The European Union (EU) and its 27 member states are members of the WTO.
The EU is also a member to several multilateral and plurilateral agreements, including the Government Procurement Agreement, the Trade Facilitation Agreement, the Civil Aircraft Agreement, the Information Technology Agreement and the Pharma Agreement.
The EU is party to several bilateral and multilateral trade and partnership agreements with third countries. The European Commission (the “Commission”) website provides an overview of the current bilateral and multilateral trade agreements concluded by the EU, as well as those which are being currently negotiated.
The EU has adopted special trade regimes under which it grants trade preferences to developing and least-developed countries. Examples include the Generalised Scheme of Preferences, the African Caribbean and Pacific Partnership Agreement, and the Overseas Countries and Territories Decision.
The EU is currently negotiating free trade and partnership agreements with, inter alia, Australia, India and Indonesia. It will also put forward a new agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean.
The EU concluded negotiations for a comprehensive and ambitious trade agreement with New Zealand on 30 June 2022. Once the European Parliament has given its consent and the agreement has been ratified by New Zealand, the agreement will enter into force.
In June 2022, the EU and India formally relaunched negotiations on a balanced, ambitious, comprehensive and mutually beneficial bilateral free trade agreement. They also launched EU–India negotiations on an investment protection agreement and on an agreement on geographical indications. They agreed to fast-track the talks with the aim of concluding them by the end of 2023.
The EU is in the process of ratifying the trade agreements with Chile, Mexico and New Zealand, to ensure their entry into force.
Continued negotiating efforts are also planned for the EU’s agreements with Australia, India and Indonesia.
Pursuant to Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU has exclusive competence with regard to its customs union and its common commercial policy.
Article 31 TFEU establishes that common customs tariff duties shall be fixed by the Council upon a proposal from the Commission. Furthermore, Article 33 TFEU foresees that the European Parliament and the Council take measures in order to strengthen customs co-operation between member states and between the latter and the Commission.
The Commission’s Directorate-General for Tax and Customs Union (DG TAXUD) represents the EU in the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and is responsible for the negotiation and implementation of customs-specific agreements or other agreements with a customs component. This includes rules of origin, customs co-operation and trade facilitation chapters in Free Trade or Partnership Agreements, and customs enforcement provisions in relation to intellectual property rights.
In accordance with Articles 3 and 5 of the Union Customs Code (UCC), national customs authorities implement the EU customs rules, impose and collect import and export duties, oversee goods in transit and under special customs procedures, and pursue customs and export violations.
National customs authorities are also responsible for issuing Binding Tariff Information (BTI) and Binding Origin Information (BOI) decisions upon a written request by an economic operator. The former determine the correct tariff classification of the goods, whereas the latter certify their origin.
A list of the competent customs authorities in the 27 EU member states is available at DG TAXUD's website.
The core EU customs legislation is:
The EU Trade Barrier Regulation (Regulation 2015/1843) provides a complaint mechanism for EU exporters that experience discriminatory trade practices in third countries. EU companies can file market-access complaints via the Access2Markets portal on DG Trade’s website.
From 1 January 2022, full customs declarations and controls were to apply to all EU goods entering the UK. To the extent that has happened, traders bringing goods into the UK need to meet full customs requirements, including declarations and payment of VAT and excise duties. The EU had already introduced full customs controls on goods imported from the UK from 1 January 2021.
On 31 October 2022, the latest version of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) was published in the European Union’s Official Journal. The CN 2023 will apply from 1 January 2023.
On 1 March 2023, Release 2 of the Import Control System 2 (ICS2) will become effective. The ICS2 is a new customs security and safety programme, consisting of a large-scale advance cargo information exchange on all goods entering the EU. ICS2 obliges carriers of goods to complete an Entry Summary Declaration (ENS) prior to the arrival of goods in the EU. Release 2 applies to all goods transported by air in postal, express and general cargo consignments. As of 1 March 2024, Release 3 will take effect and expands the obligations to maritime, road and rail carriers. ICS2 aims to protect Europe’s single market and its citizens, and will facilitate the free flow of trade through improved data-driven customs security processes.
The UK continues to roll out import controls on goods from the EU entering the UK. On 28 April 2022, it announced the postponement of the entry into application of the remaining controls and checks on goods until the end of 2023 (ie, further SPS checks on EU imports, safety and security declarations, further health certification, and restrictions on the import of chilled meats from the EU).
The Commission is working on proposals for a customs reform package. The EU customs reform will aim to better ensure the safety of goods on the single market, and ensure resilient and secure international supply chains.
Restrictive measures are adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by unanimous decisions of the Council of the EU on the basis of proposals from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and following examination in the relevant Council working groups.
EU sanctions are either implementations of UN sanctions, additional reinforcements of UN sanctions (by applying stricter and additional measures – eg, vis-à-vis DPRK), or autonomous sanctions (eg, vis-à-vis Syria, Venezuela, Ukraine/Russia).
