Private Equity 2021 Comparisons

Despite the 15 months of restrictions in the economy, M&A activity in Poland has endured. According to the "M&A Index Poland" prepared by Navigator Capital and Fordata, the second quarter of 2021 recorded as many as 82 M&A transactions, improving on the result of the first quarter by six transactions. TMT is constantly the leading sector among target companies, as with the acquisition of the Polish company Edipresse Polska by Burda Media Polska. Due to the development of the pandemic, the key drivers for Burda to acquire Edipresse Polska were the acceleration of the company's digital transformation and the growing importance of internet services, which have become a more widespread trend. Entrepreneurs are increasingly looking for technological solutions that will accelerate their development and improve customer and supply-chain interactions. 

As mentioned in 1.1 M&A Transactions and Deals, most of the M&A activity in 2021 occurred in the TMT, industrial and fast-moving consumer goods sectors. According to the "M&A Index Poland" prepared by Navigator Capital and Fordata, private equity funds were responsible for 12% of all transactions and their activity increased in comparison to 2020. It is worth mentioning that in 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Polish government introduced limitations on foreign direct investments to protect certain sectors that are considered crucial to public welfare and security (energy, gas, fuel, telecommunications, chemicals, IT, certain food production, etc) from foreign acquisition, which is still in force in 2021. Despite the regulation, there has not been a noticeable decrease in M&A activity in these sectors. 

Legal developments in the last year in Poland were not specifically tailored to influence PE funds, but rather, pertained to all commercial companies. The changes introduced focused mostly on facilitating day-to-day operations and on those adhering to the European guidelines requiring more transparency in company shareholding structures. 

Facilitations in Corporate Governance Matters

The Polish government introduced legislation enabling all Polish companies to hold virtual or hybrid meetings of their management and supervisory boards as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. In particular, the adoption of circular resolutions by management and supervisory boards enables all shareholders in Polish companies to participate electronically in shareholders' meetings and supervisory board meetings. The new rules have had a positive impact on the digitalisation of M&A processes in general and on private equity transactions in particular, and they enable the parties to substitute physical meetings with new technologies. 

Another step towards digitalisation was undertaken by the policymakerson 1 July 2021. From that date, all motions to register changes concerning companies entered into the commercial register can only be submitted electronically. 

Dematerialisation of Shares

On 1 January 2021, new legislation came into force requiring all joint-stock companies and limited joint-stock partnerships in Poland to perform an obligatory dematerialisation of their shares – ie, share certificates in paper form were replaced with electronic records of shares and recorded in an electronic shareholder register or in a securities depository, whereby only persons recorded therein are considered shareholders of the relevant company. For private equity entities, the dematerialisation of shares and the existence of an obligatory shareholder register disclosing all shareholders means more transparency and less anonymity with respect to the identity of shareholder(s) in these companies.

The primary regulators that are or may be relevant to private equity funds and transactions in Poland are the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumenta) and the Council of Ministers.

There are no particular regulations that specifically address or discriminate against private equity transactions. However, certain areas impose restrictions, depending on the identity of the buyer.

Foreign Direct Investments

Foreign direct investments in Poland are covered by the Act of 24 July 2015 on the Control of Certain Investments ("the Act"), which provides the rules and procedures for the control of certain investments, resulting in the acquisition or achievement of a significant participation in, or the acquisition of a dominant position over, entities operating in strategic sectors. Pursuant to the Act, a buyer is required to notify the president of the Competition Office when it acquires shares and/or reaches a significant participation or dominance threshold in a strategic company.

Acquisition of Real Estate

Foreign buyers are subject to restrictions with respect to the direct or indirect acquisition of real estate in Poland. Such transactions require a permit issued by the Ministry of Interior and Administration, without which the transaction is deemed null and void.

Antitrust Regulations

Merger control is carried out by the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection. The authorities must be notified of a concentration of businesses in the following cases: 

• if the combined global turnover of the entrepreneurs involved in the concentration exceeds the equivalent of EUR1 billion in the financial year preceding the year of notification; or
• if the combined turnover in the territory of the Republic of Poland of the entrepreneurs involved in the concentration exceeds the equivalent of EUR50 million in the financial year preceding the year of notification.

