing that the elected method is capable of providing the most reliable estimate of an arm’s-length transaction, taking into consideration, notably, the nature of the transaction, the existence of reliable information and the compatibility degree between identical transactions performed at arm’s length.
The selection of comparable transactions must be well grounded with selection and rejection criteria followed, including sensitivity, statistical and functional analysis to identify the proper comparable transactions and the adequate value or range of values obtained.
Following the selection of the comparable transaction and corresponding values or range of values, additional adjustments may be taken to correct the impact (of a residual nature) on transaction values caused by differences between the comparable transactions chosen and the independent transaction under analysis.
Transactions involving intangibles are subject to a specific regime which comprises of the following.
No special rules regarding hard-to-value intangibles apply. OECD guidelines on the matter are expected to be of particular relevance.
Cost sharing/cost contribution arrangements are recognised as arrangements in which two or more entities agree to allocate between each other the costs and risks of producing, developing or acquiring any assets, rights or services, according to the proportion of advantages or benefits that each party expects to obtain from its participation in the arrangement.
In such arrangements entered into between related parties, and according to the arm’s-length principle, the value of the contribution to each of the parties should be in line with the value of the contribution which would be required by an independent party under comparable conditions.
The share of the contribution each party is liable for should correspond to the share of its contribution to the expected benefits to be received under the agreement. An appropriate allocation key may apply – considering the nature of the activity, the business turnover, personnel costs, added value or the invested capital – whenever a direct and individual assessment of such benefits is not possible.
There are no specific rules on affirmative transfer pricing adjustments after filing tax returns. Thus, subsequent material adjustments with impact on the tax return information should, in principle, require the submission of a corrective tax return.
From a functional perspective, exchange of information with other jurisdictions’ tax authorities may be automatic, spontaneous or upon request. Such exchange may occur under multiple international instruments:
APAs are recognised by Portuguese law. Such agreements can be either unilateral – if the agreement is entered into between the Portuguese Tax Authorities and one or more taxpayers – or bilateral/multilateral – if the agreement includes also one or more tax authorities of another jurisdiction with whom Portugal has signed a double tax treaty.
The APAs are directly negotiated with the Portuguese tax authorities. The programme is initiated with a request filed by the taxpayer directed to the general tax director.
Portuguese domestic law recognises bilateral or multilateral APAs if the other jurisdictions involved are parties in a treaty that establishes a mutual agreement procedure (MA) in accordance with Article 25(3) of the OECD Model Convention or Article 16 of the Multilateral Instrument (MLI). Thus, in these procedures APAs involve foreign tax authorities and proper co-ordination with the applicable MAP procedures.
There are no objective limits on which taxpayers or transactions are eligible for an APA.
The preliminary request for an APA application must be filed up to nine months before the beginning of the tax year to be covered in the agreement.
A taxpayer is subject to a fee of between EUR2,618.96 and EUR34,915.85, depending on their turnover.
An APA can cover up to four years, renewable as per a taxpayer request made six months prior to its termination.
An APA can have retroactive effect concerning tax returns submitted in the preceding two years before the entry into force of the APA. This possibility depends on the similarity of the past facts and circumstances to the underlying facts and circumstances of the APA.
Penalties between EUR500 and EUR10,000 may be applied, plus 5% per day of delay, if the following conditions are not complied with:
Portuguese legislation requires a taxpayer to prepare and keep organised all tax documentation on transfer pricing policy contemplated by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, including a master file, a local file and a CbC report.
Taxpayers whose annual turnover is below EUR10 million, or, if above, when their controlled transactions income is less than EUR100,000 for each counterpart and EUR500,000 globally, are exempted.
Master File
Taxpayers must include in their transfer pricing documentation a master file containing detailed information on the following elements: (i) organisational, legal and operational group structure; (ii) group activity; (iii) intangibles; (iv) financing; (v) group policies adopted on transfer pricing matters; and (vi) other relevant group information, such as financial demonstrations and advance pricing agreements listing.
Local File
A local file must also be prepared, which shall include, with regard to each of the controlled transactions carried out, (i) a description of the taxpayer business activity; (ii) an identification and description of the related parties’ entities; (iii) characterisation of the controlled transactions; (iv) the description of the methodologies used for determining the (transfer) price for each relevant transaction; and (v) the financial information of the taxpayer.
Taxpayers qualified as small (ie, those that employ fewer than 500 people) or medium-sized (ie, those that employ fewer than 3,000 people) companies are allowed to prepare only a simplified file.
CbC Report
A Portuguese resident entity parent company of a multinational group whose consolidated revenue is equal to or higher than EUR750,000 is required to file a CbC report including the financial and tax information regarding all entities of such group.
The Portuguese transfer pricing rules are closely aligned with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2022).
The Portuguese transfer pricing rules do not depart from the arm’s-length principle. Transactions involving real estate assets are subject to special rules concerning the relevant value for CIT purposes (in particular, when the tax value is higher than the transaction value).