Restrictive measures imposed by the EU can target governments of third countries, non-state individual and legal persons or certain industry sectors. They can take the form of restrictions on exports/imports or on engaging in certain activities or with certain natural or legal persons (see further 3.5 List of Sanctioned Persons and 3.6 Sanctions against Countries/Regions).
Due to the division of powers between the EU and its member states, EU sanctions usually consist of a Council Decision and a Council Regulation. The Decision is binding for the member states and obligates them to implement those sanctions for which they have exclusive competences (eg, military sanctions and travel bans). The Regulation is binding on all EU citizens and implements those sanctions that are within the competence of the EU (ie, economic sanctions). The CFSP Council Decision and the Council Regulation are usually adopted together to allow both legal acts to produce their effects at the same time.
The enforcement of EU sanctions lies with member state competent authorities (customs, finance, export control). Member states are obliged to have in place effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, and enforce them in cases of violations. The Commission is responsible for ensuring the uniform application of sanctions.
EU sanctions usually apply:
Restrictions imposed on sanctioned parties usually include a prohibition of travel to the EU (if they are not EU citizens), a freeze of assets within the EU, and an obligation for all legal and natural persons located in the EU not to provide funds or economic resources to the sanctioned persons.
Parties are sanctioned via Council Regulation and/or Decision and notified of being sanctioned either through direct communication (ie, by letter, if their address is known) or by publication of a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Sanctioned parties can appeal to the European Courts.
The EU sanctions map provides a comprehensive overview of the EU sanctions in force. The EU imposes thematic sanctions on persons engaged in or facilitating terrorist activities (Regulation 2580/2001 and Regulation 881/2002), human rights violations (Regulation 2020/1998), cyber-attacks (Regulation 2019/796) and the proliferation of chemical weapons (Regulation 2018/1542). In addition, sanctions imposed on a specific country usually also contain restrictions on specific individuals and companies.
The Commission’s Directorate General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union maintains a consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions.
The EU generally does not impose total embargoes, but targets selected products and sectors in a given country/region. Product groups frequently targeted include military items, dual-use items, internal repression equipment, telecommunication and internet reception equipment, and equipment for key industries of the respective country. Sectors often targeted include the finance sector and core industries of the subject country – oil and gas, mining, etc. The EU can also impose restrictions on investments and financing activities.
The sanctions against Russia, Syria and North Korea, for instance, are among the most comprehensive. The EU sanctions map provides an overview of the restrictions under each regime.
Please refer to the responses to questions 3.5 List of Sanctioned Persons and 3.6 Sanctions Against Countries/Regions.
Generally, the EU refrains from adopting legislative instruments with extraterritorial application. Thus, the EU restrictive measures only expressly apply in situations where links exist with the EU (see response to 3.4 Persons Subject to Sanctions Laws and Regulations). However, in practice, it is possible that certain requirements (eg, licences or end-user declarations, or anti-circumvention clauses) have a secondary sanctions-like effect on the third-country end-user or recipient.
The enforcement of EU sanctions lies with the member states. Depending on the specific sanctions regime and the national legislation of the EU member states, as well as the gravity of the violation, penalties can be administrative or criminal and range from warnings to fines and prison sentences.
At EU level, very severe or repeated violations of sanctions could lead to the designation of the violating party as a sanctioned party.
The competent authorities of the member states can grant specific exemptions or licences for otherwise prohibited activities if this is provided for in the relevant sanctions decisions and regulations.
Sanctions implemented in the form of EU Regulations (ie, secondary EU law) have direct effect and are binding law in all member states. EU citizens therefore have to comply with EU sanctions in the same manner as with any other laws.
Sanctions regulations, however, regularly provide that actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to liability if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in the sanctions regime. However, as there is a general expectation that EU citizens are acquainted with the laws that affect them, it would be difficult to rely on this defence in administrative or criminal proceedings.
The Commission is responsible for ensuring the uniform application of sanctions. Member states have an information exchange including regarding national (enforcement) measures taken and judicial decisions, on the freezing of accounts, and derogations granted.
Certain EU sanctions regulations require EU individuals and legal persons, entities and bodies to provide information which would facilitate compliance with the applicable sanctions (eg, information on accounts and amounts frozen) to the competent authority of the member state and (directly or through the member state) to the Commission. In particular, this obligation concerns banks, insurance companies and fund managers in relation to any accounts or assets held for sanctioned parties.
As a general rule, the EU does not recognise the extraterritorial application of laws adopted by third countries and considers such effects to be contrary to international law. In 1996, in order to protect EU operators from the extraterritorial application of certain third country laws, the EU adopted the EU Blocking Statute (Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96), which was last updated in 2018.