A concentration of businesses does not need to be notified to the authorities, if, inter alia:

• the turnover of the takeover target in Poland did not exceed the equivalent of EUR10 million (in either of the two years preceding the year of notification); or
• the turnover of either of the companies that are merging did not exceed the equivalent of EUR10 million in Poland (in either of the two years preceding the year of notification).

A decision of the authorities either granting or not granting consent to the merger is usually issued within one month of the notification.

Due diligence is usually conducted in a virtual data room maintained by the seller. The due diligence process usually takes from two to six weeks, after which a red-flag report is prepared. The level of due diligence is often limited to a monetary threshold, which is determined based on the size of the transaction. If a monetary threshold is applied, certain agreements or disputes with a value lower than the threshold are not analysed during the due diligence process. 

In private equity transactions it is typical to focus on the following key areas. 

• Corporate:
1. confirming the title to shares;
2. review of the articles of association and/or other incorporation documentation; and
3. review of the validity of the appointment of the corporate bodies.
• Finance:
1. review of the financial statements; 
2. assess the risk of insolvency; and 
3. review of the financing arrangements and credit agreements.
• Assets:
1. confirming the title to real estate and/or review of lease agreements; and
2. review of held IP and IT.
• Commercial and business:
1. review of commercial agreements, eg, with key customers and suppliers, including a review of whether "change of control" clauses are included; and
2. compliance with GDPR.
• Employment:
1. review of the employment agreement templates and employment agreements with key employees; and
2. review of whether employees are employed based on civil law contracts rather than employment contracts, and assessing the risk of the re-qualification of civil law contracts into employment contracts.
• Litigation and regulatory:
1. review of pending and potential litigation issues; and
2. regulatory checks, particularly a review of the validity and conditions of the licences, consents and approvals necessary for the business.

In Poland, vendor due diligence or a fact book has been a common feature for private equity sellers. The seller usually prepares an information memorandum and conducts vendor due diligence or prepares a legal fact book (instead of a vendor due diligence report), which is shared with the bidders in the data room. Advisers usually require non-reliance from bidders on any vendor due diligence reports. Reliance is given to buy-side diligence reports, with the reservation that it is given to documentation that was provided by the seller and reviewed in the data room.

Most acquisitions by private equity funds in Poland are made by private treaty sale and purchase agreement. In medium and large transactions, the parties usually start the transaction by signing a framework or conditional agreement that stipulates the conditions precedent required for the signing of the final agreement. After the fulfilment of the conditions precedent, the final agreement signed at closing effectively transfers ownership. 

The terms of the acquisition do not differ between a privately negotiated transaction and an auction sale, although, in practice, auction sales with multiple potential buyers are closed in a shorter period of time, due to fewer negotiation rounds and tighter timeframes often being required by the seller.

In a transaction with a private equity-backed buyer, the private equity entity behind the buyer is often involved in the negotiations of the acquisition or sale documentation. The final agreement whereby the buyer acquires the target is usually signed only by the buyer and the seller. Involvement of the private equity entity is then reflected in additional documentation, such as the amendment of the articles of association, or the management and supervisory board by-laws.

The method of financing private equity deals depends particularly on the structure of the deal, the tax environment, the industry of the target, the deal volume and the reputation of the relevant private equity fund on the market. Private equity deals in Poland are usually financed by bank loans and, to a lesser extent, by funds from a private equity-backed buyer. It is common for smaller acquisitions to be financed via shareholder loans.

Sellers seek certainty of funds from private equity-backed buyers by way of guarantees and security packages, such as:

• registered pledges;
• financial pledges;
• submission to enforcement; and
• assignment of receivables.

In most private equity deals, the private equity fund holds a majority stake in the target. A minority stake is usually held by a shelf group company of the PE fund. PE funds holding minority stakes in targets are not very common, although such structures have been seen in targets with regulated revenue streams.