Portugal follows closely OECD’s BEPS project. BEPS Actions 8,9, 10 and 13 were the major source of and reason for the recent amendments to domestic legislation.
Portugal is part of the preliminary agreement regarding OECD’s BEPS 2.0, which addresses the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy. If adopted, proposed changes are expected to imply structural changes in the worldwide tax system.
Portuguese legislation allows one entity to bear the risk of another entity’s operations by guaranteeing the other entity in return. No special limitations apply.
The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing does not have any relevant impact on transfer pricing rules in Portuguese legislation, which mainly follows the OECD Guidelines. This notwithstanding, the UN model is of practical relevance from a Portuguese practitioner’s standpoint due to the significant economic ties of Portugal with jurisdictions influenced by the UN model (in particular, Brazil and some African countries).
In general, the material rules concerning compliance with the arm’s-length principle apply. Domestic legislation on reporting obligations is relaxed for smaller enterprises. See 8.2 Taxpayer Obligations under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
Portugal does not have specific rules governing savings that arise from operating in the country.
Portuguese law does not include unique rules or practices applicable in the transfer pricing context that depart from the OECD Model.
Portugal does not require co-ordination between transfer pricing and customs valuation. However, the customs valuation may be of relevance to evaluate the arm’s-length character of the controlled transaction.
There is no specific transfer pricing controversy process; therefore, general tax controversy rules apply.
A taxpayer can challenge a tax assessment resulting from a transfer pricing audit in an administrative claim, as a general rule, within 120 days from the term of the voluntary tax assessment payment. A negative decision may also be challenged through a hierarchical appeal before the Minister of Finance.
Taxpayers can also submit a claim before a state tax court or a tax arbitration tribunal. There is no need to file a previous administrative claim or appeal.
In general, taxpayers may appeal from the state court decision to the second-tier courts (Tribunais Centrais Administrativos). In exceptional situations, an appeal to the Administrative Supreme Court may be admissible.
The decision of an arbitration tribunal may not, as a general rule, be challenged before the state tax courts.
Portuguese transfer pricing case law has mainly focused on the requirements for the application of the transfer pricing rules and the accuracy of the elected method for the adjustments made by the Tax Authorities, especially in regard to intra-group services and financial transactions. Although the Portuguese legal system is not precedent-based, there is a consistent body of jurisprudence on transfer pricing, which is of the utmost importance from a practitioner standpoint.
The Supreme Administrative Court has recently decided (Process number 01240/08.0BEPRT (2021)), that the Tax Authorities are not permitted to restructure the nature of a controlled transaction in order to find a comparable; as such a requalification of a given transaction may only be admissible under anti-avoidance provisions. The Court considered that transfer pricing rules are only to be used for the purpose of readjusting the terms and conditions of transactions entered into between related parties, and not to requalify such transactions. In particular, the Supreme Court concluded that a shareholder loan with a capital nature cannot be compared, for transfer pricing adjustment purposes, with a common loan agreement and, therefore, should not be subject to transfer pricing rules.
Furthermore, the Supreme Administrative Court (Process number 01402/17 (2018)), together with other tax courts and arbitration tribunals, has reiterated a lex specialis relation between transfer pricing provisions and provisions on deductible expenses, with significant methodological consequences and practical implications for tax audits.
Portuguese law does not have any restrictions on outbound payments relating to uncontrolled transactions.
Portuguese law does not have any restrictions on outbound payments relating to controlled transactions.
Portugal does not have rules regarding the effects of other countries’ legal restrictions.
APAs and transfer pricing audit outcomes are not made public.
Portuguese Law does not allow the use of “secret comparables” by the Tax Authorities in setting an arm’s-length price.
The transfer pricing landscape in Portugal does not seem to have been drastically changed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In specific sectors particularly impacted by the pandemic, controlled-transaction terms had to be adjusted to account for the abrupt changes in comparable uncontrolled transactions.
A considerable number of temporary legislative tax measures were implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. The most relevant ones are:
Deadlines in tax audits were suspended for a period of almost three months at the beginning of 2021 due to the COVID-19 restrictive measures imposed by the Portuguese government. Also, statutes of limitation deadlines were postponed globally for approximately six months. Nevertheless, tax procedures have resumed their proper functioning for a considerable time now.
Avenida da Boavista, 3265, 3.1
4100-137 Porto
Portugal
+351 226 167 260
+351 226 167 269
geral@da.pt www.da.ptIntercompany Financing Transactions outside the Scope of Transfer Pricing Rules
With transfer pricing regulations having been at the top of the international tax community’s agenda over the last few years, understanding the boundaries of the application of such provisions is of the utmost importance for multinational enterprises’ daily practice. Recent tax law disputes on the objective scope of transfer pricing rules in the context of intragroup financing are expected to provide landmark decisions for the years to come.
Transfer pricing rules are designed to apply to any commercial or financial transaction between related entities. The whole system assumes that conditions (prices) in transactions entered into between related parties may be adjusted according to the arm’s-length principle, which relies on the idea of comparable transactions.