As a reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the EU adopted an unprecedented set of sanctions against Russia. The sanctions target import and export flows in a wide range of sectors, put in place asset freezes on hundreds of persons and entities, restrictions on the transport of goods, restrictions on the financial sector, broadcasting of Russian media, involvement with Russian state-owned enterprises, the Russian Central Bank, public procurement in the EU, and restrictions on the provision of business and other services, including legal services, IT consultancy services and accounting services. The EU also publishes and updates guidelines and FAQs on the interpretation and application of the EU–Russia sanctions.
Several challenges against the sanctions have been lodged at the EU’s General Court. For instance, the restrictions on broadcasting by Russian state-owned news stations in the EU were challenged (and the rejection of the challenge in Case T-125/22 has been appealed in Case C-620/22 P).
On 30 July 2021, the EU adopted new economic sanctions against Lebanon in light of the deteriorating economic, social and humanitarian situation in Lebanon (Council Decision 2021/1277 and Regulation 2021/1275). These sanctions come in addition to the UN sanctions already applicable to Lebanon.
The EU is expected to further tighten the sanctions on Russia and also put an increased emphasis on enforcement, if the war in the Ukraine continues.
Since 2021, the Commission has been working on a further amendment of the Blocking Statute to expand deterrence of the unlawful extraterritorial application of sanctions to EU operators by countries outside the EU. This amendment would also streamline the application of the current EU rules, including by reducing compliance costs for EU citizens and businesses.
Under Article 263 of the TFEU and the UCC, goods intended for export are subject to an export declaration. In addition, certain goods, such as military items listed in the national military lists, dual-use items listed in Annex I to the Dual-Use Regulation (Regulation 2021/821), certain waste and endangered species, require a licence before their export.
Pursuant to Article 3 TFEU, the EU has exclusive competence with regard to its common commercial policy. Article 207(2) TFEU authorises the European Parliament and the Council to adopt regulations setting up an EU regime for the control of exports, including the brokering, related technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items.
The Commission is responsible for administering and managing the EU’s export controls regulation, proposing legislative changes and updates of control lists, and co-ordination between member states.
EU member states may also impose additional (stricter) export controls. Information on additional national rules is available on DG Trade’s website.
Under Article 25a of Regulation 2021/821, the Council may authorise the Commission to negotiate with third countries agreements providing for the mutual recognition of export controls of dual-use items covered by that Regulation, and in particular to eliminate authorisation requirements for re-exports within the territory of the EU.
Each member state has national export control authorities that are responsible for the national export control laws, policies and authorisation procedures. The enforcement of export controls is usually done by the customs authorities of the member states. Information on the national authorities responsible for export controls is available on DG Trade’s website.
EU export controls apply to all exports from the territory of the EU. EU persons might also be subject to EU or member states’ export controls outside the EU; eg, when providing technical assistance or brokering services.
Security-based export controls apply to military items, to listed dual-use items, to all items subject to certain end-uses (eg, use in relation to weapons of mass destruction or missiles carrying such weapons, to military uses in countries subject to military embargos, use in relation to terrorism and human rights violations), to cybersurveillance items, to certain brokering activities, to certain transit operations, and to certain forms of technical assistance. Member states may impose additional licensing requirements.
Please refer to 3.5 List of Sanctioned Persons.
Please refer to 4.4 Persons Subject to Export Controls.
At the core of the EU’s security-based export controls are the national/EU military lists and the EU dual-use list set out in Annex I of Regulation 2021/821. These lists reflect international control regimes (Wassenaar Agreement, Nuclear Suppliers List, Australia Group, Missiles Technology Control Regime).
Military items and highly sensitive dual-use items (Annex IV of Regulation 2021/821) also require a licence for intra-EU transfers from one member state to another (ie, not only for export outside the EU).
Additional restrictions on exports and intra-EU transfers exist, inter alia, for certain waste, endangered species, pesticides, biocides, food and chemicals.
Infringements of export controls can lead to administrative sanctions, criminal sanctions, or both, depending on the seriousness of the violation and the specific laws of the respective EU member state. Penalties shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Severe violations are therefore normally subject to high fines and could lead to prison sentences for the operators responsible, whereas less severe violations could imply revocation of export privileges (eg, global licences), fines and warnings.
The EU and its member states usually have three types of licences:
Companies engaging in exports of sensitive items are required to know and comply with the applicable controls, and to have a robust internal compliance system in place. While the latter is not a general legal requirement, it is a requirement for the use of certain general licences and regularly for the granting of global licences.
If an export requires a licence, companies must obtain approval from the national export control authorities prior to the export. The use of general licences must be reported periodically to the national authorities.
On 7 January 2022, the (annual) update of Annex I of the Dual-use Regulation entered into force. The annual updates are made to bring EU legislation in line with the latest development in the international export control forums of which the EU and the member states are members (the Wassenaar Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group).