Deals involving a consortium of private equity sponsors or co-investment by other investors alongside the private equity fund are not common in Poland. Although deals involving a multiple investor structure are common where targets are acquired on a global level, the predominant target sizes in Poland are medium or small.

Generally, the use of locked-box mechanisms and completion accounts is approximately equal. In recent years the preference for a locked-box mechanism increased in the Polish market, especially among private equity funds, but due to the value uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 crisis, completion accounts have regained their popularity. The combination of a locked-box mechanism or completion accounts with earn-outs is rarely seen in private equity-driven transactions. The level of protection provided by the private equity fund in relation to various consideration structures does not differ substantially compared to that provided by strategic investors. A locked-box mechanism is customarily combined with anti-leakage provisions on a euro-for-euro indemnification basis, ordinary course of business covenants, and a dispute resolution mechanism with respect to disputes over the leakage amount. Moreover, the use of a warranty insurance policy is common in M&A transactions involving private equity investors. Such insurance, aimed at covering losses suffered by the policyholder in the case of a successful claim for breach of certain representations by the seller, is usually implemented by the private equity buyer (who can deduct the cost of the insurance from the purchase price). However, an increasing number of private equity sellers use warranty insurance policies, in order to limit buyer recourse against them.

As the value of leakage may be difficult to identify or quantify, buyers may consider imposing interest charged on a non-permitted leakage. Nevertheless, it is rare for such clauses to make it into the final agreement.

Although locked-box transactions are, overall, less likely to end in a legal dispute than completion account transactions (typically, disputes related to the locked-box mechanism come down to a disagreement over whether or not leakage has occurred), it is common to see a dispute resolution mechanism in place for both structures. While there are substantial differences between both structures, the dispute resolution mechanism is usually similar: firstly, the parties decide to refer their dispute to an independent expert, and such an expert view is only required once proceedings become final and the parties are still in disagreement, within the context of a formal arbitration proceeding.

Conditionality is typically limited to legally mandatory minimum conditions. Although private equity parties prefer the signing and closing of a transaction to be simultaneous (in cases where there are no regulatory obligations to satisfy beforehand), more complex transactions are usually subject to closing conditions, which may include, among others, the following: 

• holding all necessary corporate assemblies to validation of the transaction;
• the delivery of all corporate, government and regulatory consents and permits for the transaction (including merger clearance); and
• providing the buyer with all necessary third-party consents (to the extent they are required on the basis of change-of-control clauses included in the target's contracts).

The fulfilment of these listed conditions is usually required before signing.

"Hell or high water" undertakings require a buyer to take all action necessary to secure approval from competition authorities, and they are rarely seen in private equity transactions in Poland. Buyers are more likely to agree on a prompt filing commitment, keeping the seller informed about the merger clearance process, and consulting with the seller when needed in order to co-operate with antitrust authorities. 

Due to the limited conditionality of private equity transactions in Poland, it is unusual to see a break-fee provision in favour of the buyer in an acquisition agreement. The same applies to a reverse break fee in favour of the seller, in case the buyer, for example, breaches the agreement or is unable to consummate the transaction due to a lack of financing. Under Polish law, a break fee may be structured as a contractual penalty (kara umowna) or a payment on a guarantee basis (świadczenie gwarancyjne). Following the ruling of the Supreme Court from 2019, according to which a contractual penalty may not be reserved in a case of withdrawal from a contract due to non-performance of a monetary obligation, it is recommended that the break fee be structured as a payment on a guarantee basis. Moreover, there are no legal limits on such break fees; unlike in the case of contractual penalties, the courts may not reduce the agreed guarantee payment even if the amount of such is considered to be unreasonably high considering the circumstances of the party obliged to pay and the particularities of the transaction.