The fraught boundary between “pure” shareholder relations and commercial and financial relations
It has been noted by many authors that commercial and financial relations should be set apart from the effects of pure shareholder relations; eg, in-kind dividend distributions and increases or decreases in share capital. This does not mean, in principle, that shareholder relations are outside the scope of transfer pricing; after all, transfer pricing provisions are aimed precisely at determining the conditions in which independent parties negotiate.
However, there is a grey area between “pure shareholder relations” and “commercial and financial relations”. In fact, although some transactions may not be construed as deriving from “pure shareholder relations” they are not clearly deemed to be “commercial and financial relations”, comparable to relations between independent parties, either.
This is particularly the case for intercompany financing through quasi-capital instruments; ie, “loans” between holding companies and their subsidiaries that shares some traits with equity, in particular repayment characteristics (typically more flexible than a reduction of share capital but subordinated when ranked with other debt).
The Portuguese Companies Code has specific rules for these kinds of quasi-capital instruments, which can take the form of additional capital interest-free contributions (prestações suplementares), accessory capital contributions (prestações acessórias) or shareholders’ loans (suprimentos), that are not necessarily analogous to “pure” loans.
The question is to what extent the transfer pricing rules may apply to these quasi-capital instruments, as they may not be construed as “pure” loans.
The Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court rules on quasi-capital instruments
In a recent case (2021) the Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court was asked to decide whether an interest-free loan of a holding company to its subsidiary, subject to a subordinated debt regime, and with tight conditions on repayment (reimbursement to be approved by a shareholders’ resolution and insofar as the company’s assets sufficed to cover its entire debt inscription), could be subject to transfer pricing rules. The Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court decided that said financing transaction could not fall, in principle, within the scope of transfer pricing rules.
The court deemed the applicability of the transfer pricing regime dependent not only on the existence of controlled transactions between related parties, but also on a comparability requirement; ie, the possibility of finding, in the market, equivalent uncontrolled transactions able to sustain a comparison of conditions. In fact, the arm’s-length principle is based on a comparison between the conditions in controlled transactions with those typically agreed upon in uncontrolled transactions. It turns out that it is not (always, at least) possible to compare an intercompany financing operation with a financing operation carried out by a third party as mere creditor towards the company.
Concerning the interest-free conditions of the financing transaction (which is a mandatory condition under Portuguese commercial law), the court considered that finding a comparable transaction in cases where the shareholder, acting as such, funds the company, would always imply a material modification of the examined controlled transaction, as there is no external comparable for the relationship at stake (established between that specific shareholder and that specific company). Any other comparison would necessarily mean a requalification of the nature of the controlled transaction under transfer pricing rules, which has been clearly rejected by leading case law in recent years.
Transfer pricing provisions are for readjusting the terms and conditions of transactions, not requalifying them
In this regard, Portuguese High Courts have been clear in considering that transfer pricing provisions are only to be used for the purpose of readjusting the terms and conditions of the controlled transaction and not to requalify such a transaction. A hypothetical requalification must always operate under anti-avoidance provisions, considering that the theoretical and practical difficulties concerning the interplay of general and special anti-abuse provisions and transfer pricing provisions can be surpassed.
In short, the Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court accepted that some financing transactions occurring between a company and its shareholders may fall outside the objective scope of transfer pricing rules. Such an exclusion may only be accepted in situations where the shareholders act as such; ie, where they do not act as any other third party, which can only be assessed through the specific financing conditions.
In this context, reimbursement conditions (dependent upon shareholders’ resolution and insofar as the company’s assets suffice to cover its entire debt) and the subordinated nature of the debt (in case of insolvency, repayment will be ranked below other debts) are key criteria to draw the line between pure loans and shareholders financing operations through capital equity. From a functional perspective, capital equity financing by shareholders occurs in that capacity (and not as a third party) precisely because such financing bears a much higher economic risk, which only shareholders, as such, are willing to take – only the shareholders can be, in due course, rewarded with the valuation of their shares.
Such reasoning cannot be used to interpret conventional loans between a shareholder and a company. Here, in principle, the shareholder is financing its company as any other investor would and, therefore, has the right to demand payment on standard agreed terms, assuming a much lower risk in comparison with capital equity rewards. Thus, and because there are comparable transactions in the market, transfer pricing rules are fully applicable.
Summary
In conclusion, the specific terms and conditions applicable to a given intercompany financing transaction are key in determining the potential applicability of transfer pricing rules. Insofar as transactions have structural similarities to equity operations – eg, the subordinated nature of the debt and limitations on repayment (such as a shareholder’s resolution or minimum assets) – transfer pricing rules should not, in principle, apply. Conversely, if the terms and conditions of the intercompany financing may be compared to financing transactions between non-related entities, allowing the applicability of the arm’s-length principle, transfer pricing rules should apply.
Avenida da Boavista, 3265, 3.1
4100-137 Porto
Portugal
+351 226 167 260
+351 226 167 269
geral@da.pt www.da.pt