Over the course of 2022 and 2023, the EU will continue the implementation of new requirements and mandates under the new 2021 Dual-use Regulation (Regulation 2021/821). This includes work on cybersurveillance technologies, enhanced information exchange and transparency, the enforcement of export controls, emerging technologies and the development of EU capacity-building and training programmes for member states licensing and enforcement authorities.
Anti-dumping (AD), anti-subsidy (AS) and safeguards investigations (SG) (referred to jointly as the EU’s Trade Defence Investigations (TDI)) are conducted by the Commission’s Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade). TDI measures are imposed by Commission Regulation after consultation with the EU member states in the context of the EU Council. The Commission also reviews, adapts and extends trade defence measures.
The Commission’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) can conduct investigations into potential avoidance of payment of conventional customs duties or trade defence measures, and provide the results of those investigations to national authorities for enforcement and other follow-up actions.
The EU’s AD and AS rules are set out in Regulations 2016/1036 and 2016/1037, respectively. The EU’s safeguard rules are set out in Regulations 2015/478 and 2015/755.
The Commission monitors the application of TDI measures and can re-open investigations or initiate reviews if measures need adapting. The member states’ customs authorities enforce compliance with TDI measures upon importation and collect TDI duties. National customs authorities can also conduct administrative and criminal investigations and impose fines in cases of violations.
The Commission can initiate new investigations and certain reviews ex officio. However, investigations are usually initiated pursuant to a request from the EU industry.
New TDI investigations and reviews (eg, interim, expiry, anti-circumvention, absorption, newcomer and suspension) can be requested by interested parties. Certain reviews are subject to standing requirements and/or time limits.
Exporting producers, industry associations and government bodies of the country subject to the investigation can participate in EU TDI investigations. Other non-EU parties can participate if they can show a legitimate interest in the case. The notice of initiation of an investigation is published in the EU Official Journal and invites interested parties to come forward within a certain timeframe.
An AD/AS investigation is usually opened following a complaint/request by the EU industry to the Commission. Safeguard investigations are brought by member states upon request of the EU industry. For new AD and AS investigations, expiry reviews and certain other procedures, a standing requirement exists to ensure that the investigation has sufficient support from the EU industry producing the subject product (at least 25% of total EU production must support the complaint/request and EU producers representing more than 50% of the EU production must not express opposition).
A new AD/AS complaint must include prima facie evidence of dumping/subsidisation, injury and a causal link between the allegedly dumped/subsidised imports and the alleged injury. A review request must contain sufficient prima facie evidence to support the underlying request. An SG complaint must contain prima facie evidence of serious injury to the EU industry caused by a sudden and unforeseeable sharp increase in imports.
Following the lodging of a new AD/AS complaint, the Commission has 45 days to initiate the investigation or reject the complaint. Provisional duties may be imposed no later than eight (AD) or nine (AS) months from the initiation of the proceedings. The investigations must be concluded within 14 months (AD) or 13 months (AS). Reviews can have different or even no statutory deadlines for their opening. Usually reviews must also be concluded within nine or 15 months, depending on the type of review.
Safeguards investigations take normally nine months. Provisional safeguard measures may be imposed in critical circumstances for a maximum of 200 days and can only take the form of an increase of the existing duty level. Safeguard measures apply to imports of the subject goods from all countries. Definitive safeguards measures are usually imposed for four years (including the duration of any provisional measures), with extensions possible up to a maximum of eight years. If the duration of safeguards measures exceeds one year, they need to be progressively liberalised at regular intervals.
Regulations imposing provisional or definitive AD, CVD or SG duties, and regulations or decisions accepting undertakings or terminating investigations or proceedings, are published in the EU Official Journal.
Under the EEA Agreement, the use of TDI measures between the parties is generally excluded for the sectors covered by the agreement. Fishery and agriculture products are not covered by the exclusion.
AD and CVD duties are normally applicable for a period of five years. Before the end of the five-year period, EU producers may request an expiry review, which may result in measures being extended or repealed.
Definitive safeguard measures may last up to four years. Where they exceed three years, they must be reviewed at mid-term and can be extended once for up to a maximum of eight years in total.
Upon request or of its own motion, the Commission can review existing measures to ensure their continued effectiveness/need. The initiation of an interim review usually requires that there has been a lasting change of circumstances. An expiry review is usually initiated following a request by the EU industry which must be made no later than three months before the expiry of the measures. The request must contain sufficient prima facie evidence that the expiry of the measures would result in a continuation or recurrence of dumping/subsidisation and injury. Expiry review investigations must be concluded within 15 months of initiation. The measures remain in force pending the outcome of that review.
Regulations and Decisions on TDI measures can be appealed under Article 263 TFEU before the EU General Court within two months of their publication in the EU Official Journal.