Under Polish law, there is no typical distinction between signing and closing. An acquisition agreement can be either preliminary in nature (which may be referred to as "signing") and requires the execution of a second final agreement transferring the shares or assets, or it can be final in nature and subject only to the fulfilment of conditions precedent (which may be referred to as "closing"). In preliminary agreements, the parties may freely decide on the circumstances under which it is possible to terminate a transaction after "signing". Termination rights in private equity transactions are usually limited to the maximum extent possible. In addition to the mandatory termination rights (which cannot be excluded by the parties), such as fraud or lack of merger clearance, the parties may envisage termination rights in case of a breach of warranties or covenants in the period between signing and closing, or the occurrence of a material adverse change to the business (although they seldom do).

Allocation of risk is more straightforward in the locked-box structure, as the potential breaches are more transparent and determination of the correct purchase price does not require an expensive audit investigation, as may be the case with respect to completion accounts. Typically, it comes down to the protection of the buyer between signing and closing, by way of ordinary course of business provisions and no leakage provisions and covenants. The process starts with a due diligence exercise, and any identified risk is addressed as either a purchase price adjustment or an indemnity. Specific indemnification for matters such as pre-closing tax liabilities and employment-related liabilities is very common. Seller's indemnification obligations are subject to temporal and/or monetary limitations, if at all. For unknown risks, a representations and warranties regime is put into place. Provisions dealing with the consequences of breaches of representations and warranties typically provide for the limitation of the seller's liability – eg, de minimis (liability is excluded if certain damage amounts are not exceeded), thresholds/basket (claims may be excluded to the extent that the damages being suffered do not exceed in aggregate a certain agreed minimum), or cap (typically related to the amount of the purchase price). Furthermore, it is common for certain damages to be excluded, such as indirect losses or punitive damages.

As a clean exit is preferred in private equity deals, sellers seek to offer almost no representations and warranties. Typically, the private equity seller will provide limited warranties to a buyer on exit regarding legal organisation, solvency and financial standing, employment, material agreements, real property, key assets, litigation and compliance (see 6.8 Allocation of Risk with respect to warranties and indemnities in private equity deals).

Full disclosure against the warranties is a common concept in private equity deals in Poland, but its application depends largely on the specific circumstances, such as the business sector in which the target is operating (eg, in energy-related transactions, a full data room disclosure is widely accepted and is a market standard).

Other protections usually included in the acquisition documentation are title hold-back (legal title transfers only upon the payment of a purchase price), escrow arrangements to secure claims under the agreement, or transaction insurance products. Insurance products have only relatively recently entered the Polish market and have been used in high-volume transactions. Such insurance is increasingly used to cover the gap between the seller's interest in limiting its exposure and achieving a clean exit, and the protection and recourse requirements of the buyer.

Litigation in connection with private equity transactions is not common in the Polish market. It is standard market practice to agree on an arbitration clause in the transaction documents. If litigation does arise, it mostly concerns consideration-related matters (earn-outs, completion accounts, leakage and its value, etc) and breaches of the seller’s warranties.

Public-to-private transactions are not common in Poland. In public-to-private deals, private equity investors are supposed to comply with certain legal obligations, eg, relating to notification obligations. Additionally, mandatory offers apply in certain situations (mainly when thresholds of 33% or 66% are met). Legal requirements connected with such transactions make them very formalised and are consequently quite unpopular on the market. 

In Poland, anyone who reaches, exceeds, holds or falls below a threshold of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 33%, 33.33%, 50%, 75% or 90% of the total number of votes in a public company, is obliged to notify the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (PFSA) and the issuer of such, no later than four business days from the day on which the relevant person learned about the change of the share in the total number of votes or, with due diligence, could have learnt about it. In the case of a change resulting from the acquisition or transfer of the shares of a public company in a transaction concluded on a regulated market or in the alternative trading system, notification must occur no later than six trading session days from the day of executing the transaction.

There are also further notification obligations, as follows:

• in the case of shareholders holding more than 10% of the total number of votes, to the extent there is a change in the share of votes by at least 2% of the total number of votes in the company whose shares are traded on the official stock market; and
• in the case of shareholders holding more than 10% of the total number of votes, to the extent there is a change in the share of votes by at least 5% of the total number of votes in the company whose shares are traded on a regulated market other than the official stock market or in the alternative trading system; and
• in the case of shareholders holding more than 33% of the total number of votes to the extent that there is a change in the share of votes by at least 1% of the total number of votes.