The complainants (EU producers and their associations) and exporting producers in the country subject to the measures that participated in the administrative proceedings generally have standing to bring a direct action. Judgments of the General Court can be further appealed to the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ). Importers and users usually have to challenge TDI measures via national courts and a preliminary ruling request to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU.
On 15 March 2022, the EU adjusted its steel safeguard quotas following the introduction of import bans on steel from Russia and Belarus. The EU reallocated the quotas previously assigned to these two countries to other exporting countries on a proportional basis. The redistribution was done by product category to avoid any supply interruptions of products to steel users in the EU.
On 15 March 2022, the EU imposed AS duties on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in Indonesia and India. In that case, the EU countervailed preferential financing arrangements granted by China to producers in Indonesia. This was the second time that the EU took action against cross-subsidisation by China in third countries. In June 2020, the EU took action against this form of subsidisation by China in relation to glass fibre companies established in special economic zones in Egypt.
In late 2021 and 2022, the Commission further strengthened the AD/AS measures imposed on imports of glass fibre fabrics from China and Egypt in 2020, by extending the duties to offshore applications, imposing anti-absorption measures on imports from Egypt and extending the AD/AS measures to imports from Morocco and Turkey following respective anti-circumvention investigations.
There are currently no significant pending changes in this area.
EU member states are responsible for the adoption of mechanisms to screen FDI in their territory on the grounds of security or public order.
At EU level, the Investment Screening Regulation (Regulation 2019/452) establishes a framework for the screening by member states of FDI into the EU on the grounds of security or public order, and a mechanism for co-operation between member states and between member states and the Commission, with regard to FDI likely to affect security or public order.
Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation 2019/452, member states must notify the Commission and other member states of any FDI in their territory that is undergoing screening by providing information about, inter alia, the ownership structure of the foreign investor, the approximate value of the investment or the funding of the investment and its source. Furthermore, by March 31 of each year, member states must submit to the Commission an annual report covering the preceding calendar year, which is to include aggregated information on FDI that took place in their territory.
Further, Regulation 2019/452 allows the Commission to issue opinions when it considers that an investment poses a threat to the security or public order of more than one member state, or when an investment could undermine a project or programme of interest to the whole EU. Regulation 2019/452 also foresees the possibility for a member state which considers that an FDI in another member state is likely to affect its security or public order to provide comments to the member state in question.
A list of member states which had notified their screening mechanism to the Commission as of 10 May 2022, together with links to the applicable norms and contact details of the competent authorities, are available at DG Trade’s website.
See response to 6.1 Investment Security Mechanisms.
Within the EU, the assessment of investments on grounds of security and public order is conducted by each member state pursuant to its applicable national law. The paragraphs below summarise, as examples, the rules governing the assessment of investments on the grounds of security or public order in Germany and France.
Under Sections 55 to 62 of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung), the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy can assess whether there will be a likely effect on the public order or security of the Federal Republic of Germany, of another member state of the EU or in relation to projects or programmes of EU interest, if a non-EU resident directly or indirectly acquires a domestic company or a stake in a domestic company.
The decision to clear or prohibit the investment depends on factors such as whether the domestic company recipient of the investment operates critical infrastructure, provides cloud computing services, holds a licence for providing telematics infrastructure components or is a company of the media industry which contributes to the formation of public opinion.
Similarly, under Article L. 151-2 of the French Financial and Monetary Code (Code Monétaire et Financier), the establishment and liquidation of foreign investments in France may be subject to prior authorisation if considered appropriate to protect national interests.
Furthermore, under Article L. 151-3, a foreign investment in France which relates to the exercise of public authority, to activities likely to jeopardise the public order, public safety or national defence interests, or to the production or marketing of arms, munitions, or explosive powders or substances, is subject to prior approval by the Minister of economic affairs.
EU member states such as Germany or France require foreign investors to file an application for authorisation or notify the competent authority for the purposes of assessing the effect on public order or security of the investment in question.
Under Section 55a of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, the conclusion of a contract governed by the law of obligations on the acquisition of a domestic company by a non-EU citizen must be reported to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in writing or electronically without delay following the conclusion of the contract. The report shall provide information about the acquisition, the acquirer and the domestic company to be acquired and the shareholding structures of the acquirer. It shall also describe the main features of the fields of business in which the acquirer and the domestic company to be acquired are active.
Pursuant to Article L.151-3, foreign investments likely to affect national interests are subject to an authorisation requirement (see response 6.2 Agencies Enforcing Investment Security Measures). Furthermore, Article L. 151-3-1 of the French Financial and Monetary Code foresees that when an investment has been carried out without prior authorisation, the Minister of economic affairs may order the investor in question to file an application for the authorisation of that investment.
EU member states such as Germany and France foresee exemptions from investment security measures in cases of transactions concluded by companies belonging to the same group or controlled by the same entity.