Generally, violation of filing obligations results in the shareholder not being allowed to exercise their voting rights attached to the shares. 

Under Polish law, exceeding the thresholds of 33% or 66% of the total number of votes in a public company (directly or indirectly) is permitted exclusively as a result of a takeover offer (ie, an announcement of an invitation to subscribe to the sale or exchange of shares of this company in a number ensuring the holding of 66% or 100% of the total number of votes).

Exceptions

There are some exceptions to this general rule. For example, the rules specified above do not apply in the event of an acquisition of shares from the state treasury as a result of an initial public offering, or when the shares are purchased from an entity that is a member of the same capital group, or when the purchase is made in bankruptcy or execution proceedings.

Notification Obligations

The management board of the issuer is required to communicate the position concerning the announced takeover offer to the PFSA, and the public, no later than two business days before the day when the acceptance of subscription orders commences.

A takeover offer must be announced after the establishment of a security, the value of which is at least 100% of the value of those shares that are the subject of the takeover offer. The establishment of the security must be documented by a certificate from a bank or other financial institution which provides the security or intermediates in providing it.

A takeover offer must be published via an entity conducting a brokerage activity in Poland, which is required to simultaneously notify both the PFSA and the company operating the regulated market on which the relevant shares are listed of the intention to announce the takeover offer no later than 14 business days before the day when the acceptance of subscription orders commences.

Cash consideration is the most common type of consideration in public takeovers in Poland. However, the bidder may also offer the exchange of shares of another company or other paperless transferable securities carrying the voting rights in the company, for example, as an alternative consideration. 

In general, the share price offered in the takeover offer to subscribe for the sale or exchange of shares may not be lower than the average market price for the period of six or three months (depending on the mandatory offer thresholds) preceding the announcement of the takeover offer, during which time these shares were traded on the basic market, or the average market price for a shorter period if the company shares were traded on the basic market for a shorter period. If it is impossible to determine the price in accordance with share trading value or to the extent that restructuring or bankruptcy proceedings had been opened, the price may not be lower than the fair value price for the shares.

If the average market price of such shares determined pursuant to the general rules specified above significantly deviates from the fair value of the shares, due to particular circumstances (eg, as a result of a price agreed with respect to the pre-emptive rights), the issuer may request the PFSA's consent to propose that the price does not meet the criteria referred to above in the takeover offer. The PFSA may grant its consent if the proposed price is not lower than the fair value of such shares, and if the announcement of such a takeover offer does not infringe the reasonable interests of the shareholders.

Withdrawal

Under Polish law, withdrawal from a takeover bid that has already been announced is prohibited, unless another entity announces an alternative takeover bid for the same shares after the announcement of the first bid. However, withdrawal from a takeover bid for all the remaining shares of that company is only permitted if another bidder announces an alternative takeover bid for all the remaining shares of the issuer at a price that is not lower than the price of the first bid.

Conditional Bids

At the same time, conditional bids are permitted. The bidder may state that the bid will take place only if the issuer concludes a specific agreement, for example, or if the company’s general meeting or supervisory board adopts a certain resolution. Additionally, the takeover offer may be conditional upon reaching the minimum number of shares accepted by the bidders. Commonly, conditions in public bids are a result of legal requirements to apply for certain authorisations or clearances from public authorities – eg, when the takeover is subject to the approval of the competition authority (antitrust clearance). 

Under Polish law, a takeover offer cannot be conditional on the bidder obtaining finance. As specified in 7.3 Mandatory Offer Thresholds, a takeover offer with respect to the sale or exchange of shares can only be made after the establishment of a security at a value corresponding to at least 100% of the value of the shares that are the object of the takeover offer.

Break Fees

Break fees are not regulated under Polish law; although they are not prohibited, they are neither common nor practicable in the Polish market.

If a bidder does not obtain 100% ownership of a target, it can execute a squeeze-out mechanism, which is regulated by law. 

The squeeze-out mechanism applies to a shareholder of a public company that has reached or exceeded 95% of the total number of votes in that company, either on its own or jointly with its subsidiaries or parent undertakings. In such a situation, such a shareholder is entitled to demand that all other (remaining) shareholders sell their shares, within three months of the date of the major shareholder achieving or exceeding the mentioned threshold (compulsory redemption). 

The squeeze-out will be announced following the provision of collateral of no less than 100% of the value of the shares. 

An equivalent to a squeeze-out is a request by a shareholder having 95% or more of the voting rights of a public company to redeem the shares held by another shareholder. The redemption must be claimed within three months of the date on which the mentioned threshold was reached or exceeded. 

It used to be common in Poland to obtain irrevocable commitments from a principal shareholder of a target company by way of concluding an investment agreement or any other equivalent agreement. However, in the last few years, irrevocable commitments have become increasingly uncommon. The market is very seller-friendly, so principal shareholders do not wish to enter into any preliminary agreements that would risk the loss of a higher bid. 

Hostile takeovers are not forbidden in Poland, but are not common. Private equity-backed buyers do not normally engage in hostile takeover offers.

In the case of hostile takeovers, the principle of neutrality applies, which means that, as a rule, the management board of the target company must not implement defensive measures, but it must remain neutral in relation to the bid. Moreover, the articles of association of a public company may stipulate that, in the course of a takeover offer subscribing to the sale or exchange of all remaining shares of the issuer, the management board and the supervisory board of the issuer are obliged to obtain prior consent from the general meeting to undertake any defensive actions aimed at, for example, stopping or blocking the bid. 

Equity incentivisation of the management team is a common feature of private equity transactions in Poland, in order to ensure the smooth operations of the target and the commitment of the management team following the acquisition. 

The management team usually receives a stake in the operational target, as an incentive (usually up to 5% or 10% of the shareholding). Significant shareholding may be granted to the management team if a manager has held their position in the target for a long time and commits to continue holding that position for a period following the acquisition. 

Management participation in Poland is usually structured as sweet equity, meaning that the managers have the possibility of subscribing for shares in the operational target. Depending on the incentive plan and the importance of the position of the manager within the business, the shares may take the form of preference shares, which usually grant their holder preference with respect to:

• voting rights;
• dividend rights; and
• shares in the asset distribution after the target is liquidated.

A manager shareholder is often required to sell their shares when leaving the company. To determine how the manager's shares are valued upon exit, leaver provisions are usually included in the shareholders' agreement. Leaver provisions are typically divided into so-called "good leaver" provisions and "bad leaver" provisions. The first are incentivising mechanisms, while the latter are mechanisms designed to prevent managers from leaving the company before the investors' exit, or from simply not performing. 

When a manager leaves the company as a "good leaver", they can often sell their stake at a fair value or market value. The most common "good leaver" circumstances are:

• retirement;
• termination of the engagement with the company for ordinary or normal reasons, other than breach of duties; and
• death.

If the manager departs the company as a "bad leaver", they will usually be required to sell their shares at a price (which is usually) below the market value. Common "bad leaver" circumstances are:

• termination of the engagement with the company for breach of duties; and
• resignation of the manager before a specified deadline.

Customary restrictive covenants agreed to by manager shareholders are non-compete, non-solicitation, and confidentiality covenants. 

Non-compete clauses can be agreed for the period during the relationship with the company or for a period following the relationship with the company. However, if a manager shareholder is employed by the company under an employment contract, the non-compete covenant pertaining to them is governed by the Polish Labour Code (irrespective of any non-compete provision agreed between the parties). According to the Labour Code, after the employment is terminated, an employer introducing a non-compete clause is required to pay the restricted ex-employee compensation for not being able to perform competitive work, for an amount which is at least 25% of the employee's salary. A non-compete clause can also be used during the employment relationship, although compensation is not mandatory in that case. Legal provisions do not allow a time limit for non-compete obligations. If the manager was employed on a basis other than an employment contract, the provisions of the Labour Code would not apply.