For instance, under Section 65 of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, the investment assessment would not take place if the transaction leading to the acquisition of a domestic company is concluded between companies whose shares are held in full by the same controlling company and all contracting parties have their headquarters located in the same third country.
Similarly, under Article 151-7 of the French Financial and Monetary Code, foreign investors are exempt from the obligation to file the application for authorisation in cases where the investment is made between entities belonging to the same group, where the investor exceeds 25% of the voting rights in the capital of an entity over which it has previously acquired control, or if the investor acquires control of an entity over which it has previously exceeded the threshold of 25% of the voting rights.
The infringement of provisions governing investment security mechanisms can be subject to criminal and administrative sanctions.
For instance, Section 80 of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance categorises as criminal offences the unlawful exercise of voting rights by an acquirer or the disclosure of company-related information in violation of Section 59a of the same Ordinance.
Pursuant to Article 151-3-2 of the French Financial and Monetary Code, a failure to comply with investment security requirements may lead to the imposition of financial penalties.
Under the national law of each EU member state, foreign investors may be asked to cover certain costs arising from the authorisation procedure of their investments.
For instance, under Section 59 of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, the costs of reports produced by independent experts assessing the foreign investors’ compliance with certain commitments or obligations are borne by the parties subject to those obligations.
On 5 April 2022, the Commission published guidance for member states on assessing and preventing threats to EU security and public order from Russian and Belarusian investments. In light of the war between Russia and the Ukraine, the guidance underlines the importance of systematically checking and closely scrutinising FDI by Russian and Belarusian investors. The guidance further calls for close co-operation between member states’ competent authorities and other stakeholders.
On 1 June 2022, the Belgian federal and regional governments concluded a Co-operation Agreement implementing a general FDI screening regime which would apply to all non-EU companies wishing to invest in Belgium in certain strategic sectors. The Co-operation Agreement would apply to direct investments by foreign investors that can have effects on security, public order or strategic interests of Belgium’s regions and communities. The proposed framework is expected to enter into force on 1 January 2023.
On 17 May 2022, the Netherlands adopted the Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions Security Screening Act, which introduces a mandatory and suspensory national security regime, applicable equally to Dutch and foreign investors. The Act will enter into force retroactively as of 8 September 2020.
On 2 August 2022, Ireland published the Screening of Third Country Transactions Bill and an accompanying Explanatory Memo. Once enacted, this Bill creates a new mandatory FDI screening regime for third country investments in Ireland in full alignment with Regulation 2019/452.
Furthermore, within the last 12 months, several member states have denied authorisations to foreign investments due to national security concerns.
Several EU member states have had consultative or legislative processes, which are expected to result in updates to an existing mechanism or the adoption of a new national investment screening regime.
The EU has very strict controls on state aid which are set out in the TFEU. State aids are allowed only in strictly defined circumstances to pursue particular public policies, such as environmental protection, the strengthening of SMEs, or regional development. The EU state aid rules aim at protecting fair competition on the domestic market and not at reducing imports or encouraging domestic production.
The EU and its member states have special legislation on product (safety) standards. The European standardisation organisations (ESOs) and national standardisation organisations have also adopted ample standards for products and services.
EU standards and technical requirements are adopted in order to guarantee a certain level of quality, safety and reliability of goods and services and do not aim to reduce imports and/or encourage domestic production.
The EU has high, strict and comprehensive sanitary and phytosanitary legislation – for example:
The aim of the EU sanitary and phytosanitary measures is to reduce or eliminate the possible risks of animal, plant and public health threats, as well as animal and plant diseases being introduced into the EU by goods coming from non-EU countries. They are not aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production.
The matter is not applicable in this jurisdiction.
The matter is not applicable in this jurisdiction.
The matter is not applicable in this jurisdiction.
In the EU, product names can be granted a geographical indication (GI) if they have a specific link to the place where they are made. The GI recognition enables consumers to trust and distinguish quality products while also helping producers to market their products better. Products that are under consideration or have been granted GI recognition are listed in quality products registers. The registers also include information on the geographical and production specifications for each product.
Other EU quality schemes emphasise the traditional production process or products made in difficult natural areas such as mountains or islands.
The EU is also one of the main supporters of negotiations on geographical indications in the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda and negotiates bilateral GI protection rules with its trading partners.
The purpose of the EU quality policy and GI protection measures is to protect the names of specific products to promote their unique characteristics and does not aim at reducing imports from third countries and/or encouraging domestic production.
All relevant issues and recent developments have been detailed above. Please refer to the EU Trends & Developments chapter of this guide for more information.