The Polish Commercial Companies Code provides for a squeeze-out only with respect to shareholders of joint-stock companies. It does not provide for a squeeze-out of minority shareholders in limited liability companies, although the articles of association of the limited liability company may provide for the option of buying back the shares of the minority shareholder in certain situations. Typical minority protection for manager shareholders includes tag rights or shares with preference to voting rights. 

The management may also enjoy veto rights, which are usually included in the articles of association of the company and establish a list of matters for which the passing of a resolution must include the vote of the manager or a given quorum or majority.

Generally, private equity funds invest in two main types of companies in Poland: the limited liability company (LLC) and the joint-stock company (JSC). As of 1 July 2021, a new type of company was introduced into the Polish legal system – the simple joint-stock company (SJSC) – but this type of company is not popular in Poland as yet and private equity funds do not invest in SJSC.

Typically, private equity funds acquire full control over the target company. Moreover, some private equity funds decide to become a minority shareholder, especially when they invest in start-up companies (which is possible on the Polish market, irrespective of the maturity of the start-ups), but at the same time they have preference shares with special rights attached to them – eg, preference relating to voting rights, or rights to dividends or to the manner of participation in the distribution of assets upon liquidation of the company. 

The company’s articles of association may specify certain rights of the private equity fund shareholder. Such rights may relate in particular to the right to appoint and recall members of the management board and/or the supervisory board. Sometimes, the articles may grant personal rights to obtain certain benefits from the company, such as a right to use the company's machines or other assets – but such rights are not common with respect to private equity shareholders. 

In many cases, it is not mandatory to install a supervisory board in an LLC, so each shareholder has an individual right of supervision over the company. In a JSC, it is mandatory to appoint a supervisory board. 

It is very common for private equity shareholders to reserve certain key matters as subject to their approval, including the following: 

• amendments or changes to the rights, preferences, privileges or powers granted to the private equity shareholder; 
• increases or decreases in the company’s initial share capital; 
• transfers of shares;
• any act that has the effect of diluting or reducing the effective shareholding of the private equity shareholder;
• mergers or spin-offs involving the target company;
• sales of the company’s enterprise or an organised part thereof; 
• pledging of the company's shares;
• certain types of investments made by the company; and
• approving the company’s business plan.

Generally, shareholders of an LLC or a JSC cannot be held liable for the obligations of the company. The same rule applies to an SJSC. In practice, this means that the shareholders’ risk is limited to their share capital contributions.

However, there are two main exceptions where a shareholder might be indirectly liable for a company’s debts, as follows:

• to the extent to which the shareholder of the LLC is also a member of the management board, such a shareholder may be liable for the company's debts if enforcement/execution against the company proves ineffective; or

• a shareholder of a company in the course of incorporation as an LLC or JSC (so-called company "in organisation") is jointly and severally liable with the persons that acted on behalf of the company up to the amount of the unpaid shareholder contribution.

Private equity shareholders may impose compliance policies on larger portfolio companies. However, introducing compliance policies is not common with respect to smaller companies.

The typical holding period for private equity transactions in Poland is between five and seven years.

The most common type of exit is the sale of the company (company’s shares) to financial investors, including other private equity funds. Sales to strategic investors are also practicable. Exits via IPOs are not common.

Drag rights are typical mechanisms in private equity transactions, and are often exercised where the parties cannot agree jointly on an exit strategy. Such drag rights are typically introduced in shareholders’ agreements and are often incorporated in the articles of association. 

Drag rights can be unconditional, whereby they commonly refer to a specific lock-up period (ie, the drag right can be exercised after a specific period of time), and the drag threshold depends on the agreement between the parties on a case-by-case basis. 

The rule mentioned with respect to drag rights (see 10.2 Drag Rights) also applies to tag rights. There is no uniform practice regarding the exercise of tag rights by the shareholder. This depends on many factors, such as the current valuation of the company. 

In Poland, exit by way of an IPO is not common, and IPOs in general are not common. However, if an IPO exit does take place, the lock-up periods of the private equity seller apply and relate to a certain portion of the shares and/or specific time limitations following the IPO (eg, from one to two years after the IPO).