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An important priority for the EU has been the development of an EU trade policy built around the concept of “open strategic autonomy”. The EU has put a strong emphasis on developing new instruments to broaden and strengthen the EU’s trade toolkit. This article discusses key developments and pending changes relating to trade agreements, customs, sanctions, exports, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures and investment security in the Law & Practice chapter in this guide. However, the EU is developing new regulation in other areas, which is expected to have a significant impact on trade flows. The following sections discuss the most important trade policy developments of the past year.
International Procurement Instrument
On 23 June 2022, the Union adopted the International Procurement Instrument (IPI). The IPI establishes new procurement rules for non-EU participants in EU tenders. Access by non-EU companies to the EU procurement market is subject to a principle of reciprocity. With the IPI, the EU aims to counterbalance norms in other jurisdictions that restrict access of EU companies to their public procurement procedure, such as the US’s Buy America Act, which allows public bodies to prioritise domestic companies, and China’s restrictions on selling goods and services in its domestic market.
Under the IPI, the European Commission (the “Commission”) can carry out investigations into alleged third-country measures against EU companies, goods or services. The Commission can investigate measures, procedures or practices that seriously and recurrently undermine the access of EU goods, services and companies to the third country’s procurement market, either ex officio or upon receipt of a complaint from a member state or interested EU party.
Where, following consultations with the third country in question, the foreign national government still does not allow EU companies to participate in national tenders on an equal footing, the new IPI allows the Commission to adopt one of two measures: adjust the score of bids submitted by operators from the respective third country, or exclude entirely the bids of operators from such third countries. Measures are to be put in place for five years and can be extended, adjusted or replaced with a different IPI measure.
Moreover, successful tenders will not be allowed to subcontract more than 50% of the contract value to undertakings from a third country subject to an IPI measure. Successful tenders must also ensure that goods and services which originate in a third country subject to IPI measures do not represent more than 50% of the contract value. Violations of these obligations may result in a penalty based on the total value of the contract.
The new IPI is structured to minimise the administrative and budgetary burden upon the member states’ contracting authorities and to take into account the specificities of the least developed countries and European small and medium enterprises.
Foreign Subsidies Regulation
On 30 June 2022, the EU institutions reached an agreement on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation.
The Foreign Subsidies Regulation aims at tackling third country subsidies that distort the internal market. It contains three new tools for the Commission:
The latter gives the Commission the ex officio power to investigate financial contributions granted by non-EU governments to companies active in the EU. When assessing foreign subsidies, the Commission carries out a balancing test between the negative effects of market distortions and any positive effects of the subsidisation. If the Commission finds that the financial contributions constitute distortive subsidies, it will be able to impose measures to redress their distortive effects, including structural or behavioural remedies, such as the divestment of certain assets or the denial of access to infrastructure.
A major limitation of the proposal as drafted by the Commission is that it appears to prevent sectors that produce goods from using the new tool to the extent they also have other remedies available to them (eg, trade defence instruments). There are also concerns about evidentiary burdens and the wide discretion of the Commission.
Anti-coercion Instrument
In December 2021, the Commission pledged to develop an EU mechanism to combat coercive measures. The new instrument aims to counter any activities of non-EU countries which unduly interfere in the political decisions of the EU and/or its member states. Such coercive practices, including threats of coercion, can take the form of existing laws or unwritten policies and affect all policy areas. The proposed Regulation would give the Commission the power to impose trade, investment or other restrictive measures against non-EU countries under pressure in certain coercive situations.
The European Parliament adopted its amendments to the proposal in October 2022 and the Council agreed on a common negotiating position in November 2022. The Parliament and Council now have to enter negotiations to find a common position on the proposed Regulation.
The Parliament extended the scope of the proposed Regulation to include measures to repair the injury caused by economic coercion, where appropriate, and introduced binding deadlines to avoid procedural delays. The Council’s position cuts back the Commission’s authority in favour of the EU member states. For instance, the Council proposes the action of a qualified majority of member states be needed to determine whether coercion exists and whether response measures are to be adopted.
Under the ACI, the Commission is empowered to sanction economic coercion by third countries with response measures, including for instance tariff suspensions, restrictions to the public procurement market, restrictions on foreign direct investment and restrictions on the provision of (financial) services. These response measures are to be a measure of last resort, to be imposed only when negotiations with the third country do not bring a satisfactory result.
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
In July 2021, the Commission introduced its proposal for an EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which is one of the key elements of the EU “Fit for 55” policy package to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 and ultimately to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.
The proposed CBAM is a novel trade measure, which would require importers to pay a carbon levy on certain products. The CBAM would initially target imports of highly carbon-intensive products to prevent the negation of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts through imports of products manufactured in non-EU countries, where climate change policies are less ambitious than in the EU. CBAM is also intended to prevent the relocation of EU production to such countries.
CBAM is designed to function in parallel with the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), to mirror and complement its functioning on imported goods. It is intended to gradually replace the existing EU mechanisms to address the risk of carbon leakage, in particular the free allocation of EU ETS allowances.
In a first phase, the proposed CBAM would apply to imports from non-EU countries in five energy-intensive sectors: iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers and electricity. From January 2026, the CBAM would be fully applicable.
The trilogue negotiations on the final text of the CBAM Regulation have been ongoing since 11 July 2022 and are expected to be finalised by the end of 2022.
General System of Preferences
The current EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation is set to expire by the end of 2023. On 22 September 2021, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal for the GSP Regulation for the period 2024-2034. According to the Commission proposal, the GSP system would be continued with some improvements of the key features. The Commission wants to adapt the scheme to the needs and challenges of GSP countries, and to strengthen the scheme’s social, environmental and climate aspects.
After examining the Commission’s legislative proposal for a new GSP Regulation, the Parliament decided to open inter-institutional negotiations in June 2022. The proposed Regulation requires the approval of the Parliament and the Council through the ordinary legislative procedure.
Waste Shipment Regulation
In November 2021, the Commission adopted a proposal for a new Waste Shipment Regulation (WSR). The WSR sets out a procedure of prior written notification and consent for shipments of waste. The current version of the Regulation dates back to 2006.
The proposal would (i) establish new rules for EU waste exports, (ii) make it easier to transport waste for recycling or re-use in the EU and (iii) set out new measures to better tackle illegal waste shipments. The revision of the WSR thereby implements commitments made in the European Green Deal, the Circular Economy Plan and the Zero Pollution Action Plan.
Under the proposed revisions, different rules would apply to exports of waste from the EU to OECD countries and non-OECD countries. Exporting companies would have to carry out independent audits for all waste exports from the EU. The rationale of the new rules is that the EU should not export its pollution abroad and that waste needs to be treated in a sustainable way, both within and outside the EU.
Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence
In February 2022, the Commission published a proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence. The proposal aims to foster sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour throughout global value chains.
The proposal requires large EU and non-EU companies with a considerable turnover in the EU to set up mandatory due diligence practices to identify, prevent or mitigate, and ultimately eliminate adverse human rights and environmental impacts of their corporate activities. In addition, this proposal introduces a specific climate change obligation and further clarifies the duty of care of directors in relation to sustainability issues. The Commission’s proposal thereby aims to promote sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour and to anchor human rights and environmental considerations in companies’ operations, value chains and corporate governance.
The Council and Parliament are to adopt a position on the Commission proposal. In the Parliament, various committees are working on the proposal, and the Parliament is likely to propose stricter requirements on companies. Currently, only a handful of member states have due diligence rules in place.
Forced Labour Products Regulation
On 14 September 2022, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation on products made with forced labour. The Commission proposes to ban from the European market, goods produced in third countries or in the EU through human rights abuses.
The proposal foresees that national authorities would conduct an investigation in cases where there is a substantiated risk of forced labour being used. After national authorities identify a risk of forced labour being used based on various sources, an investigation may include requests for information and on-site inspections. Where an investigation establishes that goods are produced using forced labour, the national authorities will order the removal of the goods from the EU market and the customs authorities will refuse entry to such goods at the EU border. The proposal also foresees that the national authorities may conclude the investigation based on facts available, in cases where the foreign companies or third countries fail to co-operate. National authorities will co-ordinate their work on the basis of Guidelines from the Commission and exchanges in a new EU Forced Labour Product Network.
The proposal still needs to be discussed in the Parliament and the Council. Once agreed upon, the proposed Regulation would enter into force 24 months after its publication.
Deforestation-Free Products Regulation
On 17 November 2021, the EU published a legislative proposal for a Regulation on deforestation-free products. The proposal aims to reduce deforestation by setting targets for commodities linked to a high risk of deforestation, such as soy, beef, palm oil or coffee. The Regulation covers products (i) produced for use in the EU (domestic products), (ii) released for free circulation on the EU market (custom-cleared imports) and (iii) produced in the EU for export (exports).
The proposal imposes due diligence requirements on operators and large traders to prove their products are not linked to deforestation or forest degradation. It also requires the disclosure of information about supply chains and reporting on measures to avoid deforestation. SMEs would be subject to less stringent requirements under the proposed Regulation.
Both the Council and the Parliament have presented their positions on the proposal. Whereas the Council wants to narrow the scope, the Parliament proposes to expand the reach of the instrument in terms of products concerned, number of obligations on companies and ecosystems covered. Trilogue negotiations to finalise the Regulation on deforestation-free products are expected to start around the end of 2022.
Conclusion
In sum, in 2022, the EU started or continued various initiatives that aim at creating a more level and sustainable international playing field for EU industries. For many, further revisions will be needed to allow them to have a significant impact and for all of them, it will be important that these tools are implemented, interpreted and applied in a manner that allows them to address unfair trading practices both effectively and efficiently.
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